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Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and
Anti-Racist Politics
DARREN LENARD HUTCHINSONt
INTRODUCTION
A fiery dissent rages within the body of identity politics
and civil rights theory. The participants in this discourse
have lodged fundamental (as well as controversial) charges.
Most frequently, these critics argue that the enormous
cadre of political activists, progressive lawyers and legal
theorists engaged in the particulars of challenging social
inequality lack even a basic understanding of how the var-
ious forms of subordination operate in society because they
fail (or refuse) to realize that systems of oppression do not
stand in isolation.! Furthermore, these critics have argued
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1. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal
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that anti-oppression scholars and, activists actually rep-
licate social hierarchy in their scholarship and activism
because they render invisible and subordinate already mar-
ginalized individuals.2 The specific contestations of which I
speak began to assume an organized form at various points
in the late twentieth century. During the post-civil rights
era,3 the "second wave" of feminism, and after the ascen-
Theory out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1991) ("As we look at...
patterns of oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly,
that all forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing.");
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242
(1991) (arguing that "[fleminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and
antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently
proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on
mutually exclusive terrains"); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology
and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1090 (1996) ("It is
crucial to recognize that various forms of oppression... are intertwined.
Oppressions of gender intersect with other oppressions, including those of race,
sexuality, class and ethnicity."); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 375
(discussing "interlocking system of oppression based on race and gender that
operates to the detriment of all women and all blacks"); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 374 (1995) (observing that "oppressions of various sorts always
interlock because popular prejudice travels in multiples").
2. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
874 (1990) ("A theory that purports to isolate gender as a basis for
oppression... reinforces other forms of oppression."); Trina Grillo & Stephanie
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Com-
parisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 401
(arguing that feminist theory "perpetuates patterns of racial domination" by,
among other things, centralizing "white issues" and "rendering women of color
invisible"); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of
Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561,
637 (1997) ("[Bly marginalizing issues of race and class, gay and lesbian essen-
tialism replicates patterns of social exclusion-racism, sexism, economic oppres-
sion, people of color, women, and the poor remain irrelevant.").
3. See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINIsM 94-99
(1981) (criticizing homophobic and sexist ideologies of leaders of 1960s civil
rights movement); Audre Lorde, Learning From the 60s, in SISTER OUTSIDER:
ESSAYS AND SPEECHES (1984) (same); see also Cathy J. Cohen, Contested Mem-
bership: Black Gay Identities and the Politics of AIDS, in QUEER
THEORY/SOCIOLOGY 369 (Steven Seidman ed., 1996) (arguing that many racial
civil rights organizations dissolved over divisions surrounding identity politics).
4. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF
BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 307-09 (analyzing black critiques of
feminism during the second wave of feminism). Although similar critiques were
made during the first wave of feminism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and
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dancy of "gay and lesbian" politics in the 1970s,5 activists
and scholars within these social movements began to con-
test the very language used to define and describe oppres-
sion and the multiple identity categories around which so-
cial power and disempowerment are distributed. Driven by
personal experience6 and the demonstrated failure of "tradi-
tional" policies and theories,7 "outsiders" within progressive
political movements mounted substantial "internal cri-
tiques" of what they perceived as the essentialist and con-
stricted nature of these movements. Women of color and
supportive white feminists, for example, argued that femi-
nism and anti-racism obscured or ignored issues relevant to
women of color who face both racist and patriarchal oppres-
sion and that these political discourses, consequently,
reflected the political and social positions of white women
and men of color.9 Likewise, lesbian theorists and activists
Essentialism in Feminist Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586-87 (1990), those of
the second wave were more formalized.
5. Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture:
Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER
POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 118 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (discussing
divisions between gay men and lesbians during the 1970s and 1980s over the
ex-clusion of feminism and lesbian issues from gay politics) [hereinafter FEAR OF
A QUEER PLANET].
6. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 365 (developing critique of anti-discrimination
law using personal experiences as a black woman); Margaret Montoya,
Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grefias: Un /Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina
Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994) (developing
critique of legal discourse using personal experiences as a Latina).
7. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539 (criticizing
anti-discrimination law for failing to account for the experiences of black
women); Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1241 (criticizing domestic violence policies
for ineffectively assisting women of color); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence
Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and
Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994) (criticizing domestic
violence policies for ineffectively assisting Latinas); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying
Culture: Asian American Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 57 (1994) (criticizing failure of criminal law to protect adequately the
interests of Asian American women).
8. In this Article, "essentialism," unless otherwise noted, refers to efforts to
define a social group as unitary despite its members' diverse, as opposed to
"essential," experiences. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle:
Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
639, 640-41 n.4 (1993); Harris, supra note 4, at 584.
9. This scholarship now stands as an extensive and formidable body of
literature. See, e.g., GIDDINGS, supra note 4; HOOKS, supra note 3; BELL HOOKS,
FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); BELL HOOKS, YEARNING:
RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS (1991); MAKING WAvES: AN ANTHOLOGY
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countered the respective "maleness" and "heteronormativ-
ity"10 of gay and lesbian politics and feminism, demanding
greater visibility for lesbian issues within these social
movements." More recently, and with greater frequency,
gay and lesbian people of color and other commentators
have begun to develop a systematic critique of antiracism
and gay and lesbian politics, challenging participants in
these movements to recognize that they marginalize gays
and lesbians of color and reify racism and sexual subordin-
ation in their activism and theories."
OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN (Asian Women United of
California ed., 1989) [hereinafter MAKING WAVES]; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
MICHELLE WALLACE, BLACK MACHO AND THE MYTH OF THE SUPERWOMAN (1979);
Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003; Caldwell, supra note 1; Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U.
CI. LEGAL F. 139; Montoya, supra note 6; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); see generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed. 1997) (anthology of representative works).
10. "Heteronormativity" describes the "normalcy" of heterosexuality. In a
heterosexist society, heterosexuality serves as the transparent norm that
shapes ideology, politics, culture and social relations. See Michael Warner,
Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, supra note 5, at xxi ("Het[erosexual]
culture thinks of itself as the elemental form of human association, as the very
model of inter-gender relations, as the indivisible basis of all community and as
the means of reproduction without which society wouldn't exist."). For a general
discussion of heteronormativity in social theory, see id. at xxi-xxv.
11. On the historical conflicts between lesbians and gay men within the
context of "gay" politics see Seidman, supra note 5, at 111-12, 118; MARTIN
DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 247-50 (1993); Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective,
Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43,
60 (1994) (citing Charlotte Bunch, Not for Lesbians Only, in BUILDING FEMINIST
THEORY: ESSAYS FROM QUEST 67, 68 (1981)). For a discussion of political
skirmishes between heterosexual women and lesbians within the feminist
movement, see Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orienta-
tion: Toward Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 183,
187-88 (1995); SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE SPINSTER AND HER ENEMIES: FEMINISM AND
SEXUALITY 1880-1930 at 111 (1985); DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON,
LESBIAN/WOMAN 274-76 (1972); LESBIANISM AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
(Nancy Myron & Charlotte Bunch eds., 1975).
12. For an extensive compilation of works in this area see Hutchinson,
supra note 2, at 563-64 n.12. See also Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer
Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics
of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1314 (1997) (noting emergence
of racial critiques of gay and lesbian politics and legal theory).
1999] IGNORING SEXUALIZATION OF RACE 5
On a simple, minimally deconstructive level, one might
construe the various internal critiques of progressive social
movements as seeking only a recognition of the diversity
within the populations of marginalized communities. Such
a limited interpretation, though correct on one level, would
be inaccurate because the majority of these critiques pursue
two deeper, more compelling goals. First, the critiques seek
to reveal the ways in which "dominant" members of prog-
ressive social movements monopolize the political appara-
tuses of these movements and create hegemonic agendas
that reflect their own self-interests and that fail to respond
to the needs of less visible and less powerful populations
within these "communities."" Second, the critiques attempt
to alter fundamentally the ways in which political activists,
academics, lawmakers, courts and the broader society con-
ceptualize social identity categories and oppression." Speci-
fically, the internal critiques have as a collective goal the
formation of more complex, rather than narrow and essen-
tializing, paradigms for responding to issues of social in-
equity. Accordingly, these critiques have argued that civil
rights law and politics should develop "multiple conscious-
ness,'16 "intersectional,"'7 "holistic"8 and "multidimension-
al" models for responding to the diverse harms faced by
members of oppressed communities, many of whom endure
multiple forms of oppression which traditional, narrow
models fail to (indeed, cannot) take into account.
This Article examines the newest, most undeveloped
branch of the internal critiques-the emerging race-sexu-
13. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
14. See sources cited supra note 1.
15. See sources cited supra note 1; see generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Beyond the Rhetoric of "Dirty Laundry". Examining the Value of Internal Criti-
cism Within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed Communities, MICH.
J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 1999).
16. See Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Conscious-
ness As Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 297 (1989); Harris,
supra note 4, at 586.
17. See Crenshaw, supra note 1; Crenshaw, supra note 9.
18. See Elvia Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Le-
gal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 139-41 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 636-44; see also Berta Esperanza
Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads:
Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25' COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 369, 432-33
(1994); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Borders (E)ngendered: Normativi-
ties, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 920-26 (1997);
infra Part II.A.1.
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ality critiques of anti-racism and gay and lesbian dis-
courses. Although gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered
people of color have for decades been critical of anti-racist,
gay and lesbian, and feminist politics, ° the most sustained
and comprehensive writings and other manifestations of
this criticism have appeared in the late 1980s and the
1990s, a time in which the "feminist of color" and "lesbian
feminist" internal critiques were nearly established, if not
entrenched.2' Furthermore, much of this literature has been
produced by scholars and activists outside of the legal
academy.22 Thus, the race-sexuality critiques have not yet
constructed a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which
anti-racist and gay and lesbian legal discourses, respec-
tively, marginalize issues of heterosexism and racial
oppression. Nevertheless, a measurable body of works in
this field have begun to reveal and question the hetero-
normative nature of traditional race scholarship, critical
race theory and racial politics and has criticized gay and
lesbian legal scholarship and activism for reinforcing racial
hierarchy and marginalizing people of color.23
My analysis expands the emergent race-sexuality
critiques and my own ongoing analysis of racial and sexual
oppression24 by directing the focus of this critical scholar-
ship to anti-racist legal theory and political discourse. My
20. As Steven Seidman notes, many of the women of color who criticized
feminist essentialism during the second wave of feminism were lesbians; their
critiques also "implicated the lesbian community in the race issue." Seidman,
supra note 5, at 118. For a sampling of early race-sexuality critiques, see
LORDE, An Open Letter to Mary Daly, in SISTER OUTSIDER, supra note 3, at 66;
Barbara Smith & Beverly Smith, Across the Kitchen Table: A Sister to Sister
Dialogue, in THis BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF
COLOR 113, 120-23 (Cherrfe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfia eds., 1981).
21. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1314 (discussing recent emergence of race-
sexuality critiques).
22. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 563 (observing that "concerns" of race-
sexuality criticism "remain largely outside of traditional legal fora").
23. See sources cited supra note 12. I do not wish, however, to overstate the
size of this movement, which yet growing, remains relatively small.
24. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are:
Black Gays and Lesbians, Racial Politics, and the Million Man March, in BLACK
MEN ON RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER (Devon Carbado ed.)
(forthcoming 1999) (examining efforts to "integrate" black and gay identities
and criticizing heteronormativity in black politics); Hutchinson, supra note 2
(criticizing essentialism and subordination of the poor and people of color in gay
and lesbian politics and legal theory); Hutchinson, supra note 15 (examining
the contributions of race-sexuality and other forms of internal criticism to
progressive legal discourse).
[Vol. 47
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mission here is to raise and engage, in the context of anti-
racism, the compelling observations of the various internal
critiques of identity politics. Accordingly, this Article en-
deavors to demonstrate that anti-racist scholars often ex-
hibit a misunderstanding of (or a lack of concern for) the
relationship between racial oppression and other forms of
subordination, particularly heterosexism and patriarchy,
and that they often perpetuate heterosexism and margin-
alize gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of
color in their work. As an empirical setting for discussing
these claims, this Article examines the social problem of
systemic violence against oppressed social groups, the anti-
racist and legal responses to this violence, and more gener-
alized discussions of heterosexism and gay and lesbian
equality within anti-racist discourse and critical race
theory.
The problem of violence against oppressed social groups
provides an excellent setting for exploring the multidimen-
sionality of subordination and for developing a challenge to
anti-racist essentialism. As this Article reveals, published
accounts and available statistical data regarding oppressive
violence targeting gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered
people of color indicate that much of this violence involves
the use of sexual subordination to perpetuate racial harms.
Despite the deployment of sexualized violence against gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color to further
racial oppression, anti-racist theorists have not constructed
a substantial critique of heterosexism in their work, nor has
the issue of sexual justice for gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered people been incorporated into the agendas of
most anti-racist political organizations. In fact, several anti-
racist theorists have questioned the importance of including
sexual identity as a protected category within existing civil
rights law.
The exclusion or marginalization of issues of homo-
sexuality from and within anti-racist discourse stands in
stark contrast to the vigilance with which anti-racism has
historically unveiled and challenged the sexualized nature
of racial oppression. Yet, much of the historic attention paid
to sexualized racial aggression has centered around
heterosexual, usually male, victimization. By responding to
heterosexually based racial violence and ignoring
homophobic forms of racial violence, anti-racism margin-
alizes gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
color, allows racial oppression to escape the challenge of
anti-racist advocacy, and creates a discriminatory and het-
eronormative model of racial justice.
Although my analysis of the heteronormative nature of
anti-racist legal theory arises out of the existing internal
critiques of progressive social movements, it also represents
both a substantive and conceptual progression in this
scholarship. The following analysis reflects a substantive
progression in the internal critiques because it offers a
comprehensive examination of heteronormativity in anti-
racist legal scholarship, thus helping to fill a void in ex-
isting work that either omits sexuality from analysis or that
fails to analyze the effects of heteronormative racial dis-
courses in the specific contexts of law and legal theory. My
analysis also provides a conceptual progression in the
internal critiques because it not only seeks to include
"excluded" voices (e.g., those of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
the transgendered of color) within equality discourse, but it
also closely examines the complexity of every person's
experiences with oppression. By considering how hetero-
sexuality, for example, has affected racial subordination
and anti-racist discourse, my analysis provides an historical
context for examining the sexual dimensions of racial
oppression and for including progressive sexual politics
within anti-racism. My approach also reveals the discrim-
ination that occurs when the racial and sexual experiences
of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color,
unlike those of heterosexuals of color, are omitted from
anti-racist theory and activism.
This Article expounds its central claims in three parts.
Part I provides a theoretical framework for my analysis,
linking it to and distinguishing it from (substantively and
conceptually) pre-existing internal critiques of progressive
social movements. Next, Part I analyzes incidents of vio-
lence against gay and lesbian people of color and relevant
statistical data in order to demonstrate the multidimen-
sionality of oppression-specifically, the sexualized nature
of racial oppression, the linkage of racism and homophobia,
and the harms that homophobia visits upon communities of
color. Part II argues that, despite the synergistic relation-
ship between racism and homophobia, participants in anti-
racist legal theory and political discourse have failed to
challenge adequately heterosexist oppression and have even
questioned or dismissed the importance of sexual equality
[Vol. 47
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as a civil rights goal. Part II also closely examines the
historical problem of heterosexually based racial violence in
order to amplify my claim that racial violence has a sexual
component. Part II then contrasts the sluggish or nonexist-
ent responses of anti-racists to homophobic racial violence
and other forms of heterosexism with their vigorous oppo-
sition to heterosexually linked racial violence and subord-
ination, demonstrating that anti-racism is constructed
around a heteronormative and discriminatory vision of
racial justice in which heterosexual status qualifies indi-
viduals for anti-racist advocacy. Part II concludes by detail-
ing other problems and inefficiencies that result from the
heteronormative construction of anti-racist discourse. Part
III examines probable reasons for the disparate responses
of anti-racists to heterosexual and homophobic racism, con-
cluding that none of the reasons examined provides suffi-
cient justification for the perpetuation of heteronormativity
in anti-racist discourse. Part III closes by discussing the
immediate implications of a de-essentialized racial dis-
course for anti-racist legal theory and for civil rights law.
I. MULTIDIMENSIONALITY: A CHALLENGE TO NARROW
CONCEPTIONS OF OPPRESSION AND IDENTITY
A. Multidimensionality and Intersectionality: Similarities
and Differences
In a prior article, I argued that scholars and activists
engaged in the development of strategies to combat social
inequality must recognize the inherent complexity of
systems of oppression (e.g., patriarchy, white supremacy
and heterosexism) and the social identity categories around
which social power and disempowerment are distributed
(e.g., race, gender and sexual orientation).5 Placing legal
theory and politics concerning issues of homosexuality and
heterosexism at the focal point of my analysis, I asserted
that the various social identity categories and systems of
oppression are "inextricably and forever intertwined,""6 that
the failure of gay and lesbian legal theorists to interrogate
and challenge racial and class subordination produces
25. See Hutchinson, supra note 2.
26. Id. at 641.
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essentialist theories that invariably reflect the experiences
of class and race-privileged gays, lesbians and bisexuals,27
and that gay and lesbian essentialism precludes adequate
political, legal and theoretical responses to the contingent
and varying effects of heterosexist oppression.28 Having
demonstrated the experiential diversity of gay and lesbian
existence, I urged gay and lesbian legal theorists and
political activists to employ "multidimensionality" as a
theoretical framework for challenging heterosexist subor-
dination. Within the gay and lesbian context, multidimen-
sionality serves as "a methodology by which to analyze the
impact of racial and class oppression (or other sources of
social inequality) upon sexual subordination and gay and
lesbian experience and identity and to cease treating these
forces as separable, mutually exclusive, or even conflicting
phenomena."" By offering multidimensionality to law and
sexuality scholars, I hoped to provoke a discourse on the
intricacy of sexual subordination and to help reshape legal
theory to account for this complexity." More generally,
multidimensionality posits that individual acts of discrim-
ination and the various institutions of oppression are
complex and multilayered, owing their existence to a host of
interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage.
My analysis arose, primarily, out of an impressive body
of feminist and critical race literature that has painsta-
kingly countered the notion that sources of oppression
operate in isolation from one another." This scholarship has
criticized, most extensively, feminist and anti-racist legal
theory and politics for failing to examine how the conver-
gence of racial oppression and gender hierarchy often cre-
ates unique experiences for women of color-experiences
that essentialist theories either submerge or fail to explain
accurately. 2 Applying a theoretical approach commonly
27. See id. at 583-635.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 640.
30. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 640.
31. See sources cited supra note 9. I explicitly grounded my analysis in this
literature. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 564 n.13 ("This Article is also
greatly inspired by a body of critical race, anti-racist and feminist scholarship
that explores the relationship between race and gender.").
32. See sources cited supra note 9. Although other internal critiques exist
within legal theory, the race-gender critiques stand as the most developed and
extensive. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1333 ("The analytical tools known as
multiplicity and intersectionality were pioneered by critical race feminists to
[Vol. 47
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referred to as "intersectionality," these scholars have
proposed several public policy and doctrinal reforms that
would make civil rights law responsive to the needs and
experiences of women of color.3
Although I locate my work on the interlocking nature of
race, class and sexuality within established scholarship on
the synergistic nature of oppression, I also view my writing
as both a substantive and conceptual extension and
redirection of this literature. While the multidimensionality
paradigm differs substantively and conceptually from the
intersectionality scholarship, the insightful observations of
intersectional scholars created the conditions for the devel-
opment and evolution of multidimensionality and of other
theoretical extensions and rearticulations of intersection-
ality.34
My analysis represents a substantive extension of the
prevailing literature on the "intersectionality" of oppression
because this latter work has been limited, almost
exclusively, to understanding and exploring the operation of
just two sources of oppression-patriarchy and racism-in
the lives of women of color.35 My analysis builds upon-yet
bring into sharp relief, and to spotlight, the particularized interplay of white
racism and androsexism."); Eaton, supra note 11, at 215 (noting that "much of
the commentary and debate about interacting oppressions has focused almost
exclusively on the connections between race and gender domination").
33. See sources cited supra note 9. Some of these arguments have led to
judicial and policy reforms. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551,
1562 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Wlhere two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be
neatly reduced to distinct components... Rather than aiding the decisional
process, the attempt to bisect a person's identity at the intersection of race and
gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature of their experiences.")
(citing Crenshaw, supra note 9); UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUN-
ITY COMMISSION, INTERSECTIONAL DISCRUMINATION 6 (1996) (stating that the
E.E.O.C. "recognizes intersectional discrimination claims as an enforcement
priority" and drawing upon leading legal scholarship on the issue).
34. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 641 (describing multidimensionality as
"drawing upon, extending and developing intersectionality" rather than serving
as "a wholly alternative paradigm"). The evolution of intersectionality was
perhaps anticipated by its leading commentator, Kimberle Crenshaw. See
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism
and 2 Live Crew, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111, 114 (Kimberle Williams Crenshaw et
al. eds., 1993) (describing intersectionality as a "provisional" or "transitional
concept that.., can be replaced as our understanding of each category becomes
more multidimensional") (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. Although this scholarship explores
only gender and racial oppression, many authors within this movement have
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differs from-this work because it explores the social
meaning of sexual identity (along with race, gender and
class), a topic which, recent scholarship notwithstanding,
remains largely unexplored in the intersectionality corpus
and in legal theory generally.36
Conceptually, my analysis differs from the pre-existing
body of intersectional scholarship because it attempts to
complicate the implication of this latter work that social
identity categories or systems of oppression only "intersect"
in the lives of persons burdened by multiple sources of
disempowerment, such as women of color. The idea that
"intersecting" systems of oppression only affect limited
categories of individuals is implied by statements in several
writings in the race and gender line of analysis." These
statements, together with the almost exclusive focus the
literature has given to experiences of women of color-
rather than those of white women and men of color-
suggest a limited relevance of intersectionality 8 Neverthe-
less, white women and men of color also experience "multi-
dimensional" oppression. Men of color and white women,
recognized that "other" sources of disempowerment affect the lives of women of
color. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1245 (limiting analysis to race and
gender but recognizing that factors "such as class or sexuality.., are often as
critical in shaping the experiences of women of color").
36. For an extensive listing of race-sexuality scholarship, see Hutchinson
supra note 2, at 563 n.12. See also Valdes, supra note 12 (urging law and
sexuality scholars to integrate issues of racial subordination into their work);
Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some
Thoughts on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 319 (1998) (questioning value of same sex-marriage for people of color and
the poor); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Co-Synthesis of Categories, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997) (offering "co-synthesis" as methodology for exploring
relationship between oppressions).
37. See Crenshaw, supra note 9 (arguing that anti-discrimination
jurisprudence diminishes the multidimensional experiences of black women);
Harris, supra note 4, at 604 ("Far more for black women than for white women,
the experience of self is precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of
race and gender-of being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory,
discourses of sexuality and color."); see also Kwan, supra note 36, at 1275
("Central to intersectionality theory is the recovery of the claims and identities
of those who, like African American women, are pushed to the margins of the
racial discourse because of assumptions of patriarchal normativity, and simul-
taneously pushed to the margins of the feminist discourse because of assump-
tions of racial normativity.").
38. See, e.g., Kwan, supra note 36, at 1275 ("[Sltraight white maleness
arguably is a multiple identity, but intersectionality theorists would resist the
claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.").
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however, may not typically conceive of their subordination
as a combination of gender and racial hierarchy because
"maleness" and "whiteness," privileged and dominant
categories in a patriarchal and white supremacist society,
are rarely acknowledged to exist but, nevertheless, form the
invisible foundation for social policy, civil rights strategies
and critical theory." Although some race-gender scholars
have acknowledged the multiplicity of white women and
men of color experiences," they have not explored signi-
39. The extent to which whiteness and maleness create privilege, however,
depends upon other factors, such as race, sexuality and class. For a discussion
of the invisible nature of whiteness, see HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING:
CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITEs 109 (1996) ("For most
Whites, race-or more precisely, their own race-is simply part of the unseen,
unproblematic background."); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See":
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) (examining the "transparency phenomenon" or
the "tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms,
behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific"); Peggy
McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to
See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE
AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 23 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds.,
1995) ("White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special
provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes,
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks."); Robert Westley, White Nor-
mativity and the Racial Rhetoric of Equal Protection, in EXISTENCE IN BLACK: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF BLACK EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 91 (Lewis R. Gordon ed., 1997)
("To the extent that the dominant group escapes racial or ethnic identification,
it is free to act as a value-free norm for the rest of society."). For an analysis of
the invisible nature of maleness, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEM-
INIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237-38 (1989) ("In male supremacist societies, the
male standpoint dominates civil society in the form of the objective standard-
that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world, does not appear to
function as a standpoint at all ... ."); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J.
259, 316-17 (1993) ("[T]he law's incorporation of a male normative standard
may be invisible but it is not inconsequential.") (footnote omitted); Lucinda M.
Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature
of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 888 (1989) ("The body of law
about gender discrimination is widely understood to involve 'women's issues'--
thus reinforcing the understanding that 'man' is a genderless, standard crea-
ture who does not have to concern himself with gender issues."); Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60 (1988) (arguing that one
"project" of feminist legal theory is "the unmasking and critiquing of the pa-
triarchy behind purportedly ungendered law and theory").
40. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1252 (arguing that the "specific
raced and gendered experiences [of white women and men of color], although
intersectional, often define as well as confine the interests of the entire group");
Harris, supra note 4, at 608 ("This sense of a multiplicitous self is not unique to
black women, but black women have expressed this sense in ways that are
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ficantly the dimensions of these experiences but have lim-
ited their analyses primarily to uncovering the multidi-
mensionality of women of color and their historical experi-
ences with subordination.4'
Placing the emergence of intersectionality into an
historical context provides a basis for understanding its
heavy emphasis on issues of women of color, which, perhaps
unintentionally, helped to create a false implication that
only women of color experience multilayered subordination.
When intersectionality was first introduced to legal theory,
there were virtually no analyses of the unique effects of
subordination on women of color in feminist legal theory
and traditional civil rights scholarship; furthermore, judi-
cial decision-making demonstrated a remarkable misunder-
standing of or lack of appreciation for the ways in which
women of color were affected by racial hierarchy and
patriarchy.42 Thus, by centering their analyses on women of
color, the intersectionality scholars filled (and continue to
fill) a tremendous void in civil rights jurisprudence. 43
While the intersectionality critiques have provided
substantial insight into the complexity of oppression, the
limited (explicitly and implicitly) nature of the critiques
leaves the intersectional paradigm open to a charge that it
only applies to a specific category of individuals (e.g.,
women of color or poor white lesbians).44 Consequently,
skeptics can disparage or question the importance of argu-
striking, poignant, and potentially useful to feminist theory."). But see Kwan,
supra note 36, at 1275 ("[Sltraight white maleness arguably is a multiple
identity, but intersectionality theorists would resist the claim by straight white
males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.").
41. Recent works have explored the race and gender experiences of men of
color. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a
Racial Victim, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 50 (1997) (examining race-gender
subordination of black men and arguing that this black male subjectivity is the
paradigmatic form of racial oppression); D. Marvin Jones, 'We're All Stuck Here
for a While'" Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP.
L. 35 (1998) (examining race-gender construction of black men in legal
discourse and institutions).
42. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 1 (discussing marginalization of
black women in legal scholarship and judicial opinions).
43. See Kwan, supra note 36, at 1275 ("Intersectionality thus made
important contributions in opening up the theoretical framework discussing
race in a much more inclusive way.").
44. See, e.g., Kwan, supra note 36, at 1275 ("[S]traight white maleness
arguably is a multiple identity, but intersectionality theorists would resist the
claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.").
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ments concerning the complexity of oppression and
regarding the need for more sophisticated paradigms for
confronting social inequality. In the gay and lesbian
context, for example, white gay male critic Richard Mohr
has dismissed demands by lesbian feminists and people of
color that gay political organizations challenge issues of
racial subordination and patriarchal oppression and form
coalitions with anti-racist and feminist groups. Mohr
criticizes such efforts as an "unnecessary and... wasteful
drain on the movement."45 Because intersectionality and
related scholarship imply that the multiplicity of identity
and oppression has limited relevance and significance,
these works may actually leave the impression that claims
such as Mohr's are correct in a very limited, but troubling,
sense. If, for instance, multilayered identities and oppres-
sion only implicate women of color and their experiences,
then an examination of the "intersectionality" of race and
gender might indeed be a "wasteful"--or at least less
relevant-venture for white women and men of color.
Subsequent to the introduction of intersectionality to
legal scholarship, however, feminist and critical race
theorists have offered compelling arguments that decon-
struct the "transparent" nature of whiteness and maleness
in legal discourse.46 These arguments call into question any
suggestion that the complexity of subordination only
matters to certain categories of individuals. Once whiteness
and maleness (and heterosexuality and upper-class status)
are uncovered as important (and "real") social constructs,
the notion that the multidimensional nature of oppression
and identity has limited application becomes difficult to
sustain. When we view whiteness and maleness (and their
45. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND
LAW 328 (1988); see also MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL:
HoW AMERICA WILL CONQUER ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 90s, at 180
(1989) (characterizing feminist, poverty and anti-racist concerns as "super-
fluous" to gay and lesbian liberation); BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE:
THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 37 (1993) (describing creation of a
"queer people of color media production company" and the publication of an
"anthology of lesbian, gay and bisexual Asian/Pacific writers" as "constricting"
and as "Balkanization"); see id. at 216 (dismissing scholarly research on the
links between gender, class, race and sexuality as "[plolitically correct and
multiculturalist rhetoric"); see Bruce Bawer, Under Glass, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1995, § 7, at 24 (arguing that sexism, racism and economic injustice are "issues,
yes-but gay issues?").
46. See sources cited supra note 39.
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resulting privileges) as part of the same landscape of social
constructs as "colored" and "female" statuses, then we can
also consider how these constructs contribute to the
positionality of white women and men of color. If whiteness
and maleness impact these groups' respective experiences
as women and as people of color, they too will have multi-
layered experiences. Stated differently, whiteness undoubt-
edly interacts with female status to create multidimen-
sional experiences for white women, and maleness invar-
iably interacts with colored status to create multidimen-
sional experiences for men of color.47 Accordingly, the reality
of multidimensional subordination is generalized, not re-
stricted to specific categories of individuals.48
This conceptual distinction-that multilayered exper-
iences are "universal"--between the focus of intersection-
ality and multidimensionality has important implications
for future theorizing on the complexity of oppression. First,
this distinction problematizes claims such as Mohr's by
revealing their discriminatory nature. When skeptics reject
the need to embrace multidimensional theories of equality,
they falsely imply that their own essentialized theories are
"authentic" and "pure." Most likely, however, these theories
are in fact multilayered-resting on the transparently
multidimensional perspectives of white women and men of
color, for example.49 Molar's argument itself reflects white
gay male positionality because only those persons who do
not encounter racial and gender subordination (but who
47. See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to
Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 18 (1995)
(extending intersectionality to account for the privileged status of whiteness
and concluding that "while Professor Crenshaw discusses a woman standing at
the single intersection of race and gender, in fact we all stand at multiple inter-
sections of our fragmented legal selves") (emphasis added).
48. When I describe multidimensional experiences as "universal" or "gener-
alized," I do not mean to imply a "unitary" experience of subordination. Despite
the fact that everyone's identities and experiences are shaped by a host of
factors, oppressed persons will, nevertheless, experience subordination differ-
ently.
49. This observation has its roots in the race-gender critiques. See
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1252 (noting that white women and men of color
define experiences of women and people of color, respectively); Harris, supra
note 4, at 592 ("[Fleminist essentialists find that in removing issues of 'race'
they have actually only managed to remove black women-meaning that white
women now stand as the epitome of Woman."). These critiques, however, have
not fully engaged the multiple dimensions of white female and male of color
experiences.
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enjoy racial and gender privilege) could comfortably de-
scribe anti-racist and feminist reforms as "wasteful" and
"unnecessary."" Thus, Mohr's argument arises out of his
own multidimensional positionality as white, gay and male.
The universality of multidimensional experience thus
presents a difficult question for those who eschew multilay-
ered theories of equality: if everyone has multidimensional
experiences and if progressive social theories likely already
reflect (though not admittedly) multidimensional perspec-
tives, why should these theories marginalize or exclude
particular classes of multidimensional experiences (e.g.,
those of women of color, gays and lesbians of color, and poor
white gay men) from analysis? By conceptualizing multi-
plicity of experience as a universal concept, multidimen-
sionality compels essentialist theorists to account for the
inherently discriminatory nature of their work, which privi-
leges some multilayered experiences over others.5 Multidi-
mensionality, thus, pushes legal theorists and political acti-
vists to recognize the multiple and complex ways in which
all individuals experience oppression and construct cate-
gories of identity, to acknowledge that equality theory
already incorporates transparently multidimensional ex-
periences, and to begin reshaping theory and policy to
account for the diversity of harms within oppressed social
groups.
B. Violence as a "System" of Oppression
One of the most powerful manifestations of multidimen-
sional subordination occurs in the historic problem of
violence directed toward oppressed social groups-what I
refer to as "oppressive violence." In the popular legal and
criminological nomenclature, acts of physical violence
against disfavored groups-people of color, women, gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered-are often
labeled "bias-motivated violence," "bias crimes" or "hate
50. Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 621 ("Although [several white gay critics]
contend that race, class, and gender detract-or are separate-from gay
politics, the political vision they prescribe rests firmly upon racial, class, and
gender privilege.").
51. See infra pp. 79-100 (discussing how sexualized racial oppression affects
heterosexuals; revealing and questioning disparate responses to heterosexual-
ized and homosexualized racism).
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crimes.""2 Such naming of this brutality accurately captures
its discriminatory dimension: when committing such vio-
lence, the perpetrator singles out This""3 victim because she
or he is a member of a disparaged social group.
Though accurate to some degree and helpful perhaps in
the context of criminal proceedings (where "intent" is often
relevant), limiting the description of violence against
socially subordinate groups to the "discriminatory" rubric
may rest on problematic assumptions that have the effect of
masking the systematic, political and structural signi-
ficance of such violence. The discriminatory label, for
example, suggests that this violence occurs as isolated,
atomistic and random acts. Yet, as scholars within critical
race theory, feminist legal theory and critical legal studies
have argued (particularly in the context of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence), the perception of social
subordination solely as the inappropriate behavior of a few,
random, "biased" individuals, distorts its institutionalized,
pervasive, enduring and often subtle nature.54
The social phenomenon of violence against subordinate
groups (like other acts and institutions of domination
examined by critical theorists) constructs and reinforces
hierarchical social relations-white supremacy, compulsory
heterosexuality, patriarchy and class oppression. Kendall
Thomas' compelling observations in the context of
"homophobic" violence provide a helpful explication of the
52. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a
Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320 (1994).
53. The use of the pronoun "he" is intended to capture the gendered nature
of such violence; the prototypical assailant is male. See Lu-in Wang, The
Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-
Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 51 & n.19 (1997).
54. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future
of Civil Rights, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 & n.129 (1990) (discussing
"political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control
power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white
superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance
and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of
institutions and social settings"); Flagg, supra note 39, at 959 ("Beyond the
individual forms of racism that stereotyping, bias, and hostility represent lie
the vast terrains of institutional racism-the maintenance of institutions that
systematically advantage whites-and cultural racism-the usually unstated
assumption that white culture is superior to all others."); see generally Alan
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimin-
ation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MNN. L. REV. 1049
(1978) (discussing institutional nature of racism).
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structural dimensions of oppressive violence. Thomas
understands homophobic violence as a "mode of power" or
an "institution"55 that serves to delimit the boundaries of
sexual expression and that c6ntributes to the ideological
and political processes which construct homosexuality as
subordinate and devalued and heterosexuality as privileged
and preferred:
Viewed systemically, the objective and outcome of violence against
lesbians and gays is the social control of human sexuality.
Homophobic violence aims to regulate the erotic economy of
contemporary American society, or more specifically, to enforce the
institutional and ideological imperatives of.. .compulsory hetero-
sexuality. Insofar as homophobic violence functions to prevent and
punish actual or imagined deviations from heterosexual acts and
identities, it carries a determinate, political valence and value.
6
Homophobic violence thus executes (or "enforces") the
political, social and ideological institution of heterosexism;
it punishes non-heterosexual practice, and it aims to pre-
vent future challenges to heteronormativity by employing
the threat of violence to attach fear and stigma to nonhet-
erosexual intimacy and desire.57 While Thomas does not
interrogate the multidimensionality of homophobic violence
(by relating it to other forms of hierarchy), such violence
also reinforces social hierarchies of gender and race. 9
55. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1431,
1467 (1992).
56. Id.
57. Numerous psychological studies have found that oppressive violence
creates an environment of fear and paralysis throughout the oppressed group of
which the individual victim is a member. See Lawrence, supra note 52, at 346
("Members of the target community of a bias crime perceive that crime as if it
were an attack on themselves directly and individually .... "); Wang, supra note
53, at 119-20 (arguing that an act of biased violence "has an especially strong
impact on observers who identify with the victim because they feel that they
share the characteristic or status that explains the victim's experience. Those
individuals will incorporate into their own assumptive worlds a perception that
their very identities render them especially vulnerable to criminal victimization
of a particularly devastating kind"). That such violence produces harms that
extend well beyond the individual victim lends additional support for a systemic
and ideological conceptualization.
58. Many commentators and certain courts have examined the relationship
between heterosexism and patriarchy. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Dis-
crimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law
as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
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Thus, the lesson of critical theory is that violence
against oppressed groups serves broad and institutional
(rather than isolated and individuated) purposes: to deline-
ate and sustain hierarchical social relations of race, gender,
sexuality and class and, thereby, to perpetuate the inequal-
ity of marginalized communities.' Conceiving oppressive
violence as a system of subordination permits us to examine
how it, like other structures of domination, shape the exper-
iences of historically oppressed social groups.
C. Oppressive Violence and Multidimensionality
Viewed together, the argument that oppressive violence
is a system of subordination, coupled with the reality of
multilayered subordination, compels a finding that op-
pressive violence is multidimensional in nature. In other
words, if subordination is multidimensional and if oppres-
sive violence is itself a structure of subordination, then
oppressive violence will generate varied effects, due to the
reality that its victims are situated in diverse and shifting
contexts of racial, gender, class and sexual power. The
multidimensional nature of oppressive violence also means
that a number of social hierarchies will inform and be
reinforced through its occurrence. In the remainder of this
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 187; Valdes, supra, note 1;
James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as
Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 989 (1997) (arguing that homophobic violence perpetuates gender
inequity); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (ruling
that prohibition of same-sex marriage constitutes gender discrimination under
state constitution). Although heterosexism supports oppressive gender hierar-
chies, law and sexuality scholars must remember to consider the differences
between gay men and women, differences created by the oppression of women in
a patriarchal society. See sources cited supra note 2 (criticizing marginalization
of lesbians within gay theory).
59. See infra pp. 21-39.
60. See Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 209, 212 (making connection between ideology of
homophobia embraced by legal structures and homophobic violence). Similar
observations have been made in the context of "sexist" violence. See SUSAN
SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE
BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982; see generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
YALE L.J. 1087 (1987); R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY (1979); see also infra pp. 93-
111 (discussing "racial" violence).
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section, I will demonstrate this claim through an analysis of
reported cases of violence against actual or "perceived as"
gay and lesbian people of color and through scrutiny of
existing statistical data on "homophobic" violence which
suggest that race factors in the commission of such violence
and in the public response.
1. A Multidimensional Reading of Oppressive Violence.
One of the most graphic examples of oppressive violence
against gays and lesbians of color6' involves the case of Loc
Minh Truong, a 55-year-old, working class, Vietnamese
American.6 2 On the evening of January 9, 1993, as Truong
walked along Mountain Street Beach, a popular "gay
section" of Laguna Beach, California, he was confronted by
a gang of at least eight white teenagers. 3 Two of the youths,
Jeff Michael Raines and Christopher Michael Cribbins,
61. There are numerous other examples that I could have pursued in this
section; however, analysis of these cases would have rendered the discussion in
this section repetitive and too lengthy. For an example of other cases, see GARY
DAVID COMSTOcK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 62 (1991)
(discussing role of white supremacist groups in the perpetuation of homophobic
violence); see id. at 219-20 n.31 (compiling extensive listing of news articles
reporting the role of conservative and racist groups in the perpetuation of
homophobic violence); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 567-83 (discussing acts of
racist-homophobic violence and the legal responses to this violence); Timothy
Egan, Violent Backdrop for Anti-Gay Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 1, at
40 (reporting murder of black lesbian and white gay male by white supremacist
teenagers and authorities' belief that race and sexuality factored in the
murder).
62. See Kim Christensen, Victim's Beating Baffles Relatives, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Jan. 14, 1993, at Bi. The issue of Truong's sexuality is
complicated. Loc has denied being "gay." See Richard Core, Judge Delays
Sentence in Gay Bashing Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1993, at B6. However,
Truong has pleaded guilty to engaging in "lewd" conduct with another man on
the same beach were he was beaten. See Gregory Crouch & Leslie Earnest,
Police Arrest 2 Others in Laguna Beating, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al. The
manner in which Truong defines his sexual identity does not, however, negate
the element of homophobic bias in this attack.
63. See Mark I. Pinsky & Thuan Le, 2 Plead Guilty in O.C. "Gay Bashing,"
L.A. TniES, Aug. 3, 1993, at Al. Another article reports that 11 individuals
attacked Truong. See Byron MacWilliams, Teen Gets 10 Years for Hate Attack,
ORANGE CouNTY REG. (Cal), Jan. 8, 1994, at Al. None of the numerous news
articles I found covering Truong's attack reported that the youth were white, no
doubt a reflection of the invisibility of whiteness and the marginalzation of race
in the response to Truong's assault. An attorney who represented Truong
during a subsequent civil lawsuit to recover damages for his physical injuries
confirmed this fact. Telephone Interview with Russell Kerr, Attorney (June 9,
1998) [hereinafter Kerr, Interview].
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pushed Truong to the beach's rocky terrain, beat him and
stomped his head and face repeatedly.' The attack left
Truong disfigured and caused serious damage to his left
eye; he was later found unconscious on the beach with a
sharp rock impaled in the back of his head.65 The remaining
teenagers watched the attack and failed to intervene on
Truong's behalf.66 One of the "bystanders" testified to police
that the group went to the beach with knowledge that a
"sexualized" crime was going to occur.67 During the attack,
at least one of the perpetrators hurled a sexual epithet.68
In the aftermath of Truong's attack, governmental
officials and local gay and lesbian political activists mount-
ed a vigorous response to the crime. Police arrested the two
perpetrators, and one assailant subsequently pleaded guilty
to attempted murder, assault and a violation of California's
"hate crime" statute; the other pleaded guilty to assault and
the commission of a hate crime.69 A local public high school
sponsored seminars to educate students on the problem of
homophobia,7" and gay rights organizations provided needed
advocacy" and emotional support.72
Despite their laudable efforts, the activists and govern-
mental officials evidenced a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of the operation of oppression-specifically, its multidi-
mensional nature. Prosecutors and police, for example, con-
cluded that race did not factor into Truong's victimization,
pursuing the hate crime charge solely as a case of "anti-gay"
animus." Furthermore, while city officials and activists
64. See Pinsky & Le, supra note 63, at Al.
65. See id.
66. See Anna Cekola, Hate Crime Case Hinges on Group Responsibility, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1994, at Bi.
67. See Pinsky & Le, supra note 63, at Al (reporting police statement that
Raines, prior to the attack, invited other youths to "go down to Mountain Street
to get some fags").
68. See id. ("Cribbins called [Truong] a 'fag' and shoved him against the
rocks .... (reporting statement of prosecutors)).
69. See Rene Lynch & Doreen Carvajal, Teen Gets 10 Years in O.C. "Gay
Bashing Case, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1994, at Al. The defendants received re-
spective sentences of ten years and one year. See id.
70. See Lily Dizon, Suspect in Laguna Gay-Bashing Faces Hate-Crime Trial,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993, at Bi.
71. See id. (reporting that activists and city officials urged public school
officials to attend seminars sponsored by gay and lesbian advocacy group).
72. See Jeordan Legon, Vigil Held for Man Beaten at Gay Beach, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Jan. 16, 1993, at Bll.
73. See Byron MacWilliams, Tests Ordered for Men in Laguna Beating,
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urged the city to educate youth on the problems of
homophobia, there seem to have been no similar demands
for the implementation of educational programs on racial
discrimination and violence.
Several factors strongly support the public's homo-
phobic construction of the crime: the sexualized language
used by the attackers, the actual confession of homophobic
intent by one of the youths, and the commission of the
crime in a known gay and lesbian section of the town. Nev-
ertheless, a conclusion that homophobia influenced the
crime does not preclude the involvement of racial or other
motivations. Only under an essentialist or narrow concep-
tion of subordination could strong evidence of anti-homosex-
ual motivation preclude or negate an explanation that in-
cludes other forms of oppression concurrently. A multidi-
mensional understanding of oppression and systems of op-
pressive violence, by contrast, demands close scrutiny of all
the possible-indeed, likely-social and political layers of
the attack.74
Although the "dominant" white responses to the crime
dismissed the possible influence of white supremacy, anti-
Asian sentiment and patriarchy upon Truong's victim-
ization, several aspects of the crime strongly suggest the
relevance of these systems of domination in the assault.
First, the racial backgrounds of the victim and assailants of
this admittedly bigoted attack lend credence to a racial
interpretation. Because Asian Americans have endured a
long history of white supremacist subordination through
the institution of oppressive violence75 any "hate" crime
involving a large group of white men physically and bru-
tally dominating an Asian American likely involves an
element of white supremacist motivation. A contrary con-
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Oct. 9, 1993, at BI ("There was no racial motive for
the crimes, according to police."); see also Pinsky & Le, supra note 63, at Al
("Prosecutors believe that Raines and Cribbins drove to Laguna Beach along
with several others to seek out and attack gays.").
74. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 640 ("Multidimensional analysis...
reveals the multiple dimensions of social identity categories and offers a
comprehensive framework for conceptualizing sexual subordination that neither
'destroys' nor 'fragments' our lives."); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1189
("When I see something that looks racist, I ask, 'Where is the patriarchy in
this?' When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, 'Where is the heterosexism
in this?' When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, 'Where are the
class interests in this?").
75. See infra pp. 89-96.
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clusion ignores the persistence of racism and a history of
anti-Asian violence.
Furthermore, the assailants' very conclusion that their
victim was "gay" could have resulted from interlocking race,
sexuality and gender constructs. Under the landscape of
white supremacist and patriarchal stereotypes, Asian
American males are constructed as effeminate, asexual and
weak.76 These stereotypes, apart from asexuality, correlate
strikingly with popular characterizations of gay men.
77
Hence, race, gender and sexual stereotypes of Asian Amer-
ican males may have influenced the assailants' selection of
their "gay" victim; they might have believed Truong was
gay because he was Asian American and male. 8 Under this
interpretation of .the crime, Truong's racial status was
sexualized-the sexual (and gendered) stereotyping of
Truong was inextricably intertwined with his status as an
Asian American male. This "sexualization of race,"79 here
76. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 577 & n.78 (citing Cynthia Petersen,
Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS,
GAY MEN AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 122 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995)
[hereinafter, LEGAL INVERSIONS]; see also David Mura, How America Unsexes
the Asian Male, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at C9); John M. Kang, Deconstruct-
ing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 345 (1997)
("[Tihe rhetoric surrounding Asian men emphasize[s] either their asexuality or
their perceived femininity."); John Kuo Wei Tchen, Believing Is Seeing:
Transforming Orientalism and the Occidental Gaze, in ASIA AIERICA:
IDENTITIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICAN ART 13, 18 (Margo Machida ed.,
1994) (describing the "standard representation of a Chinese man [as] un-manly,
asexual, waiflike, comic, yet slightly sinister").
77. See RICHARD A. ISAY, M.D., BEING HOMOSExuAL: GAY MEN AND THEIR DE-
VELOPMENT 20 (1989); A.P. MacDonald, Jr., Homophobia: Its Roots and Mean-
ings, 3 HOMOSExuAL COUNSELING J. 23, 30 (1976). These stereotypes may only
reflect beliefs about white gay men because men of color, particularly black and
Latino males, are typically constructed as masculine, violent and threatening.
See Hutchinson supra note 2, at 569-70 (arguing that police did not believe
Puerto Rican male was gay due, in part, to conflicting stereotypes of Latino and
gay males).
78. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 577 (arguing that police may have be-
lieved victim of murder was gay due to his Asian American male status); Kwan,
supra note 36, at 1276-77 (same); Petersen, supra note 76, at 122 (describing
racist attack on Asian American students in which attackers called male vic-
tims "faggots").
79. Other scholars have used similar terms to describe the interaction of
race and sexuality in the subordination of people of color. See CHARLES HERBERT
STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL BARRIER TO AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY
(1976) (discussing "sexual racism"); see Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2501 (1994) (discussing "rac-
ialized sexual hostility" and "sexualized racial hostility"); see generally Sumi K.
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Asian American status, likely played a central role in
Truong's subjugation.
One could also draw a conclusion that race mattered in
Truong's attack from the assailants' admitted adherence to
homophobic ideology. Numerous psychological studies indi-
cate that biased individuals typically embrace several forms
of bigotry.0 If these psychological studies are correct, then
persons (like Truong's attackers) who subscribe to homo-
phobic ideology will invariably adhere to racist and sexist
ideologies and political agendas as well. Accordingly, the
perpetrators' admitted homophobia supports a determin-
ation that they are also white supremacists and that
Truong's attack was, therefore, an act of sexualized racial
violence.
Finally, the disfigurement of Truong suggests the crime
had a racial dimension. When officials found Truong, he
had been so badly beaten that they could not determine his
race.8' Although critical theorists have compellingly dis-
puted biological definitions of race,82 social constructionist
theory still defines race as the "social meaning" attached to
biological and morphological features,83 thus preserving a
role for biology and physicality in the social and political
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model
Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (analyzing
"sexualized racial stereotypes" and "racialized gender stereotypes"); Stacey
Pastel Dougan, With Justice for Whom? The Presumption of Moral Innocence in
Rape Trials, 71 IND. L.J. 419, 435 (1996) (discussing "racialized sexual stereo-
types"); Naomi Zack, The American Sexualization of Race, in RACE/SEX: THEIR
SAMENESS, DIFFERENCE, AND INTERPLAY (Naomi Zack ed., 1997) (discussing
"sexualization of race").
80. See Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use of Acts of Discrimina-
tion Against "Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Fed-
eral Employment Law, 43 STAN. L. REV. 241, 249 (1990) (summarizing psycholo-
gical data).
81. See Dianne Klein, Prejudice Targets Outsiders, But We Are All Victims of
Hate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at El ("fTruong's head was bashed so viciously
that for more than a day, police could only venture a guess as to his race. Asian
or Latino, they figured, because of his black hair.").
82. See Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observa-
tions on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 28
(1994) ("Race must be viewed as a social construction. That is, human inter-
action rather than natural differentiation must be seen as the source and con-
tinued basis for racial categorization."); see also MICHAEL OM & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FoRMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994).
83. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 38-39 ("Race is revealed as historically con-
tingent, socially mediated systems of meaning that attach to elements of an in-
dividual's morphology and ancestry.").
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processes that fabricate racial meaning. The attackers' con-
centration of their blows to Truong's face could have evi-
denced a desire to stamp out (quite literally) any morpho-
logical markers of Asian American (or "non-white") status.
In other words, the attackers may have beaten Truong
beyond racial recognition in order to neutralize his "Asian"
appearance.
Despite the many ways in which race and gender could
have acted together with heterosexism to influence the
brutal attack, the public response largely focused on the
sexual dimension of the crime. This exclusive focus on
sexuality deploys the same problematic essentialism that
the internal critiques of social movements have challenged.
Additionally, however, it is quite likely that the pernicious
"model minority myth" also explains the public's failure to
offer a racial reading of the crime. Under this myth, the
economic success of some segments of the Asian American
population is cited by whites to negate claims that racism is
responsible for the material inequality of other people of
color.8" As numerous scholars have demonstrated, the myth
obscures the historical and ongoing oppression of Asian
Americansl blurs the vastly different experiences across
communities of color86 and among Asian Americans," and
84. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1241, 1264 (1993) ("[T]he model minority myth... hurt[s] other racial mi-
norities and poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian
Americans.").
85. See id. at 1258 ("Th[e] history of discrimination and violence, as well as
the contemporary problems of Asian Americans, are obscured by the portrayal
of Asian Americans as a 'model minority."); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225,
246 (1995) ("[Tlhe model minority myth whitewashes the discrimination faced
by Asian Americans.").
86. See Wu, supra note 85, at 245 ("IT]he model minority myth ignores Afri-
can-American history. African Americans have had an experience different in
kind and not only in degree-in chattel slavery, Jim Crow, and institutional
racism-that continues to this day.").
87. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1259 (discussing economic makeup of Asian
American communities and concluding that myth diverts attention from poor
sectors of Asian American population); see also Wu, supra note 85, at 245.
[Tihe model minority myth blurs and glosses over markedly different
patterns among Asian ethnic groups. It enshrines the insult, "they all
look alike," implying that "they all are alike." Statistically, the socio-
economic positions of Vietnamese and other southeast Asian refugee
groups resemble the position of African Americans, rather than that of
whites.
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denies the existence of racism.88 One consequence of the
myth is that people often do not believe, or have difficulty
believing, that Asian Americans-viewed as successful and
industrious-are victims of racism.89 Accordingly, the public
officials' failure to make a racial reading of Truong's
victimization could also have stemmed from their adher-
ence to the myth. If acceptance of the model minority myth
explains the singular focus of the governmental response to
Truong's beating and the submergence of a racial analysis,
then the response itself is white supremacist because it
denies the role of racial hierarchy in the subordination of
Asian Americans and other people of color.0
Although the model minority myth likely explains the
omission of a racial analysis in the governmental and gay
and lesbian responses to Truong's attack, essentialism also
undoubtedly influenced the singular focus on sexuality.
Despite the wide availability and compelling nature of the
various internal critiques, many political activists and civil
rights theorists continue to cling problematically to essen-
tialism, either because they fail to comprehend or otherwise
reject the premises of anti-essentialist criticism.9 With even
Id.
88. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1264-65 ("The model minority myth plays a
key role in establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian
Americans while simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial mi-
norities and poor whites.").
89. See id. at 1260 ("The successful inculcation of the model minority myth
has created an audience unsympathetic to the problems of Asian Americans.
Thus, when we try to make our problems known, our complaints of
discrimination or calls for remedial action are seen as unwarranted and
inappropriate."); see also Wu, supra note 85, at 246 ("There can be no appre-
ciable racism against Asian Americans, because as the model minority myth
posits, they all are well-off or have the ability to overcome discrimination.").
90. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1260 (explaining that the model minority
myth is a "tool of oppression" which "den[ies] the existence of present-day discri-
mination against Asian Americans" and "legitim[izes] the oppression of other
racial minorities and poor whites").
91. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sheila Rose Foster, Discussion of Same-
Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 329, 331 (citing panelist
William N. Eskridge, Jr. who dismisses class and race critiques of same-sex
marriage movement as "articulate but wrong") (transcript of panel discussion);
WiLuAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 82 (1996) (stating that author is "baffled-" by
feminist, anti-racist and poverty critiques of same-sex marriage); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, Or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 20 (1991) (linking racial critiques of feminist theory
with the "trivialization of the white woman's subordination").
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greater relevance to the present discussion, however, the
essentialist nature of the responses to Truong's beating is
revealed in the legal strategies employed by an attorney,
Russell Kerr, who represented Truong in a civil action to
recover damages for injuries he sustained during the at-
tack.92
In his civil suit, Truong brought claims for violation of
California's civil "hate crimes" statute against the two actu-
al attackers." His complaint also alleged that the other
youths had a "special relationship" with him, which gave
rise to a duty to intervene and prevent the attack.94 The
particularities of Truong's "hate crimes" claim demonstrate
how essentialism limits Kerr's view of the attack and, more
generally, how essentialist conceptions of subordination
also plague legal strategies and decision-making.
Kerr pursued the claim strictly as one resulting from a
homophobic assault. Kerr logically concluded that homo-
phobia influenced the attack due to its occurrence in a gay
area, the sexualized language directed toward Truong, and
the youths' confession to a homophobic hate crime. The
factor of homophobia, however, should not preclude or
eclipse a racial reading of the crime. In fact, the circum-
stances surrounding the case and the long history of anti-
92. Unless otherwise stated, all factual information regarding Truong's civil
suit was obtained during a June 9, 1998 telephone conference I conducted with
his attorney Russell Kerr. Kerr, Interview, supra note 63.
93. Kerr, Interview, supra note 63. California civil rights law provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free
from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed
against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation,
age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person
perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics.
Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a) (Supp. 1988). The law also authorizes suits for damages
for the injured party. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b) (Supp. 1988) ("Whoever denies
the right provided by Section 51.7, or aids, incites, or conspires in that denial, is
liable for each and every offense for the actual damages suffered by any person
denied that right .... "). Truong also pursued a claim of common law battery
against the two assailants. Kerr, Interview, supra note 63. The particulars of
that claim is not relevant to this discussion.
94. Truong argued that a special relationship was created as a result of the
youths joining the two assailants as they journeyed to the beach to commit an
act of oppressive violence and by their encouraging and watching the attack.
Kerr, Interview, supra note 63. Under certain special circumstances, courts may
impose tort liability on individuals who otherwise have no affirmative duty to
act under the common law of torts. See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
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Asian violence strongly suggest the operation of white
supremacy in Truong's victimization. Nevertheless, Kerr is
resolute in his belief that race was irrelevant to the attack,
offering the following explanation for his dismissal of race:
"they [the youths] did not go to 'Little Saigon' to select a
victim; they went to 'Mountain Street Beach."'95 Kerr's
comments dramatically portray the essentialist treatment
of race and sexuality in the Truong case, legal theory and
litigation. To Kerr, racism and homosexuality are not
simply distinct and unconnected in a theoretical or abstract
sense; they also resist convergence physically and geograph-
ically. Under Kerr's telling observation, no potential racial
victims populate the "gay" Mountain Street Beach, and no
targets of homophobia are located within the "colored"
Little Saigon. Ultimately, Kerr's analysis erases gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color, a popu-
lation of which his client is possibly a member. Kerr's
reasoning also constructs homosexuality and gay geo-
graphic "spaces" as white and people of color and spatial
communities of color as heterosexual.96
Kerr's essentialism is also troubling because it ignores
the very history of gay and lesbian politics, through which
people of color have recognized and resisted multidimen-
sional oppression. For example, New York City's "Stonewall
Riots of 1969," which many scholars point to as a catalyst
for the modern "gay rights movement,"97 began when a
group of Puerto Rican, black and poor gay, lesbian, trans-
gendered and gender non-conforming individuals resisted
95. Kerr, Interview, supra note 63. Little Saigon is a predominately Vietna-
mese-American community in Westminster, California (and is in Orange
County, as is Laguna Beach). See Dennis McLellan, Dancing in the Dark, L.A.
TIMES, July 5, 1996, at El.
96. On the exclusion of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered Asian
Americans from "public spaces" in which national citizenship is constructed and
expressed, see Eric Estuar Reyes, Strategies for Queer Asia and Pacific Islander
Spaces, in ASIAN AMERICAN SEXUALITIES: DIMENSIONS OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN
EXPERIENCE 85, 86 (Russell Leong ed., 1996) [hereinafter ASIAN AMERICAN
SEXUALITIES]. For a discussion of how public policies and legal theories create
"racially identified space," see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race,
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
97. See Elvia R. Arriola, Fairies, Marimachas, Queens, and Lezzies: The
Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLuM. J.
GENDER & L. 33, 33 (1995) (observing that riots "changed history and breathed
life into the then dormant and internally conflicted homophile movement"); see
also JOHN D'EMmIo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 233 (1983).
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the repeated physical and other forms of harassment they
endured from local police."
On the particular evening of the riots, police, as they
had often done on prior occasions, "raided" the Stonewall
Inn (a gay bar) to harass patrons and to arrest individuals,
charging them with "lewdness" or "solicitation." ' People of
color, women, the poor and the transgendered were often
targeted for arrest and harassment. 0 The oppression that
these individuals faced was undeniably multidimensional in
nature-resulting from interwoven gender, race, sexuality
and class hierarchies.'0 ' The subordination of people of color
by the New York police was a manifestation of sexualized
racism: racial and sexual hierarchies rendered them vul-
nerable to police abuse and constructed their sexual
identity as particularly offensive and improper. Although
gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender statuses were
generally deemed transgressive and intolerable by the offi-
cers, subordinate racial status separated people of color
from white gays, lesbians, and bisexual and transgendered
individuals. The disparate treatment of gays, lesbians, bi-
sexuals and the transgendered of color suggests that the
transgressive sexual practices of people of color might be
perceived as particularly deviant and threatening to hetero-
sexual normalcy, a result that is consistent with the legacy
of negative stereotypification of the sexuality of people of
98. See Arriola, supra note 97, at 33 ("The Stonewall Riots erupted ... when
an unlikely group of revolutionaries, a few Black and Puerto Rican drag queens
and butch lesbians, turned a routine bar raid into a street fight with the local
police."). For a general account of the riots, see DEMImo, supra note 97, at 231-
33.
99. See Arriola, supra note 97, at 73-74 (discussing the patterns of harass-
ment which took place in New York City gay bars). As Arriola observes, the
most minimal behavior qualified individuals for arrest. Id. at 74-75 ("[Ihe po-
lice would shut down gay bars that allegedly permitted their patrons to flirt,
hold hands, kiss, hug, and dance with each other, all in violation of lewd con-
duct and solicitation statutes.") (citing ERic MARcus, MAKiNG HISTORY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990, at 64, 75-76 (1992);
see also Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and Men in
New York City 1960-1980, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 159 (1981)).
100. Arriola, supra note 97, at 74 ("There was an unspoken agreement to
arrest transvestites and lesbian buttes.... ."); id. at 76 (observing that black
Puerto Rican patron, Rey Rivera, "was targeted for harassment both as a cross-
dresser and as a black Hispanic").
101. Id. at 76 ("The events at the Stonewall Inn in 1969 remind gay people
of the need to be wary of goals and strategies that ignore the realities of racism,
classism, and sexism in the lesbian and gay worlds.").
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color. O Thus, the Stonewall rioters, these early radicals
from gay and lesbian communities and communities of
color, responded to a multidimensional system of sexualized
racial violence and harassment directed toward them by the
"protective" arm of the state. A "racial" reading of the
Stonewall Riots provides an historical context for the
problem of violence against gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered persons of color; this historical framework
problematizes an essentialist interpretation of Truong's
victimization that leaves no room for a conclusion that
white supremacy influenced the commission of the attack.
Thus far, my analysis has focused on the inefficiencies
associated with the responses to Truong's attack by legal
actors and, to a lesser extent, the predominately white gay
and lesbian community. Given the many racial dimensions
of the crime, however, one should also expect a significant
presence of anti-racist activists and people of color reacting
to the crime. The only visible anti-racist involvement in the
politicization of Truong's crime was by a few members of
the Asian American community, including members of
Truong's family. The (heterosexual) Asian American
responses to the crime exhibit the same troubling
adherence to an essentialist conceptualization of oppression
that plagues the dominant white response. While several
Asian Americans rightfully asserted that the attack was
racial in nature, 103 at times they treated race as an exclusive
feature of Truong's victimization. For example, in response
to portrayals of the attack as a "homophobic" crime, Quat
Truong, the victim's 35-year-old nephew complained:
Everyone is using that fact that he was in Laguna Beach at the
time to accuse him of being gay. I think it had to do with his being
Asian. I think they saw that he was different, not because they
thought he was gay, but because they saw that he was not
white.0
The nephew's comments indicate that he was either
trying to "defend" his uncle against allegations that he was
102. See infra pp. 79-96 (discussing the construction of people of color as
sexually deviant).
103. See, e.g., Costa Mesa, Asian-Americans Organize AWARE, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1993, at B4 (reporting that Asian Americans "believe Truong was also
targeted for assault because of his race").
104. Lily Dizon & Len Hall, Victim's Family Believes Pummeling Was
Racially Motivated, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at A17.
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gay-obviously a heterosexist mission-or to unveil the
racial dimensions of the crime, or both. Under either inter-
pretation, however, the nephew clearly attempted to sever
homosexuality from Asian American status. The nephew's
invocation of a "racial" explanation for the act of oppressive
violence depended upon or compelled (he hoped) the
negation of the crime's homosexual nature. In this sense,
anti-racist advocacy is heteronormative; it is conditioned
upon the absence, submergence or "closeting" of homo-
sexuality. Viewed within a larger social context, the
nephew's comments reinforce the invisibility of gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered within Asian
American communities.'0 5
The heterosexual Asian American and white gay and
lesbian responses to the Truong's attack evince an
essentialist conceptualization of oppressive violence be-
cause both of these marginalized communities attempted to
conceal important dimensions of the assault. Thus, while
their activism helped to politicize Truong's assault, both
communities engaged in the problematic essentialization of
105. See generally ASIAN AMERICAN SEXUALITIES, supra note 96; A LOTUS OF
ANOTHER COLOR: AN UNFOLDING OF THE SOUTH ASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN
EXPERIENCE (Rakesh Ratti ed., 1993). Subsequent to Truong's victimization,
Peter Pham, a young Asian American filmmaker, attempted to conduct research
on the attack for a documentary on Asian American gays, lesbians, bisexuals
and transgendered persons. See Mark Chalon Smith, Filmmaker Has Taken on
a Taboo Subject, L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1993, at F2. Pham claims that his project
met resistance from the Vietnamese-American community and from Truong's
family. Id. ("[Tihe Vietnamese community hasn't been supportive or responsive.
He (Truong) wouldn't even talk to me, [sic] his family didn't want him to.")
(quoting Pham). Id. Despite the racial interpretation of the crime offered by
some members of the Asian American community, the numerous journalistic
accounts of the crime muffled or ignored this racial discourse, focusing almost
exclusively on the crime's sexual dimensions and the activism of (white) gays
and lesbians. Furthermore, due to the crime's "homophobic" nature, many
Asian Americans, acting on heteronomative visions of racial status, were likely
unable to perceive the crime as an act of racial aggression, thus contributing to
an absence of visible racial activism surrounding Truong's assault. Neverthe-
less, some Asian Americans persisted in believing that the crime was racially
motivated. In fact, in response to Truong's attack and to other perceived
incidents of racial discrimination and harassment, a group of Asian American
activists in Orange County formed an anti-racist organization to monitor dis-
criminatory police practice in Asian American communities and to challenge
other acts of anti-Asian bigotry. See Mesa, supra note 103, at B4 (reporting
formation of AWARE, the Alliance Working for Asian Rights and Empowerment
and citing Truong's beating as the type of incident to which the group would
respond).
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identity and oppression that contributes to the invisibility
of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered people of
color. 06 Yet, even as they differed in their reading of the
crime, both communities experienced the assault as an act
of oppression. Despite the narrow interpretation Asian
Americans and gay activists attached to the crime, Truong's
victimization engendered multidimensional harms: it de-
livered a message of inferiority and domination to Asian
American and gay and lesbian communities (and the
various intersections of these populations). 7 The attack,
consistent with the nature of oppressive violence, deployed
terror and the fear of future violence to reinforce hier-
archical social relations constructed by white supremacist
and heterosexist ideologies. Thus, the actual multidimen-
sional nature of this crime remained unaffected by the
narrow constructions it received.0 8
2. Racial Patterns in Statistical Studies of Oppressive
Violence. The foregoing analysis provides a qualitative
examination of violence against gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered people of color that unveils the multidimen-
sional nature of systems of oppressive violence. Existing
statistical studies of such violence also suggest that oppres-
sive violence involves a complex fusion of homophobia, rac-
ism, patriarchy and class domination. Before I examine this
data, I note from the outset that there are only a limited
106. Furthermore, it is important not to be misled by the Asian American
response to Truong's assault. Typically, homophobic victimization does not gar-
ner the attention of anti-racism. In the Truong case, this attention, to the ex-
tent that it was given, was often precipitated on the submergence of homo-
sexuality.
107. See Jeordan Legon, Beating Has Gays Feeling Vulnerable in Once-Safe
Haven, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Jan. 18, 1993, at B4 (reporting fear in the
gay and lesbian community as a result of the attack); Mesa, supra note 103, at
B4 (forming of anti-racist group indicating Asian American community touched
by the crime).
108. That both communities were terrorized by the attack suggests a possi-
ble basis for communities of color and gay and lesbian communities to form
coalitions to combat oppressive violence. The respective devaluation of gay
rights and anti-racism by communities of color and gay and lesbian commun-
ities, however, precludes such collective action from occurring. See Hutchinson,
supra note 2, at 643 (arguing that coalition politics could result from a
multidimensional construction of equality); see also SHANE PHELAN, GETTING
SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS (1994) ("If we challenge the grand
narratives of race, class, gender and sexuality in favor of more local and specific
analyses, we find that our allies are everywhere.").
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number of empirical analyses of homophobic violence,
10 9
despite the politicization of this violence in gay and lesbian
communities and the efforts of several anti-violence organ-
izations to collect such data."' An even smaller number
provides information regarding the race of the victims and
assailants, due in part to the failure of gay and lesbian
politics to address issues of racial subordination and of anti-
racist organizations to confront homophobia."' Further-
more, when researchers investigate homophobic violence,
their data may not provide a representative sample of the
gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered community be-
cause many victims are "closeted" and, therefore, fail to
report their victimization."' The general invisibility of
109. As Gary David Comstock observes:
[Tihe information [regarding homophobic violence] provided by the
gay/lesbian and mainstream media has been primarily anecdotal and
descriptive; the political analyses and social commentaries written by
lesbians and gay men and other writers have tended to discuss single
incidents and to make general observations; and the social sciences
have noticed anti-gay/lesbian violence as one of many problems faced
by lesbians and gay men without giving it singular attention.
COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 32.
110. See VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIMEs: NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 49-108 (1997) (discussing the politi-
cization of oppressive violence within gay and lesbian communities and efforts
to compile data regarding such violence).
111. Valerie Jenness and Kendal Broad have studied several organizations
formed to combat homophobic violence. They conclude that the general omission
of issues of racism (and religious bigotry) in gay and lesbian politics has affected
the movement's response to homophobic violence in at least three ways:
First, none of the antiviolence projects in our sample identify as an
organization of and/or for gays and lesbians of color. Second, while
addressing the problem of hate-motivated violence against gays and
lesbians, only rarely do these organizations speak to the issues of
racism and anti-Semitism and how they provide an institutional and
cultural context for the victimization of gays and lesbians of color, as
well as gays and lesbians who identify as racial and/or ethnic minor-
ities. Third ... although some of these organizations sponsor select
activities for people of color and acknowledge a political concern for
people of color, very few enact corresponding activism or tailor their
message to gays and lesbians of color.
JENNESS & BROAD, supra note 110, at 55 (internal footnotes omitted); see also
Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An
Overview, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY
MEN 29 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) [hereinafter HATE
CRIMES] ("Additional research with larger and more representative samples of
lesbians and gay men clearly is needed to assess the relationship betveen mem-
bership in minority racial and ethnic groups and the risk of anti-gay violence.").
112. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 32 ("Because lesbians and gay men
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people of color means that their experiences are even more
unrepresented in these data."' Many gays and lesbians,
moreover, distrust law enforcement due to a history of vic-
timization and harassment by police officers and, thus,
often do not report such violence to law enforcement offi-
cials."' As a consequence, statistics compiled by police de-
partments may distort the magnitude of homophobic bru-
tality.
Conscious of these methodological difficulties, the re-
maining portion of Part II tentatively examines existing
empirical studies of homophobic violence in order to un-
cover racial patterns in such violence. These data suggest
that race might increase the vulnerability of gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and the transgendered of color to homophobic
violence and subject them to additional harassment and
further abuse by police officers when they report their
victimization.
One of the most comprehensive studies of homophobic
violence was conducted by Gary David Comstock. 5 The
Comstock Survey compiles the results of a survey of 291
gays and lesbians of different class and racial back-
grounds."6 Participants in the survey responded to a series
of questions regarding their experiences with homophobic
vary in their degree of visibility, they comprise a population that cannot be
sampled representatively."); Berrill, supra note 111, at 39 (arguing that because
"many lesbians and gay men, fearing hostility and discrimination... conceal
their gay identities" existing surveys do not provide a representative sample of
the gay and lesbian community).
113. See CoMSToCK, supra note 61, at 32 (arguing that surveys of persons
who have access to gay and lesbian institutions are "not likely to reach lesbians
and gay men who do not associate openly with other lesbians and gay men or
black, Ullispanic, and other ethnic people who are marginalized even within
lesbian/gay communities"); Berrill, supra note 111, at 39 (arguing that surveys
of homophobic violence do not include adequate numbers of "people who are
closeted, disabled, economically disadvantaged, elderly or very young, members
of racial minority groups, or living in rural settings," and concluding that "in
most surveys that provide[ I demographic data, a disproportionate number of
those sampled were White, male, highly educated, and of middle income").
114. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 158-59 (discussing under-reporting of
homophobic violence due in part to fear of hostility from police); Kevin T. Berrill
& Gregory M. Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimization in Anti-Gay Hate
Crimes: Official Response and Public Policy, in HATE CRIMES, supra note 111, at
294-95 (same).
115. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61. Hereinafter, the text of this Article
refers to Comstock's research as the Comstock Survey.
116. COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 32.
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violence."7 The survey also compiles the results of thirty-
four other studies of homophobic violence."' The Comstock
Survey presents its results in two broad categories:
"general" and "specific" violence."9 The general violence
category gathers information based on participants' respon-
ses to a single question generalizing all incidents of violence
(e.g., "Have you been assaulted because you are lesbian or
gay?"), or by collapsing together and summarizing answers
to a series of questions regarding particular kinds of as-
saults (e.g., "Have you ever been raped, robbed, or beaten
because of your sexual orientation?").12 The "specific vio-
lence" category presents data detailing the percentage of
individuals who have experienced certain subcategories of
violence and harassment, such as assaults, rape and
vandalism; in the specific category (unlike the general
category) the data for the subcategories of violence remains
disaggregated. 2'
Both the general and specific violence categories
demonstrate racial patterns. Under the general violence
category, for example, the Comstock Survey finds that 58%
of lesbians of color compared with 41% of white lesbians
reported victimization; among men, 70% of men of color and
59% of white men reported victimization.22 Thus, when
asked whether they have experienced homophobic violence
generally, a higher percentage of persons of color responded
affirmatively.' The subcategories or specific categories
contain shifting results. In some categories, a higher per-
centage of people of color experienced such violence; in
other categories, the rate of victimization was greater
among whites. Still in other subcategories, the rate of
victimization was equal. 24 Overall, lesbians of color and
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 34.
120. Id. at 34.
121. See id. at 38. Comstock includes eight categories of violence in his
survey: chase, thrown object, beating, vandalism, robbery, rape, use of weapon
and spitting. See id. at 42.
122. See id. at 37, 146.
123. Although Comstock does not draw any hard conclusions regarding the
higher overall rate of victimization for people of color, he suggests that it may
result from the fact that people of color generally are disproportionately the
victims of violence. See id. at 55; see also Berrill, supra note 111, at 29 (drawing
the same conclusion).
124. See Comstock, supra note 61, at 42-43. For example, a greater number
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white gay men reported higher rates of victimization in the
various subcategories."5 These data may mean that lesbi-
ans of color and white gay men report a greater breadth of
assaults. Comstock, however, fails to account for the differ-
ences between the general and specific categories. In partic-
ular, Comstock does not state whether white male partici-
pants (who, overall, reported a lower level of victimization)
had higher rates of violence within the subcategories be-
cause certain individuals suffered multiple attacks or be-
cause the attacks they experienced involved combinations of
offenses in the various subcategories.
Other studies support Comstock's finding that people of
color experience homophobic violence in rates exceeding
those of whites.2 While these studies tentatively support a
finding that race subjects people of color to higher rates of
anti-gay/lesbian violence, more research is needed due to
the methodological difficulties associated with gay and les-
bian surveys and because the number of studies that have
provided racial data remains too small to draw any final
conclusions. Nevertheless, even if statistical data ultimately
prove that race does not subject people of color to greater
victimization rates, racial hostility will still likely play a
role in precipitating individual acts of sexualized violence. 7
The Comstock Survey also details and documents the
tense relationship between law enforcement and gay, les-
bian, bisexual and transgendered communities. 2 Police of-
ficers and the courts have historically been indifferent to or
even active participants in the marginalization of gays and
lesbians through oppressive violence.' Comstock confirms
of men of color had objects thrown at them and were chased, while a greater
number of white men reported being robbed and beaten.
125. See id.
126. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 197 & n.59; Berrill, supra note 111, at
29; Beatrice von Shulthess, Violence in the Streets: Anti-Lesbian Assault and
Harassment in San Francisco, in HATE CRIMES, supra note 111, at 70. Comstock
observes that one study contradicts the finding of greater rates of victimization
among people of color. See COMSTOCK, supra at 37. Comstock, however argues
that this study was conducted when gays and lesbians were less willing to come
out of the closet and that it also failed to include subcategories of violence. See
id.
127. For example, regardless of statistical trends, it remains possible to
offer a racial interpretation of Truong's attack. See supra pp. 23-26 and accom-
panying notes.
128. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 152-62.
129. See id. See also Berrill & Herek, supra note 114, at 293-95 (discussing
"secondary" victimization of victims of homophobic violence by police and
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this history of hostility with statistical data. Specifically,
the Comstock Survey finds that 73% of the victims of all
forms of homophobic violence declined to report the inci-
dents to police,"' while 58% of victims of more graphic at-
tacks declined to report the incidents.13' Other surveys con-
firm these results.3
The alarming implications of these data increase when
the findings are controlled for racial backgrounds. In partic-
ular, 82% of victims of color, as opposed to 72% of white
victims, did not report their victimization to police.133
The Comstock Survey also examines police responses to
reports of homophobic violence, categorizing the victims'
descriptions of police reactions as "helpful, courteous" "in-
different," "hostile," "physically abusive," and "compe-
tent."'34 These data suggest that a higher percentage of gays
and lesbians of color than whites experience harassment
and abuse from police when they report incidents of homo-
phobic violence. Specifically, 42% of people of color, com-
pared with 16% of whites, described police responses as
"hostile"; 8% of people of color, compared with 3% of whites,
described police responses as "physically abusive"; and 17%
of people of color, compared with 65% of whites, described
police responses as "helpful, courteous." 5 The racial pat-
terns in these data confirm a history of particularized hos-
tility between gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgen-
dered of color with law enforcement (a history evidenced by
courts). Among the most pernicious examples of the institutionalization of het-
erosexism in the law is the "homosexual panic defense." Under this defense, de-
fendants charged with murdering a gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered
person can seek to have the charge reduced to manslaughter by arguing that
the victim made a sexual "advance." For a criticism of this defense, see Gary
David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAW &
SEXUALITY 81, 86-89 (1992); Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992).
130. See COMSTOCI, supra note 61, at 158. The rate of non-reporting of vio-
lent crimes in the general population is 64%. See id. at 158-59.
131. See id. at 158.
132. See id. (discussing other findings).
133. See id. at 159. The results for victims of serious forms of violence were
roughly equal among people of color and whites, 59% and 58%, respectively. See
id.
134. Id. at 160.
135. Id. Totals exceed 100% because "some respondents reported more than
one incident." Id. (Table C.3). Results in the "indifferent" category were roughly
equal, with 67% of people of color and 68% of whites describing the police
response as such. See id.
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the Stonewall Riots13 ) and affirm the general tension be-
tween communities of color and the police.3 7 These findings
also demonstrate the importance of implementing anti-
heterosexist agendas within critical race theory and other
forms of anti-racist discourse and placing anti-racist politics
within gay and lesbian liberation discourse. For example, if
anti-racism and gay politics seek to challenge police insen-
sitivity and hostility directed toward all members of their
respective communities, then they must recognize and con-
front the ways in which race and sexual oppression interact
to shape oppressive police conduct.3 '
The foregoing discussion has uncovered the multidi-
mensional nature of oppressive violence and the use of sex-
ualized racial oppression to dominate and marginalize gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. The
synergistic relationship between gender, class, sexuality
and racial hierarchy sustains systems of oppressive vio-
lence, shapes the often negative responses of law enforce-
ment to such brutality, creates harms that paralyze and
reinforce the domination of multiple oppressed commun-
ities, and treats the transgressive sexual identities of gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color as par-
ticularly harmful, threatening and undesired. Given the
"collusion" of racism, homophobia and patriarchy in the
brutalization of people of color, anti-racist legal theorists
and political activists should pay close attention to the role
of heterosexism (and other forms of exclusion) as an institu-
tional source of subordination; they should also advocate
pro-gay and lesbian legal and policy reforms. Yet, as Part II
136. See supra pp. 29-31.
137. See Chris Braeske, The Drug War Comes to a Highway Near You: Po-
lice Power to Effectuate Highway "Narcotics Checkpoints" Under the Federal
and State Constitutions, 11 LAw & INEQ. J. 449, 461 (1993) ("[T]he relationship
between people of color and the police is often fraught with apprehension, dis-
trust, and possibly outright fear."); Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V. Ward,
Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 323,
326-27 (1995) (discussing tense relationship between people of color and police
due to history of racial harassment and violence by police); Dwight L. Greene,
Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Color-
less Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 2053-54 (1993)
(describing "[b]onds of trust.., between the police and... minority commun-
ities" as "minimal").
138. Cf Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 637-38 ([]f 'coming out,' physical
safety, and access to healthcare are indeed important issues in gay and lesbian
politics and legal equality, gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists
must analyze and confront racial and class subordination.").
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reveals, anti-racist political activists and legal theorists
often omit an examination of heterosexism in their work or
approach the issue of gay and lesbian equality with ambiva-
lence or skepticism. Consequently, their activism and
theories, in direct opposition to the inherent goals of anti-
racism, fail to counter the perpetuation of racial subord-
ination-when it occurs through systems of homophobic
racial violence and discrimination. Because these theorists
and activists, however, have responded vigorously to
systems of heterosexual racial violence, they have construct-
ed a heteronormative and discriminatory racial discourse,
in which heterosexual status (or the submergence of homo-
sexuality) serves as a prerequisite for anti-racist advo-
cacy.
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II. HETERONORMATIVITY AND ANTI-RACIST DIscOURSE
A. Anti-Racist Political Discourse
Despite the reality of homophobic racial oppression,
anti-racist legal theorists and political activists have
generally failed to engage in a substantial critique of heter-
osexism.' Manifestations of the marginalization of homo-
sexuality in anti-racism range from outright homophobia'
139. See infra pp. 79-96.
140. There are, of course, numerous exceptions to this statement, which
counter a popular myth that people of color are more homophobic than whites.
See BELL HOOKS, Homophobia in Black Communities, in TALKING BACK:
THINKING FEMINIST, THINKMG BLACK 120 (1989) (analyzing and criticizing
homophobia in black communities); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 88-89 (1994)
(criticizing homophobia within black communities); Harlon L. Dalton, Aids in
Blackface, 118 DAEDALUS 205 (1989) (same); Holly Morris, Civil Rights Leaders
Back End to Military's Gay Ban, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 1, 1993, at C8
(reporting support by several racial civil rights groups of gay and lesbian efforts
to desegregate military); Deb Price, Japanese-American Group Backs Gay
Marriages, STAR TRIB., Oct. 5, 1994, at 4E (reporting support for same-sex
marriage by Japanese-American civil rights group); Lena Williams, Blacks
Rejecting Gay Rights as a Battle Equal to Theirs, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at
Al (noting support of gay rights by Coretta Scott King, Jesse Jackson and
NAACP); id. (reporting survey indicating greater black than white support for
end of military's homophobic policies).
141. See Cheryl Clarke, The Failure To Transform: Homophobia in the
Black Community, in HOME GILS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 197-98
(Barbara Smith ed., 1983) (discussing outward homophobia and condemnation
of gays and lesbians by black nationalist organization); Hutchinson, "Claiming"
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to a general lack of commitment to sexual equality.' The
ambivalence or opposition toward "gay rights" among anti-
racists reflects the heterosexism that exists inside and
outside of communities of color.'
Perhaps the most frequent manifestation of hetero-
normativity and subordination of gays and lesbians within
anti-racist discourse occurs in attempts by people of color-
primarily black heterosexual males-to critique compar-
isons of "racism" to "homophobia" or of "black" experience to
"gay" experience." Proponents of the race-sexuality anal-
ogies, primarily white gay and lesbian civil rights activists
and scholars, employ them hoping that they will garner
empathy and greater support for gay and lesbian political
agendas."5 Furthermore, the centrality of "race" in equal
and "Speaking" Who We Are, supra note 24, at 12-15 (analyzing explicit
homophobia of Nation of Islam leadership).
142. See, e.g., Dana Y. Takagi, Maiden Voyage: Excursion into Sexuality and
Identity Politics in Asian America, in ASIAN AMERICAN SEXUALITIES, supra note
96, at 27 (criticizing fact that "the topic of homosexuality in Asian American
studies is often treated in whispers, if mentioned at all"); Angela Ards, The New
Black Radicalism, THE NATION, July 27, 1998, at 19 (discussing rifts among
participants of the 1998 conference of the Black Radical Congress, a progressive
race organization, over the role of anti-heterosexism in black politics); Art Pine,
Gay Issue Quietly Spreads Rifts Through Civil Rights Groups, Lobbyists: High
Profile Black and Latino Groups Are on Sidelines in Battle To End Military's
Ban on Homosexuals, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at A20 (reporting ambivalence
or opposition to gay and lesbian equality in traditional black and Latino and
Latina civil rights organizations).
143. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 141.
144. See, e.g., John Sibley Butler, Homosexuals and the Military
Establishment, 31 SOCIETY 13 (1993); Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels-Gays
and Blacks: Linking Military Ban to Integration Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al; Susan Feeney, Echoes from the Past: Sides at
Odds over Parallel of Military Integration, Gay Ban, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 23, 1993, at JI; David Lightman, To Congressman, Military's Gay Ban Not
Like Racial Bias, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al; Joe Rogers, Spare
Us the Comparisons Between Gays and Blacks, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at
A21; Williams, supra note 140, at Al; Larry Witham, Black Clergy Balk at Gays
Sharing Rights Umbrella, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at A3.
145. See, e.g., URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY
AND LESBIAN LIBERATION 181 (1995); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 626. Such
analogies are bountiful in gay and lesbian liberation discourse. See, e.g., Robert
Dawidoff & Michael Nava, Why Martin Luther King, Jr. Is a Gay-Rights Hero:
His Life and His Message Resonate Beyond the Fight Against Racial Prejudice,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at M5; William Eskridge, Race and Sexual Orient-
ation in the Military: Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, RECONSTRUCTION, No.
2, at 52 (1993); Gerald Gillerman, Dred Scott Revisited. A Comment on Bowers
v. Hardvick, 30 BOST. BAR J., No. 5 Sept.-Oct. 1986; Lisa Keen, The Fears Are
Unjustified, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1993, at C7.
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protection jurisprudence greatly influences the use of this
analogy in legal scholarship and litigation. By using the
analogy, legal theorists and attorneys wish to convince
courts that the history of discrimination against gays and
lesbians is sufficiently similar to that against people of color
so as to warrant application of heightened judicial scrutin Y
to governmental classifications based on sexual identity.'
Furthermore, because much of the legal and political dis-
course on race, for historical and other reasons, is construc-
ted around the history of black subjugation by whites,147 the
analogy typically invokes blackness, rather than other dis-
paraged racial statuses. Consequently, many of the respon-
ses to the analogies from people of color have been made by
blacks.
As numerous scholars in feminism, anti-racism and gay
and lesbian legal theory have argued, comparisons between
oppressed groups distort and hinder, rather than aid, the
respective goals of cross-cultural understanding and social
justice. The analogies, for example, incorrectly treat their
subject populations as mutually exclusive groups, thus
erasing the experiences and compounding the invisibility of
persons with multiple subordinated statuses.' The analo-
146. See Janet Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the
Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITIcS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121
(David Kairys ed. 1998) ("[Sleeking to find room under the aegis of key equality
precedent, gay and lesbian advocates often find themselves saying that sexual
orientation is like race, or that gay men and lesbians are like a racial group, or
that anti-gay policies are like racist policies, or that homophobia is like
racism."); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and
"Passing". Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLAcKLETrER J. 65, 76 (1997)
("[Elqual protection analysis revolves around comparing different types of
discrimination to race or sex discrimination. At present, then, advocates for gay
men and lesbians who attempt to secure heightened scrutiny for sexual orien-
tation discrimination cases are pursuing both possibilities of comparing sexual
orientation to sex and race.").
147. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture,
Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181
(1997) (discussing "black/white paradigm" in legal and political discourse);
Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1103 (1997) (same).
148. See Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified: Speculation on Law's
Discourse, Race, and the Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS,
supra note 76, at 62 (" 'Black homosexual' is... an oxymoron in an analogical
comparison of blacks and homosexuals."); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 583-84
(arguing that race-sexuality analogies erase gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgendered people of color); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in
the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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gies also obscure varying distributions of power across so-
cial groups.'49 For instance, claims by white gays and lesbi-
ans that they are "the same" as blacks masks the operation
of racial privilege in white gay and lesbian experience. Un-
der the analogies, a poor black heterosexual is similarly sit-
uated as an upper-class white gay male: both are margin-
alized.
Conservative white gay male scholar Andrew Sullivan,
for example, has invoked the institution of slavery to draw
support for political and legal efforts to legalize same-sex
marriage. His analysis powerfully demonstrates the
inefficiencies associated with the race-sexuality analogies.
Sullivan argues that the oppression of (white) gays and les-
bians is not
less intense than that against, say, heterosexual blacks .... There
was no slavery for homosexuals, for example; but even slaves, if
they were heterosexual, were occasionally allowed the right to
marry the persons they loved. That right was often peremptorily
taken away, but when it was, the hideousness of the injustice was
clear. But that injustice is unavailable to homosexuals, because
they haven't even been deemed eligible for the institution of
marriage in the first place; they have always been, from one
particular perspective, beneath slaves. And they still are.150
Sullivan distorts the history and scope of racism by
ignoring the fact that slave marriages had no legal effect." I
He also romanticizes the value of "marriage" to slaves who,
"married" or not, remained the "property" of whites. As a
283, 297 (1994) (arguing that attempts to compare homosexuals and other
groups "erases vertical differences within a group"); Grillo & Wildman, supra
note 2, at 404 ("To analogize gender to race, one must assume that each is a
distinct category; the impact of which can be neatly separated, one from the
other. Whenever [this division] is attempted, the experience of women of
color ... is rendered invisible.").
149. See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 2, at 401 ("Comparing sexism to
racism perpetuates patterns of racial domination by marginalizing and
obscuring the different roles that race plays in the lives of people of color and of
whites."); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 631 (noting that proponents of race-
sexuality analogies "ignore a legacy of racial and class hierarchy-of racial and
economic privilege and subordination"); Schacter, supra note 148, at 297
(observing that attempts to compare homosexuals and other groups "erases
'horizontal' differences across the spectrum of legally protected groups").
150. ANDREw SULLiVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY 154 (1995). Interestingly, Sullivan's "comparison" is made in a
point in his discussion when he expresses discomfort with the analogies. See id.
151. See HOOKS, supra note 3, at 43.
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consequence of these distortions, blacks and whites-even
slaves and white gay slave owners-falsely share an equal
lot: they are both "oppressed."' 2 Sullivan's comparison also
erases black gays and lesbians; he even explicitly compares
"homosexuals" for whom "there was no slavery" to "black
heterosexuals."5 '
While most race-sexuality comparisons are not as
dramatic as Sullivan's, they all suffer from the same pit-
falls-the erasure of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the
transgendered of color and the obfuscation of the effects of
racial subordination and racial privilege. Despite the persis-
tence and virulence of heterosexist oppression, white gays
and lesbians remain socially advantaged in a racially hier-
archical society that privileges whiteness. By treating black
subjugation (or other forms of racial domination) as the
same as white gay oppression, the analogies mask the real-
ity that social and economic .power is racially distributed.
As a result, many people of color have rightfully criticized
the deployment of the analogies in gay and lesbian political
discourse.' To the extent that black critiques of race-
sexuality analogies attempt to problematize the obfus-
cation of racial subordination inherent in these compari-
sons, the critiques serve the interests of progressive poli-
tical and legal agendas."'
Although the race and sexuality comparisons tend to
blur the pervasive impact of racial subordination and pri-
vilege, an anti-essentialist critique of the analogies need not
imply a diminution or wholesale rejection of the compelling
goal of gay and lesbian equality. Yet, an analysis of the
black responses to the analogies reveals that many of them
are veiled disparagements of sexual equality made through
the politics and rhetoric of anti-racism.'56 The arguments of
152. Sullivan's "comparison" actually goes farther than most "analogies"
because he concludes that gays are "beneath," rather than similar to, blacks (or
"slaves"). SULLIVAN, supra note 150, at 154.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 144.
155. For an additional critique of the analogies, see Hutchinson, supra note
2, at 625-34.
156. VAID, supra note 145, at 187 ("[Slome of the [black community's] anger
at the analogies stems from homophobia."); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 628
("While some of the black responses to the race-sexuality analogies represent a
legitimate attempt to problematize gay and lesbian essentialism, some of them
flow from a disapprobation of homosexuality and an opposition to gay and
lesbian rights.").
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John Sibley Butler, a sociologist at the University of Texas
and a commentator on racial discrimination, illustrate the
often heteronormative (and heterosexist) nature of the
black heterosexual critiques of the race-sexuality compar-
isons.
Butler criticizes the utilization of the race-sexuality
analogy in the context of debates to repeal the military's
discriminatory policies against gays and lesbians. 1' While a
portion of his analysis legitimately challenges the obfus-
cation of race in the analogies,'58 Butler ultimately, though
unnecessarily, dismisses the importance of gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgender equality. Butler's discussion mar-
ginalizes gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender identity,
politics and legal reform efforts in at least four ways: it de-
legitimizes gay and lesbian oppression as a "civil rights"
issue, erases black gays and lesbians, dismisses the injur-
ious effects of homophobia, and ratifies homophobic charac-
terizations of gayness.
Butler marginalizes gay and lesbian politics in his
veiled effort to place heterosexism and gay and lesbian
oppression beyond the scope of remedial civil rights law and
policy. Butler endeavors to effectuate this (unstated) goal
by analyzing, then rebuking, comparisons of "blacks" and
"homosexuals." Butler observes that usage of the race-
sexuality analogies in gay and lesbian political discourse
reflects the gay and lesbian community's search for a
"metaphor" with which to place heterosexist oppression
within a larger history of societal discrimination, thereby
evoking support for gay and lesbian equality. 9 Butler oppo-
157. Butler, supra note 144. Much of the black criticism of the analogies and
the deployment of the analogies occurred in the context of debates concerning
the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military. See Hutchinson, supra
note 2, at 625-31 (discussing black criticism of analogies in military debates).
158. Butler, supra note 144, at 17 ("The idea of common oppression with
blacks is not only fallacious, it trivializes the entire history of suffering that
blacks have experienced because of their outward racial characteristics,
characteristics which cannot be hidden as one goes through life.").
159. Id. at 13 ("The racial metaphor... brings the issue of homosexuality
into the arena of civil rights, or the right to be a part of the military regardless
of one's background."). This observation is consistent with prevailing scholarly
opinion. Butler also observes that analogies have been deployed historically by
several oppressed groups seeking to obtain civil rights protection. See Butler,
supra note 144, at 16 ("Whatever the movement, its leaders, activists, and com-
mentators have always used appropriate metaphors to help people understand
why it was important to change a policy.").
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ses the use of racism as a metaphor for heterosexism and
seeks to demonstrate the inappropriateness of such com-
parisons.
Butler argues that comparisons between race and "ho-
mosexuality" are misplaced because race is an imposed trait
while sexuality is a chosen behavior: "For white gays or
white lesbians to compare themselves with blacks as a
racial group violates the rules of comparative analysis. One
cannot compare an achieved behavior that runs through all
racial groups with an ascribed characteristic like race."6 '
Butler's analysis, contrary to contemporary racial theories,
treats race as a biological phenomenon, rather than a social
construct developed by political, historical, economic and
ideological forces. 6' On the other hand, Butler seems to
recognize some of the social dimensions of sexual identity;
he describes "homosexuality" as something "achieved" and
as a "lifestyle,"'62 even as he narrowly limits its content
(almost contradictorily) to sexual "behavior." 3 In addition
to characterizing sexual identity as chosen and behavioral,
Butler also distinguishes homosexuality from race on the
grounds that the latter is an "outward characteristic" while
the former can be "hidden""6  Because, Butler argues,
"homosexuality" is behavioral, heterosexism, unlike racism,
falls outside of the scope of protective civil rights policy.
Butler concludes that "homosexual behavior...belongs to
the group of metaphors that address behavior" and that gay
160. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
161. See sources cited supra note 82.
162. See Butler, supra note 144, at 17 ("It should be quite clear that persons
of European, African, Asian, or Mongolian descent who are attracted sexually to
other people of the same sex are just a diversity of people with a certain sexual
lifestyle.").
163. As do racial theorists, many sexuality scholars treat sexual identity as
a social construct. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv, 503
(1994) (critiquing use of biological definitions of sexual orientation in equal
protection litigation); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness:
Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 84,
117-23 (1998) (discussing social construction of sexual identity); Valdes, supra
note 1, at 367 (urging "[q]ueer legal theory to join in the unfinished task of
conceptualizing 'sexual orientation' as a functional legal and social construct.").
The social constructivist view of sexual identity remains subject to contention.
See Halley, supra (discussing division in gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender
community over biological and social constructionist conceptualization of sexual
identity).
164. Butler, supra note 144, at 17.
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and lesbian equality "cannot be based on arguments about
civil rights and the denial of civil rights."' Thus, unlike
progressive critiques of the race-sexuality comparisons,
which unveil their inherent distortions and omissions,
Butler's discussion ultimately rejects the comparisons be-
cause he cannot-or he refuses to-imagine how sexual
freedom for gays and lesbians might clearly relate to a
broader civil rights goal of racial justice. Butler thus posits
a narrow vision of civil rights that marginalizes the exper-
iences of persons who are not similarly situated with
blacks.'66 Butler's "distinction" of race from sexuality (a
"reverse analogy") is problematic on several grounds.
First, Butler's distinction of race and sexuality seems
contrary to the lived experiences of gay and lesbian people.
While Butler concludes that "homosexuality" "differs" from
race because the former is behavioral and concealable, it is
precisely when "homosexuality" is practiced (or behavioral)
that it becomes visible, "like" race, and a source of discrim-
ination and subjugation.67 Furthermore, Butler's analysis
problematically reduces race to a biological trait, thus ob-
scuring its social, political, historical and cultural dimen-
sions. Race, like sexuality, is experienced and practiced,6 ' a
fact that Butler's biological framework ignores. Butler, for
165. Id. at 19.
166. See infra pp. 60-67 (criticizing similar view of civil rights offered by
critical race theorists).
167. Eaton, supra note 148, at 62-63 ("When the sexual aim finds
expression... desire enters the world of others, and becomes a phenomenon to
be witnessed and perhaps judged. It is not that activity distinguishes sexual
identity from race; on the contrary, it is precisely when desire erupts into
conduct that it becomes observable and, like race, a matter of visual
appreciation or disdain.").
168. John A. Powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as
a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAw & INEQ. 99, 102 91997) ("[Rlace is
an experiential truth, and it is a categorical error to attempt to reduce the
meanings and functions of race to scientifically verifiable measurements.").
Critical race theory has been instrumental in forging the experiential concep-
tualization of race and examining how race creates diverse knowledge and per-
spectives. Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial
Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1865
(1990) ("Critical Race Theorists are attempting to integrate their experiential
knowledge, drawn from a shared history as 'other,' with their ongoing struggles
to transform a world deteriorating under the albatross of racial hegemony.");
Alex M. Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2034 ("[Like
Critical Feminist Theory, Critical Race theory is largely experiential, grounded
in the experience of scholars of color as participants in a society whose history
has been soiled by racism and racist acts toward people of color.").
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example, asserts that "[allthough racial groups do organize
for political purposes, the emphasis is on shared racial
characteristics, not shared lifestyles."'69 The shared physical
"characteristics" of oppressed racial groups, however, have
no meaning outside of a history of white supremacist
domination and racial categorization.! ° The importance of
race results from the historical oppression of persons with
"shared characteristics" (and their resistance to this
subordination)-not from the "characteristics" themselves.
Although the particular "distinctions" Butler makes
between homosexuality and blackness are subject to criti-
cism, my aim here is not to locate similarities between the
two categories. Given the essentializing nature of compara-
tive and distinguishing approaches to race and sexuality
and the diverse manifestations of oppression, the achieve-
ment (or denial) of gay and lesbian equality must not
depend upon the perceived similarities (or differences)
between the two categories."i' Sexual subordination inflicts
a multitude of harms upon its victims and the larger so-
ciety. These harms require the legal and political remedies
provided by the existing civil rights framework-despite
"differences" (or "similarities") between black heterosexual
and white gay existence.
7 2
In addition to placing anti-heterosexism beyond the do-
main of civil rights policy, Butler's analysis also disparages
gay and lesbian equality by marginalizing gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and the transgendered of color. Butler's attempt
to "distinguish" blackness from "homosexuality," like the
analogical approach employed by white gay and lesbian
169. Butler, supra note 144, at 17 (emphasis added).
170. See Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 747, 777 (1994) ("Race cannot be self-evident on the basis of skin color,
for skin color alone has no inherent meaning."). Butler's understanding of the
meaning of race seems to shift in his analysis, however. While he describes race
as simply a biological trait, his argument derives tremendous potency when he
examines the historical subjugation of blacks, a history which renders
"fallacious" any analogy of white gay experience to "black" experience. Butler,
supra note 144, at 15-18 (describing how analogies obscure history of racism).
171. Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 633 ("[G]ay and lesbian legal theorists
and political activists should advocate sexual equality by addressing the many
harms sexual subordination causes. These harms require legal and political
remedies for their own sake-without reference to the rights and injuries of
black heterosexuals."); Schacter, supra note 148, at 315 (concluding that race-
sexuality analogies do not "serve... the cause of gay civil rights").
172. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 633.
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activists and theorists, treats blackness and "homo-
sexuality" (and black subjugation and homophobia) as un-
connected. As a result, Butler's framework erases black gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgender experience and places
black heterosexuals and white gays and lesbians at the
center of analysis. Ironically, Butler criticizes white gay and
lesbian activists for omitting "black homosexuals" from
discussion through their use of the analogies.'73 His own
analysis, however, makes the same omission. For example,
after locating "distinctions" between "homosexuality" and
blackness, Butler concludes that the "issue of social change
relating to homosexuality must be divorced from issues
relating to the history of blacks in America."74 This conclu-
sion essentializes black identity by ignoring the multiplicity
of experiences within black communities. Black gay exper-
iences, for example, cannot be "divorced" from black history.
Furthermore, Butler, at various points in his analysis, ex-
plicitly limits his observations to white gays and lesbians
and black heterosexuals.'75 By erasing black gays and les-
bians, issues of their multidimensional oppression, the rele-
vance of gay and lesbian equality to "black" liberation, and
a discussion of what the repeal of the military's anti-gay
policy might mean for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the
transgendered of color are excluded from discussion.
Butler's elision of black sexual diversity is also demon-
strated in his analysis of white gay social status. Butler ex-
amines white gay and lesbian racial privilege in order to
question their claim of oppression and need for civil rights
protection.76 While the question of white privilege is vital
173. Butler, supra note 144, at 17. ("A related point is that when someone
says blacks and homosexuals, they automatically leave out blacks who are
homosexuals.").
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id. at 17 ("For white gays or white lesbians to compare themselves with
the blacks as a racial group violates the rules of comparative analysis."); id. at
18 ("White homosexuals are well represented in all professions and have had
the same opportunity as other white persons to take advantage of the varied
existing opportunity structure."); id. at 14 ("When we say blacks in the military
from an historical perspective, we are speaking of blacks who were male and
non-homosexual .. ").
176. Id. at 18 ("White homosexuals are well represented in all professions
and have had the same opportunity as other white persons to take advantage of
the varied existing opportunity structure."); id. at 17 ("[Tlhere were probably
white homosexuals who opposed the [racial desegregation of the military, no
less than the rest of society. Let us not forget that J. Edgar Hoover, the head of
the FBI and a reputed homosexual, was one of Martin Luther King's worst
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for discussions of racial and sexual inequality,'77 the inclu-
sion of black gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered
individuals in Butler's analysis would have complicated his
discussion regarding the relative jrivileges of white gays
and lesbians and those of "blacks."'
Butler, for example, observes that white gays and les-
bians could always participate in the military, despite ex-
clusionary policies, if they concealed their sexual identity;
blacks, on the other hand, could not do so because "skin
color" historically served as an open and visible barrier to
their participation.9 Although these observations raise im-
portant questions about the existence of privilege within
gay and lesbian communities, Butler's analysis ultimately
suffers because he fails to integrate blackness and gayness
and include black gays in his argument. As a result, Butler
does not consider how the military's sexual discrimina-
tion-and heterosexist oppression in general-harms com-
munities of color and creates uneven distributions of power
and privilege among blacks. As his analysis subtly suggests,
black gays may not benefit equally as black heterosexuals
from "advancements" in racial equality because they often
remain subject to homophobic racism and acts of hetero-
sexist discrimination generally. The existence of heterosex-
ist subordination may mean that black heterosexuals will
have access to "privileges" (e.g., participation in the
military) denied to black gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgendered individuals.8 '
enemies.").
177. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 642 (encouraging scholars to explore "
'differences' in gay and lesbian experiences supplied by racial and class
hierarchies").
178. Butler's analysis of white gay privilege also ignores the injurious
effects of homophobia. See infra notes 51-55.
179. Butler's analysis overlooks the possibility of black gay males serving in
the military, perhaps because he believes that population of gays and lesbians
is white, or that the population of black gays and lesbians is negligible. Butler,
for instance, observes that white gays and lesbians have been able to partici-
pate in the military, despite the exclusionary policies, by concealing their sex-
uality. Butler, supra note, 144, at 17. ("It is without a doubt that there were
white homosexuals, albeit unknown, in the Navy [during its period of racial
exclusion]."). He, never-theless, fails to make the same conclusion regarding
blacks. See id. at 14 ("When we say blacks in the military from an historical
perspective, we are speaking of heterosexual blacks who were male and non-
homosexuals (if they were homosexual, then they were excluded from military
service when it was instilled in the code of military justice).").
180. See Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988)
[Vol. 47
19991 IGNORING SEXUALIZATION OF RACE 51
The recognition of power inequality within communities
of color would have problematized Butler's questioning of
gay and lesbian claims for civil rights protection based on
the existence of white gay privilege. If black heterosexuals
(and wealthy blacks and black males) remain (rightfully)
entitled to civil rights protection, despite their possession of
varying degrees of social privilege, then a more complicated
argument is needed to deny civil rights to white gays and
lesbians because they are white.181 Such an argument would
have been difficult to construct; indeed, under Butler's
reasoning no oppressed group could obtain civil rights
protection because each group (including blacks) has
"privileged" members. By excluding black gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and the transgendered from his analysis, Butler
avoids confronting the question of heterosexual privilege
within black communities, an issue that undermines his
questioning of the need for gay and lesbian civil rights
based on the existence of privilege within gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgender communities.Butler's analysis also disparages gay and lesbian
politics and identity by dismissing the injurious effects of
heterosexist oppression. Butler, as have other commen-
tators, argues that gays and lesbians may evade discrim-
ination by "hiding" their sexuality.'82 As a result of this
"ability," Butler argues, "white homosexuals are well repre-
sented in all professions and have had the same opportunity
as other white persons to take advantage of the varied
existing opportunity structure."'83 Butler's argument is, on
(noting the challenge to military's anti-gay and lesbian policy by black male),
amended by 847 F.2d 1329, different results reached on reh'g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). For a discussion of the
court's essentialist treatment of Watkin's identity, see Eaton, supra note 148, at
56-65.
181. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 628 ("[Diespite the existence of class
stratification and privilege within black communities, all blacks... are entitled
to civil rights protection due to their vulnerability... to racial discrimination.
Although privilege exists in gay and lesbian communities, civil rights protection
is necessary to secure the interests of the more marginalized (and even
privileged) sectors of those communities.").
182. Butler, supra note 144, at 17 (contrasting experience of "homosexuals"
with that of blacks who suffer discrimination based on "their outward racial
characteristics, characteristics which cannot be hidden as one goes through
life"); see also Rogers, supra note 144, at A21 (arguing that gays and lesbians,
unlike blacks, can "pass through life and selectively shield themselves from
criticism, praise, negative attitudes or other perceptions").
183. Butler, supra note 144, at 18 (emphasis added); see also id. ("In
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one level, legitimate because racial subordination, patri-
archy and economic deprivation create diverging experien-
ces of oppression within the populations of gays and lesbi-
ans and may shield male, upper-class and white individuals
from certain forms of homophobic exclusion."8 Butler's sug-
gestion that heterosexism is without cost or that it does not
limit "opportunity," however, is severely problematic for
several reasons. First, Butler's analysis draws upon the
positionality of white, wealthy and upper-class gays and
lesbians. In a society where heterosexist oppression leaves
individuals vulnerable to employment and housing discrim-
ination and oppressive violence, persons with a certain de-
gree of social and economic privileges will have a greater
ability to live openly gay or lesbian lives.8 ' The greater
ability of race and class-privileged individuals to express
publicly their marginalized sexual identities has helped
create a false-yet common-belief that all gays and lesbi-
ans are wealthy, powerful and white. ' Emerging statistical
models and literature, however, refute this myth and dem-
onstrate the relationship between gay and lesbian status
and economic harm.8 7 Butler's analysis likely reflects his
adherence to this mythology.
Butler's failure to recognize the injuries caused by
America, [homosexuals] have served their country and have held the highest
positions in government. This is especially true for those of European origin.
Black homosexuals, like all blacks, have had a different experience in the work-
place.").
184. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 583 ("[Bjecause race and class also
create privilege, these statuses may offer some insulation from forces of oppres-
sion.").
185. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 605-08 (discussing positive correlation
between ability to "come out" and economic privilege); Samuel A. Marcosson,
The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Rights, 9
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 137, 160 n.69 (1995) (same).
186. Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 605 (discussing "stereotype that 'all' gay
men and lesbians are wealthy: relative to the 'heterosexual' population"); Karen
De Witt, Gay Presence Leads Revival of Declining Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1994, at A14 (discussing "notion that all homosexuals are rich"); Stuart
Elliot, A Sharper View of Gay Consumers, N.Y TIMES, June 9, 1994, at DI ("It
has become conventional wisdom to consider homosexuals far more affluent
than the general population.").
187. M.V. Lee Badgett, Beyond Biased Samples: Challenging the Myths on
the Economic Status of Lesbians and Gay Men, in HoMofECONOMICS:
CAPITALIsM, CoMMrNITY AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES 19
(Amy Glcukman & Betty Reed eds., 1995) (finding that gay and lesbian status
negatively impacts income); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 605-08 (same);
Marcosson, supra note 185, at 160 n.69 (same).
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heterosexism also glamorizes "the closet." Opponents of gay
and lesbian equality often point to the ability of gays and
lesbians to withdraw from society and live their lives in the
shadows of secrecy and dishonesty as a source of privilege
(a "privilege" not possessed by other oppressed groups). 8
While the closet does allow gay and lesbian individuals to
evade some forms of discrimination, it is not a comfortable
"safe haven"'89 for any gay or lesbian individual, wealthy or
poor; rather it causes many psychological injuries and
precludes collective political action by gays and lesbians to
end oppression.90 Furthermore, the closet is not a foolproof
way to avoid heterosexist oppression. Many victims of bru-
tal acts of homophobic violence, for example, are "closeted"
but are victimized because they are perceived as gay or are
discovered as being gay by their assailants. 9' In addition,
188. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 144, at A21 (arguing that gays and
lesbians, unlike blacks, can "pass through life and selectively shield themselves
from criticism, praise, negative attitudes or other perceptions").
189. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's
Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 145-45 (1991)
("Lesbians and gay men probably maintain self esteem most effectively when
they identify with and are integrated into the larger lesbian and gay
community."); Schacter, supra note 148, at 299 ("Far from the innocuous safe
haven pictured by opponents of gay rights, the closet exacts a high price in self-
esteem, emotional health, and access to the community."). The liberating as-
pects of "coming out," however, are often overstated by gay and lesbian theorists
who ignore the reality of racism, patriarchy and class oppression within gay and
lesbian communities. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 603 ("The coming out
process.., does not necessarily or automatically 'liberate' people of color, who,
by revealing their sexual orientation and attempting to integrate themselves
within white gay and lesbian communities, may encounter racial hierarchy.");
Introduction to A LOTUS OF ANOTHER COLOR: AN UNFOLDING OF SOUTH ASIAN
GAY AND LESBIAN EXPERIENCE 12 (Rakesh Ratti ed., 1993) (relating experiences
of South Asian gays and lesbians and observing that "[olnce some of us entered
the lesbian and gay subculture of the West, our feeling of isolation did not fade
as we had assumed it would; it only changed face ... None of our newly found
gay or lesbian friends and acquaintances spoke our languages, shared our
history, or really understood our culture."); Marlon Riggs, Tongues Untied, in
BROTHER TO BROTHER: NEW WRITINGS BY BLACK GAY MEN 203 (Essex Hemphill
ed., 1991) (black gay male observing that in dominant white gay and lesbian
community of San Francisco, California he is "an alien, unseen, and seen,
unwanted").
190. Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection
for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989) (arguing
that closet precludes political action by gay and lesbian individuals);
Hutchinson, supra note 163, at 120-21 (discussing political and emotional costs
of the closet); Schacter, supra note 148, at 299.
191. See supra pp. 35-36 and n.112 (observing that many victims of
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the closet also hinders political action in communities of
color; fearing disclosure of their sexual identities, gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color may de-
cline from engaging in political action for their own unique
needs.192 The closet, thus, precludes political action for the
advancement of persons of color. Because Butler erases
gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color
from his analysis, he does not consider what injuries the
closet might visit upon communities of color and anti-racist
politics.
Finally, Butler marginalizes gays, lesbians, bisexuals
and the transgendered by uncritically portraying, even
ratifying, pejorative characterizations of homosexuality.
Butler, for example, asserts that repealing the military's
sexually discriminatory policies is a "complicated task," not
only because homosexuality is a behavior ("unlike" race),
but because "it is classified [in social science and medical
literature] as a behavior that is deviant."9' Although gay
and lesbian persons have suffered a history of abuse and
discrimination from social scientists and the medical profes-
sion, contemporary reforms have led to some improvement
in official policy towards homosexuality by mental health
professionals. 9 Butler's analysis, however, does not engage
homophobic violence are in the closet). Furthermore, Loc Minh Truong denied
being gay but was the victim of a homophobic assault. Id.
192. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 371 ("[The level of silence among black
lesbian and gay men is still an immediate and pressing concern for those
organizing in the [black] community today.").
193. Butler, supra note 144, at 18 (emphasis added). Butler observes that
"[homosexuality] has appeared in sociology textbooks in the same section as
prostitution, alcoholics, and mental disorders" and that "[i]n psychiatry,
homosexuality is regarded as a condition that can be treated, but the wish to
change is the most important prerequisite for successfully changing the
behavior." Id.
194. See Teemfi Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the
Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269,
331 n.72 (1996); Valdes, supra note 1, at 377 n.230 (noting declassification of
"homosexuality" as a mental illness by the American Psychiatric Association
but also noting categorization of "unhappy homosexual," desirous of a "cure," as
an official disorder). Some mental health literature also support a view of
"homosexuality" as non-dysfunctional. See, e.g., Virginia Uribe & Karen M.
Harbeck, Addressing the Needs of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth: The
Origins of Project 10 and School-Based Intervention, 1991 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 9,
13 (1992); Laura Reiter, Sexual Orientation, Sexual Identity, and the Question
of Choice, 17 CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 138 (1989). But see Toward a
Further Understanding of Homosexuality, COLLECTED PAPERS FROM THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY OF HOiiOSEXUALITY, ANNUAL
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the mental health policies and literature that counter the
"deviant" classification of homosexuality. He also fails to
challenge or question the "deviant" categorization of
homosexuality himself, instead letting it stand as implicitly
valid and unassailable truth.
Butler also uncritically portrays homophobia within
black communities. Butler argues that black (heterosexual)
opposition to gay and lesbian equality should not "surprise"
Americans:
This position is... not surprising to those who understand that
there is a segment of blacks that is very conservative when it
comes to behavior issues. The idea that blacks should support
every change in behavior, simply because they have a history of
being excluded based on race, is not only illogical but represents a
misapplication of metaphor. Reading of the literature and
attendance of major black institutions make clear that homosexual
behavior is not accepted in the black community. This does not
mean that there are no blacks who engage in this behavior. It
simply means that the community as a whole does not accept this
lifestyle; people have not stood up and legitimated it as an
acceptable tradition.
Butler is correct in noting that homophobic attitudes
exist among blacks-as in all other racial groups.'96 Butler's
argument, however, constructs a monolithically homophobic
black community, obscuring the existence of dissenting
points of view by blacks of varying sexual identities.'
Moreover, Butler does not offer any critique of black
homophobia, instead leaving the impression that he accepts
its legitimacy. Given the numerous ways in which Butler's
argument minimizes the importance of gay and lesbian
equality and the harms of heterosexist exclusion, the
CONFERENCE (1995); John K. Milles, The Psychoanalytic Perspective of
Adolescent Homosexuality: A Review, 25 ADOLESCENCE 912 (1990) (noting the
"different types of homosexuality that emerge in adolescence which are
influenced by different psychodyamic conditions in each stage of adolescence").
For an excellent explication of the legacy of heterosexist practices by mental
health professional, particularly against gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered youth, see generally Ruskola, supra.
195. Butler, supra note 144, at 18 (emphasis added).
196. See sources cited supra note 141 (noting homophobia in black commu-
nities).
197. See sources cited supra note 140 (noting support for gay and lesbian
equality by black political organizations and political figures and other racial
civil rights groups).
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uncritical presentation of societal homophobia in his anal-
ysis strongly suggests his ratification of heterosexist op-
pression." Butler's analysis, though framed as an anti-
racist critique of gay and lesbian essentialism, ultimately
endorses heterosexist oppression, marginalizes gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgendered people of color, and places anti-
heterosexist agendas outside the scope of traditional civil
rights policies.
Butler's work is reflective of a pervasive and harmful
misconception in anti-racist thought and in communities of
color-that combating heterosexism is unrelated to the pur-
suit of racial justice and that homosexual identity is uncon-
nected to or inconsistent with "colored" status." Although
ambivalence towards gay rights is by no means universal
within-or limited to-communities of color and anti-racist
organizations, homophobia and essentialist political agen-
das present special problems for oppressed racial commun-
ities. First, heterosexism divides communities of color poli-
tically and socially, often preventing collective action
against racial oppression.2 ' Also, the heteronormative con-
struction of anti-racist politics means that an entire body of
sexualized racial oppression-directed toward gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgendered persons of color-does not
receive the attention of (or receives insufficient and essen-
tialist treatment from) anti-racist activists and theorists."1
Perhaps the most damaging context in which the het-
eronormative construction of anti-racist political discourse
operates is in the anti-racist responses (or lack of respon-
ses) to the epidemic of AIDS and HIV within communities
of color. Blacks and Latinos are vastly over-represented in
198. At one point in his analysis, Butler concedes that the issue of civil
rights for gays and lesbians "represents a special moral case." Butler, supra
note 144, at 19. The remainder of his analysis, however, overshadows, indeed
undermines, this fleeting concession. Moreover, Butler does not even begin to
spell out the elements of this "special moral case"nor does he conclude whether
the "case" is strong enough to defeat societal opposition to gay and lesbian
equality (which he does not challenge). Perhaps Butler's silence as to why gay
and lesbian rights presents a special case reflects his ambivalence or opposition
to this claim.
199. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 24 (discussing heterosexist
nature of anti-racist politics).
200. See id. (observing how Million Man March fractured over question of
black gay sexuality); see also infra p. 110.
201. See generally infra pp. 96-100 (discussing problems of heteronormative
anti-racism).
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the number of persons with AIDS and HIV."2 Despite the
devastation of AIDS within communities of color, anti-racist
political organizations have largely ignored this issue, due
to homophobia, heteronormativity and a false "belief' that
the issues presented by AIDS lie outside the scope of
"traditional" anti-racist politics."°3 Anti-racist advocacy,
however, is needed to obtain financial support for HIV
prevention programs and for the provision of health care to
persons of color (particularly the poor) with HIV and AIDS-
related illnesses. These issues-equal access to health care
and to preventative health counseling for persons of color-
202. See Minorities Miss Out on AIDS Survival Increase, AIDS ALERT, May
1, 1997, at 56 (noting that blacks have AIDS at seven times the rate of whites
and that Latinos have AIDS at three times the rate of whites).
203. Dalton, supra note 140, at 209-11 (observing that homophobia in black
community precludes adequate responses to AIDS epidemic); HIV Prevention in
People of Color: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations of House Comm. on Government Operations, 102
Cong. (1994) (statement of Martin Ornelas-Quintero, Director AIDS Programs,
National Latino/a Lesbian and Gay Organization (LLEGO)) (arguing that
homophobia prevents effective protection of Latinos and Latinas from AIDS and
HIV); Paula C. Johnson, Silence Equals Death: The Response to AIDS Within
Communities of Color, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1992) ("[Due to
homophobia] the response of minority civil rights organizations to the AIDS
crisis has often been one of silence."); James Monroe Smith, When Knowing the
Law Is Not Enough: Confronting Denial and Considering Sociocultural Issues
Affecting HIV Positive People, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL y 1, 13-14 (arguing
that homophobia in black and Latino communities harms black and Latino
persons with AIDS and HIV and prevents black and Latino communities from
"owning" the HIV and AIDS epidemic); Katie Monagle & James Earl Hardy,
Confronting the AIDS Crisis; Reactions from the Gay Community and the
Minority Communities, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Feb. 22, 1991, at 6
("[H]omophobia... in both the black and Hispanic communities has prevented
many people even from acknowledging AIDS' existence."(reporting opinion of
James Chapman, a gay minister and AIDS activist)); Tim Padgett, Waking Up
to a Nightmare, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1988, at 25 (listing "homophobia" as one
reason why "Hispanic Americans are one of the last groups in the United States
to take action against AIDS"); Clarence Page, Veil of Denial Blinds Black,
Hispanic Leaders to AIDS, CHIC. TRIB., June 19, 1991, at C17 ("Most
remarkable, in light of the growing toll AIDS is taking in their communities, is
how little minority leaders talk openly about it."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Epidemic of Silence: Eyes Shut, Black America Is Being Ravaged by AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1998, at Al (reporting that black homophobia precludes
political responses to AIDS and 1IV epidemic and reporting view of Urban
League that AIDS is "outside of [the organization's] traditional purview")
(quoting Lee Daniels, spokesperson for Urban League); Cynthia Tucker, Even
Blacks Can Be Bigots, DENVER POST, May 23, 1998, at B7 ("[Bilack America
pays a high price for... homophobia, in the advance of AIDS among blacks.").
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are squarely within traditional anti-racist politics."4 Only a
heteronormative construction of anti-racism could define
AIDS and HIV-related health care issues as non-racial,
given the harmful racial impact of the epidemic. The virtual
silence of the anti-racist political community on the vital
issue of AIDS and HIV serves as a troubling reminder of
the heteronormative construction of anti-racist political dis-
course and the urgent need for multidimensional anti-racist
political agendas."
204. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 375. As Cathy Cohen has argued:
Because AIDS touches on, or is related to, so many other issues facing,
in particular poor black communities-healthcare, poverty, drug use,
homelessness, etc.-we might reasonably expect black leaders to 'use'
the devastation of this disease to develop and reinforce an
understanding of the enormity of the crisis facing black communities.
Id. For commentary on the issue of racial discrimination and racial disparities
in the provision of and access to health care, see Barbara A. Noah, Racist
Health Care?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 357 (1996) (discussing statistical studies
demonstrating racism in delivery of health care to blacks); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921,
978-84 (discussing statistical studies demonstrating racism in delivery of health
care to people of color); Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism:
Trusting the Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American
Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 191 (1996) (discussing
historical and contemporary discrimination against and oppression of blacks by
medical profession); Vernellia Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an
Unjust Health Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH
MATRIX 127 (1993); Note, The Impact of Managed Care on Doctors Who Serve
Poor and Minority Patients, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1625 (1995) (arguing that
managed care programs may have detrimental effect on health care delivery to
communities of color because they utilize selection criteria that undervalues
work of doctors who serve communities of color).
205. The omission of AIDS and HIV from anti-racist agendas is particularly
devastating given the marginalization of people of color in AIDS-related and
other gay and lesbian civil rights organizations and the general powerlessness
of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. See, e.g., Cohen,
supra note 3, at 365.
In the case of AIDS, without the support of established leaders and
organizations in black communities, underfimded community-based
education programs encounter limited success, facilitating the
continued infection and death of black men, women, and children.
Further, in the absence of political pressure from leaders,
organizations, activists, and mobilized members of the black
community the federal government is allowed to continue its shameful
dealings, neglecting to provide the full resources needed to effectively
fight this disease in black communities.
Id. Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 619-35 (discussing marginalization of people of
color in gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender politics); Valdes, supra note 1,
at 354 n.1252 (discussing dissolution of "Queer Nation" movement over, among
other things, "allegations of racism"); David W. Dunlap, Three Black Members
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B. Critical Race Theory
Anti-racist legal scholarship, including critical race
theory, also deploys a heteronormative conception of racial
justice."6 Despite the prevailing heteronormativity in legal
scholarship on race, critical race theorists have been at the
forefront of the various internal critiques, including race-
sexuality scholarship, which question traditional and essen-
tialist methods for analyzing identity and oppression. °7
Consequently, critical race theory has been receptive-even
if sluggishly-to internal dissent, modification of theory,
and accommodation of new voices."' Consistent with its
relative openness to evolution, the critical race theory
movement has recently begun to "institutionalize" the race-
sexuality critiques by incorporating issues of heterosexual
oppression within academic conferences0 9 and scholar-
ship.210 Though welcomed as a sign of progress, these recent
overtures do not negate the overall heteronormative nature
of the theory.
Quit AIDS Organization Board, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at B2 (reporting
resignation of three black members from board of directors of Gay Men's Health
Crisis, the nation's largest AIDS legal and social services organization, due to
organization's alleged insensitivity toward people of color and issues of racism);
Andrea Lewis & Robin Stevens, At the Crossroads: Race, Gender and the Gay
Rights Movement, ETHNIc NEWSWATCH, Apr. 30, 1996, at 22 ("There is more
resistence to conscious efforts to integrate [racially] the movement and its
organizations. It's somehow become viewed as political correctness rather than
as a sound strategy."') (quoting white gay and AIDS activist Eric Rofes).
206. Valdes, supra note 12, at 1332 (discussing omission of sexual identity
issues in critical race scholarship).
207. See supra pp. 1-6 (discussing internal critiques of progressive social
movements); see generally, Hutchinson supra note 15.
208. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 741, 767-71 (1994) (arguing that postmodernist currents of critical race
theory, including race-gender critiques, contribute to "sophistication" of race
scholarship).
209. During the 1997-1998 academic year, heterosexism was discussed at
several race theory conferences, including the Critical Race Theory Workshop at
Tulane Law School, the Critical Race Theory Conference at Yale Law School,
the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Rutgers-
Camden School of Law and the Western People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference at the University of Oregon School of Law.
210. Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Nothing and Everything:
Race, Romer and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
229 (1997) (analyzing racial implications of Supreme Court's gay and lesbian
jurisprudence).
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1. Ambivalence or Opposition to Gay and Lesbian Civil
Rights. Critical race theorists deploy a heteronormative
conception of race when they (as do anti-racist political
activists and commentators) dismiss the importance of
sexual equality for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the trans-
gendered. A recent article by Roy Brooks,2 11 a prominent
race theorist, illustrates how racial discourse may diminish
the importance of gay and lesbian equality.
Brooks' analysis considers two opposing contentions-
that race is an "under-inclusive" and "over-inclusive" con-
cept. Brooks first responds to arguments that race is under-
inclusive. According to Brooks, some social scientists con-
tend that "the civil rights conception of race is too narrow
because it necessarily looks at the cultural ... experiences
of social groups separately rather than jointly." 11 These
scholars, as Brooks construes their work, argue that
"racial" categories should be defined by the common experience of
cultural subordination. African Americans, Asians, women, the
disabled, and homosexuals, for example, are "racially" identifiable
in terms of their "outsider" status, in terms of their "otherness,"
and in terms of their common cultural experiences in relation to
the socially dominant group in American society-namely,
straight, able-bodied white males.2
13
Brooks, however, cautions against a reconceptualized
theory of race that would relate racial subordination to-or
equate it with-other forms of oppression. Brooks offers
several reasons for rejecting a "unifying" theory of oppres-
sion. First, Brooks argues that a "broader" definition of
race, one that equates other forms of oppression with
racism, would constitute a "monumental change in constitu-
tional law by expanding the number of suspect classifi-
cations."1 4 Brooks claims that according the same level of
scrutiny to non-racial and racial classifications would
211. Roy L. Brooks, Race As an Over-Inclusive and Under-Inclusive Concept,
1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 9 (1994).
212. Id. at 13 (citing RONALD TAKAM, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 136 (1979); PAuL GILROY, THERE AIN'T No BLACK
IN THE UNION JACK: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF RACE AND NATION 14, 17, 27
(1987)).
213. Id. at 12 (citing Anthony Platt, Rethinking Race, SOCIAL JUST., Spring-
Summer 1993, at iii-v) (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 14.
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"strain" the judicial system, causing a substantial increase
in the amount of civil rights litigation.215 Brooks contends
that judges would respond to growth in civil rights cases by
erecting procedural barriers, such as "heightened pleading
standards," to the adjudication of discrimination claims. "
Brooks argues that such restraints would harm "African-
Americans... more than any other 'racial' group, for
litigation has been the traditional and often most effective
vehicle used by African-Americans in the drive toward
racial equality."217 Finally, Brooks, like Butler,2"8 examines
the "exceptional history" of blacks in America, contrasting
black suffering from other forms of inequality.219 Brooks
concludes that the unique experience of blacks "defies a
unifying theory of subordination."2 "
Although I do not contest the anti-essentialist portion of
Brooks' argument, in which he criticizes arguments equat-
ing inter-group experiences, 22 his thesis subsequently de-
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see generally
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); JACK BASS,
UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
218. See Butler, supra note 144, at 14 (discussing history of black
subjugation). Brooks relies on Butler's work to develop several themes in his
analysis. See Brooks, supra note 211, at 13 n.17 and accompanying text (citing
Butler for the proposition that use of race as metaphor for oppression is
improper); id. at n.28 and accompanying text (citing Butler for the proposition
that race-sexuality analogies distorted because gays do not suffer as the result
of a visible, immutable characteristic); id. at n.51 and accompanying text (citing
Butler for the proposition that use of race as a "metaphor" for other forms of
oppression are imprecise).
219. Id. at 15-19.
220. Id. at 15.
221. I am not in complete agreement with Brooks' interpretation of the
progressive scholars he criticizes for purportedly seeking a "uniform" theory of
subordination, in which intergroup differences are submerged. These
progressive race critics, who seek a broader construction of race, one that
accounts for particularities and interdependence of gender, sexuality and class,
have not argued that subordination can be accurately described without ac-
counting for differences. On the contrary, these scholars have been at the fore-
front of unveiling the diverse experiences within oppressed groups and across
the social fabric of subordinate populations. See, e.g. Platt, supra note 213, at
iii-iv ("Our understanding of race has a new richness and complexity when it is
informed by an analysis in which class, race and gender are constitutive of the
material relations of production and reproduction, when racism and sexism are
understood as reciprocally determining processes, not simply a by-product of ex-
ploitation.") (emphasis added); id. at iii ("[Ilt is not enough to add gender and
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values the importance of combating "non-racial" forms of
subordination, thereby marginalizing anti-heterosexism as
a broader civil rights and anti-racist goal.
Brooks' "cost-benefit analysis" of social justice, for ex-
ample, implicitly devalues non-racial forms of oppression
and treats them as separate from race. Brooks argues that
courts should not recognize new suspect classifications,
such as sexual orientation, because this development would
unduly burden the judiciary to the detriment of blacks.222
Brooks, however, fails to state why the potential "harm" to
the judiciary from expanded notions of equality would
outweigh the benefits to those groups protected by thisjurisprudential transformation.223 Furthermore (and more
importantly), Brooks does not immediately consider how
"black" liberation efforts might benefit from an expanded
construction of justice,224 including the implementation of
anti-heterosexist policies. In his move to guard black poli-
tics and anti-discrimination law from what he perceives as
the encroachment of "other" progressive movements, Brooks
blurs the connections between anti-racism and these
movements.
Brooks also devalues "non-racial" oppression by directly
questioning the importance of sexual equality as a civil
rights goal. Brooks, for instance, offers the following obser-
vation concerning the protection of gays and lesbians as a
marginalized class:
[Ilt could... be argued that some classes "deserve" less protection
than others or no protection at all. Some might argue... that
group identification based on an immutable personal trait (e.g.,
skin color or gender) should enjoy greater protection than group
sexuality to class and race but.., to uncover and explain their interdepen-
dence.").
222. See Brooks, supra note 211, at 14.
223. Brooks also fails to explain how an expansion in civil rights would
dangerously increase the volume of civil rights litigation, overwhelm the judi-
ciary, and thus, impede the ability of blacks to pursue "equality." He also does
not consider whether any additional judicial burden that might result from an
expansion of civil rights doctrine could be alleviated by devoting greater eco-
nomic resources to the judiciary. One might argue that an expanded notion of
equal protection should generate a greater allocation of resources to enforce
civil rights laws.
224. Brooks later analyzes differences within the black community, partic-
ularly those supplied by class. See Brooks, supra note 211, at 20-27. This anal-
ysis, however, does not refute his earlier questioning of gay rights. See infra pp.
66-67.
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identification predicated on behavior (e.g., some forms of obesity or
homosexuality). Even if a condition (say homosexuality) is
immutable, should groups who can "Dass" receive the same
protection as groups who cannot "pass"?
2
2
Although Brooks frames his analysis as a series of
hypothetical arguments,226 his failure to respond to these
"arguments" and his express desire to limit the number of
constitutionally protected categories (including sexual iden-
tity) indicate that he likely agrees that sexual equality
should have a subordinate role in civil rights jurisprudence,
litigation and legal reform efforts. The passage immediately
following the above-quoted text provides additional support
for my reading of Brooks' work. There, Brooks questions
whether homosexuality (a "condition") is an immutable
characteristic like race and gender and "assuming that it is,
whether the line between protected and unprotected classes
should be based upon whether discrimination against a
group is reasonable or unreasonable under the circum-
stances."22 7 This passage suggests that Brooks believes dis-
crimination against gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the trans-
gendered might be "reasonable" under certain, unspecified
225. Id. at 15 n.28 (emphasis added). An interesting question raised by
Brooks' "passing" analysis is whether blacks who can pass should be denied civil
rights protection. Furthermore, Brooks' argument does not confront the
hierarchal systems of race and sexuality that encourage "passing."
226. These hypothetical arguments are also raised in footnotes. Their
location, however, does not diminish their import.
227. Id. at 15 n.28 (emphasis added). This argument has the effect of
biologizing race. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins
Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions
Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino
Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (1997) ("[Tlhe
mutable-versus-immutable dichotomy ignores the persuasive argument... that
even so-called 'immutable' characteristics such as race and sex are social
constructs rather than anthropological or biological facts of life."); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1739 (1993) ("The legal
definition of race [during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] was the
'objective' test propounded by racist theorists of the day who described race to
be immutable, scientific, biologically determined-an unsullied fact of the blood
rather than a volatile and violently imposed regime of racial hierarchy."); Chris
K Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific
American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/ White Paradigm,
29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 47, 51 (1997) ("Constructed race is not simply a
biological and immutable attribute such as phenotype or skin color, but 'an
unstable and decentered complex of social meanings constantly being
transformed by political struggle.'").
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circumstances. A conclusion that anti-gay and lesbian
discrimination is "reasonable," under certain circumstances
indisputably reflects heteronormativity: it portrays homo-
sexuality as deviant and in need of discriminatory pro-
scription and, by implication, depicts hetero-sexuality as
"normal" and preferred.
A reading of Brooks' work as heteronormative is also
supported by his subsequent devaluation of the contribu-
tions of the race-gender internal critiques. In a later article
Brooks and co-author Mary Jo Newborn examine the con-
tributions of critical race theory to racial legal scholarship
and compare critical race literature to the work of tradi-
tional civil rights-or "reformist"-scholars."' A portion of
this article examines the work of intersectionality scholars
and concludes that "intersectionality analysis has not con-
tributed a perspective on Title VII employment discrimi-
nation claims that differs substantially from that offered by
the reformists."229 Brooks and Newborn base their conclu-
sion on the fact that prior to the groundbreaking work of
Kimberle Crenshaw, which demonstrates how Title VIIjurisprudence often fails to accommodate the experiences of
women of color,"' "reformist" scholars had already devel-
oped the notion of "compound discrimination," which would
permit race-gender discrimination claims by women of
color.23' Intersectionality, however, offers much more than a
new litigation-oriented civil rights paradigm. As Angela
Harris observes, responding to Brooks and Newborn,
"Crenshaw's concept of intersectionality brings a post-
modernist skepticism about the transparency of language to
bear on legal doctrine and social policy. In demanding ajurisprudence that can recognize women of color as proper
legal subjects in themselves, Crenshaw destabilizes the
familiar categories of 'race' and 'gender."'232 Brooks and
Newborn's constricted reading of intersectionality suggests
a lack of appreciation of its theoretical observations-obser-
vations that transcend the particular boundaries of Title
228. See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theoly and
Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?,
82 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1994).
229. Id. at 839.
230. See Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 139.
231. Brooks & Newborn, supra note 228, at 839.
232. Harris, supra note 208, at 768; see also supra pp. 10-17 (discussing
contributions of intersectionality to race and feminist scholarship).
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VII litigation-regarding the complexity of subordination
and the need for more comprehensive and inclusive para-
digms for conceptualizing and responding to oppression.
Thus, Brooks' arguments-though compelling to the
extent that they embody anti-essentialist criticism-dis-
miss the general importance of sexual equality and the
connections between sexual equality and racial justice. Ac-
cordingly, they have the effect of deploying a heteronorm-
ative vision of racial equality and excluding gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and the transgendered from the protection of
anti-racist law and politics and from the broader terrain of
civil rights policies.
Ironically, while Brooks criticizes efforts to construct a
"unifying" and essentializing theory of subordination, his
own arguments reflect an essentialist view that racial
subordination and sexual subordination are wholly inde-
pendent forces. By questioning the need to implement vig-
orous anti-heterosexist policies, Brooks fails to recognize
the importance of sexual freedom for communities of color.
Because sexuality (and gender and class) serves as a
mechanism for racial domination, anti-racist legal theorists
should not seek to guard civil rights jurisprudence from the
"intrusion" of progressive sexual politics or from the recog-
nition of additional subordinated classes for heightened
judicial protection. Rather, given the multidimensional na-
ture of racial oppression and the existence of sexualized
racism, anti-racist theorists should join efforts to inscribe
progressive sexual politics into the language of civil rightsjurisprudence. Brooks' analysis, however, leaves little (if
any) space for progressive sexual politics in critical race
discourse.
In addition to reflecting essentialism, Brooks' analysis
encourages essentialism. Brooks argues that civil rights law
should focus on differences between oppressed social
groups. Attempts to draw similarities, Brooks claims, ob-
scures historical and political particularities of inter-group
experience."' After making this anti-essentialist observa-
tion, Brooks questions the importance of according civil
rights protection to groups whose experiences with subord-
ination differ from those of blacks. In other words, Brooks
criticizes arguments that "equate" black experiences with
the subjugation of other oppressed groups, but he then
233. See Brooks, supra note 211, at 15.
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posits a vision of civil rights protection that would seem-
ingly limit civil rights protection (or at least the most stren-
uous protection) only to those groups who can accurately
claim to be similarly situated with blacks (e.g., those whose
discrimination is based on an "immutable" trait).34 A civil
rights paradigm, as the one offered by Brooks, that limits
heightened protection only to those groups having similar
(or "the same") experiences as blacks, inevitably causes
"non-black" groups to make analogies between black
suffering and their own experiences. Thus, Brooks' vision of
civil rights ultimately induces the very essentialism that he
condemns.
While the first portion of Brooks' analysis addresses
claims that race is an under-inclusive concept, the latter
section of the article turns to the question of whether race is
over-inclusive. Specifically, Brooks examines whether the
traditional civil rights model, which analyzes race in iso-
lation from other forms of subordination, creates a "super-
ficially broad understanding of race" that obscures gender,
class, sexuality and other internal differences.23 It is in this
portion of his analysis that Brooks first acknowledges and
discusses the fact that communities of color are not mono-
lithic 6 and that the varied experiences of persons within
oppressed racial groups compel "a more complex under-
standing of race than has been the tradition in civil rights
law."" Brooks, however, never connects or harmonizes his
conflicting arguments that civil rights law often fails to
recognize "internal" racial group differences with his sug-
gestion that civil rights law should not include sexual iden-
tity as a protected category. Thus, Brooks leaves the im-
pression that a subordinate role for gay and lesbian
equality might be appropriate under and consistent with a
234. Id. at 15 n.28
Some might argue... that group identification based on an immutable
personal trait (e.g., skin color or gender) should enjoy greater
protection than group identification predicated on behavior (e.g., some
forms of obesity or homosexuality). Even if a condition (say
homosexuality) is immutable, should groups who can "pass" receive the
same protection as groups who cannot "pass"?
Id.
235. Brooks, supra note 211, at 20.
236. In particular, Brooks examines how class and economic deprivation
creates varied experiences and needs among blacks. See id. at 20-27.
237. Id. at 20.
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more "complex" formulation of race and racial justice."5 Be-
cause the vision of civil rights Brooks articulates is ambiv-
alent toward (or even opposed to) having a central role for
pro-gay and lesbian politics and theory, his model of equal-
ity provides a marginal space for gays, lesbians, bisexuals
and the transgendered of color in anti-racist laws and poli-
tics.
2. Maintaining "Some" Distance Between Race and
Sexuality. Even those critical race scholars who embrace
gay and lesbian equality and seek to examine the con-
nections between race and sexuality jurisprudence may dis-
tance, to some degree, race from sexuality. A recent article
by Robert S. Chang and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. 9
illustrates this point. In this publication, Chang and Culp
take an insightful look at the Supreme Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans, ° in which the Court invalidated on equal
protection grounds a Colorado constitutional amendment
("Amendment 2") that repealed and prohibited the enact-
ment of state or municipal legislation or policies protecting
gays, lesbians and bisexuals from discrimination. 4' Chang
and Culp seek to demonstrate that the Romer decision and
the underlying facts of the case have important racial
dimensions. 42 With this as their mission, the authors' work
serves a compelling goal-ending the separation of race and
sexuality discourse within critical race theory. Their
238. A mere recognition of internal differences among oppressed racial
groups does not necessarily mean that one would vigorously support "other"
progressive social movements or the need to combat the systems of inequality
that create these internal differences.
239. See generally Chang & Culp, supra note 210.
240. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
241. Amendment 2 provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian,
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
242. See Chang & Culp, supra note 210, at 234 ('[Tlhe simple truth is that
Romer is always and everywhere a case about race as well as being about the
rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.").
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analysis, however, maintains some distance between race
and sexuality, which limits their ability to unveil more
completely the relevance of race in Romer.
Although Chang and Culp distance race from sexuality,
they, unlike Butler and Brooks, do not marginalize or call
into question the need for vigorous protection of gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered from heterosexist
discrimination. Thus, their analysis does not produce the
type of harms caused by the active devaluation and ex-
clusion of anti-heterosexism within critical race theory.243
Nevertheless, the space the authors place between sexuality
and race blurs their analysis of race in the context of
heterosexist discrimination. Accordingly, my criticism here
seeks to nudge the authors toward examining race and
sexuality as interdependent forces rather than as close, yet
distant, systems of domination.
In their analysis Chang and Culp contend that the
Court ignored important racial factors that shaped the
underlying controversy in Romer. Primarily, Chang and
Culp charge the Court with improperly submerging race in
its rejection of Colorado's argument that civil rights
protection for gays and lesbians amounts to "special
rights."2" Chang and Culp assert that the "special rights"
argument advanced in Romer has a pre-existing history in
race-related civil rights cases,245 a history which the Court
should have addressed to contextualize its refutation of the
anti-gay "special rights" rhetoric deployed in Romer.2"
While Chang and Culp convincingly unveil the Court's ob-
fuscation of race in its rejection of the "special rights"
discourse, race maintains some "distance" from sexuality in
their own arguments because they fail to consider how the
"special rights" rhetoric in the sexuality context is itself a
243. See infra Part III.
244. See Chang & Culp, supra note 210, at 239-48. The Court swiftly refuted
this claim, stating that "we cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's
prohibition on specific legal protections does no more than deprive homosexuals
of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability
upon those persons alone."Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
245. Chang & Culp, supra note 210, at 245 ("The notion that the role of civil
rights law is to create 'special rights' is a product of our jurisprudence on
race.").
246. Id. at 248 ("The power of the Court's opinion in Romer would have been
enhanced if the Court had been willing to put the special rights debate into a
better moral and political framework that acknowledged the power of race to
distort the truth.").
[Vol. 47
1999] IGNORING SEXUALIZATION OF RACE 69
racialized discourse, not simply a by-product of a seemingly
"separate" or "parallel" jurisprudence on race. To develop
this argument, I first examine the elements of the "special
rights" discourse invoked in Romer, demonstrating how the
"special rights" rhetoric in the anti-gay context is a nar-
rative on the racial composition of gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgendered communities. I will argue, more speci-
fically, that the "special rights" rhetoric in the gay and les-
bian context effectively constructs gays and lesbians as
white (and, by implication, people of color as heterosexual).
I will then demonstrate how Chang and Culp's distancing of
race from sexuality caused them to overlook the racial-
ization of gays and lesbians through the "special rights"
argument advanced in Romer.
The "special rights" depiction of gay rights has a notor-
ious history in political and legal challenges to gay and les-
bian inequality."' According to the "special rights" dis-
course, gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered do
not need civil rights protection because they lead comfor-
table lives, 48 are wealthy 9 and powerful,25° and have the
ability to conceal their sexual identity and evade discrim-
ination.25' Because rights-seeking gays and lesbians,
247. See Schacter, supra note 148, at 293 ("'Special rights' has become the
central slogan for the anti-gay movement, appearing regularly in the names of
organizations opposing gay civil rights and in their media campaigns.").
248. See id. at 291-93 (observing that anti-gay rhetoric "depicts comfortable
gay and lesbian lives").
249. See id. at 291-92 (arguing that "opponents of gay civil rights claim that
gay men and lesbians are economically well-off and therefore do not need legal
protection."). See also VAID, supra note 145, at 250-52 (discussing role of
perception of gay wealth in anti-gay political campaigns); Hutchinson, supra
note 2, at 605 ("Anti-gay and lesbian groups... have appropriated... surveys
[purporting to demonstrate gay and lesbian wealth] in order to depict the gay
and lesbian community as wealthy and privileged and, therefore, undeserving
of civil rights protection.").
250. See Schacter, supra note 148, at 293 ("Opponents of gay civil rights
claim that the drive for civil rights masks a 'blatant power grab' by a powerful
'special interest group' bent on accruing unfair advantage.") (citing Will
Perkins, Views on Gay Rights Conflict, DENVER POST, Oct. 11, 1992, at Dl);
Steve Bousquet, Florida Group Launches Attack on Gay "Activism," ADAM
HERALD, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al.
251. See Schachter, supra note 148, at 299 (discussing anti-gay "suggestion
that gay men and lesbians can opt out of discrimination by staying hidden from
public view"). Justice Scalia "bought" substantially all of the "special rights"
arguments in his dissenting opinion. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 645 ("[T]hose who
engage in homosexual conduct tend to ... have high disposable income... [and]
they possess political power much greater than their numbers.") (Scalia J.,
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according to the "special rights" discourse, are not actually
subordinated, they are merely trying to augment their
power by unfairly obtaining "special" status under civil
rights laws, laws which should only protect the "truly
disadvantaged."252
The "special rights" portrayal of gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender wealth and privilege is a racialized (and
class-based) discourse, which constructs gay and lesbian
people as white. This process of racial construction occurs in
at least two important ways. First, the "special rights"
rhetoric is racialized because its "conclusion" regarding the
purported wealth and privilege of gay and lesbian commun-
ities is drawn from race (and class) based data that reflect
white (and upper-class) status and that misrepresent the
income levels of the average gay and lesbian individual.
Second, the rhetoric is racialized because it compares
"privileged" gays and lesbians to "oppressed" communities
of color, assuming a separateness of the two populations
that erases gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered
of color, thereby depicting gays and lesbians as white and
communities of color as heterosexual.
The "evidence" of gay and lesbian wealth offered by
anti-gay activists contributes to the racialization of the
anti-gay "special rights" rhetoric. Frequently, proponents of
the "special rights" discourse rely on polling data to support
their observation that most gays and lesbians are
wealthy.53 As several scholars have argued, however, these
studies are invariably based on biased samples that inflate
gay and lesbian wealth.254 The socioeconomic data in many
of the popular polls, for example, were collected by survey-
ing persons whose names appear on donor lists of gay and
lesbian civil rights organizations or on subscription lists of
dissenting); see id. at 636 (characterizing Amendment 2 as a "modest attempt
by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against
the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through the
use of the laws") (Scalia J., dissenting). Although they do not explicitly align
themselves with the "special rights," anti-gay forces, the arguments of Brooks
and Butler also strikingly parallel the contours of this rhetoric. See supra pp.
45-56, 60-67.
252. Schacter, supra note 148, at 291-93 (observing that anti-gay forces
claim that gay and lesbian civil rights will give protection to powerful group,
protection previously reserved for the racially oppressed).
253. See sources cited supra note 249.
254. See VAIn, supra note 145, at 252-53; Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 606;
Marcosson, supra note 185, at 160 n.69.
[Vol. 47
1999] IGNORING SEXUALIZATION OF RACE 71
gay and lesbian periodicals.255 Periodical subscribers and
financial contributors to political campaigns, however, have
higher income levels than the average population;256 thus,
reliance on these samples as indicators of gay and lesbian
wealth provides a skewed representation of gay and lesbian
income."' Furthermore, to the extent that the data only
pertain to individuals who publicly identify themselves as
"gay" or "lesbian" (as do individuals on gay and lesbian
organizational membership and periodical subscription
lists), they again will inflate gay wealth. Due to the eco-
nomic consequences of heterosexist employment and hous-
ing discrimination, those individuals "who are in a position
of relative comfort and security" will face fewer barriers
than the poor in living openly gay and lesbian lives.258 Thus,
surveys of "out" gays and lesbians tend to under-represent
the poor.
The population of open gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgendered individuals is also racially distorted, as peo-
ple of color may face greater difficulties than whites in com-
ing out of the closet. Indeed, people of color often point to
the existence of racial discrimination as a factor that pre-
vents them from coming out; they fear that the discrimina-
tion resulting from coming out will exacerbate their already
vulnerable social positions.259 Furthermore, people of color,
who are disproportionately poor, will comprise a large por-
255. See sources cited supra note 254.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Marcosson, supra note 185, at 160 n.69. See also VAID, supra note 145,
at 256 ("[Middle-class and wealthy gay people are far more likely to be visible
than are working-class poor queers."); Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 607-08 (dis-
cussing relationship between wealth and racial status and the ability to "come
out").
259. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 608 ("[G]ays and lesbians of color have
stated that racial, gender, and class oppression force them to conceal their
sexual orientation .... "); Marta A. Navarro, Interview with Ana Castillo, in
CHICANA LESBIANS: THE GIRLS OUR MOTHERS WARNED Us ABOuT 113, 123 (Carla
Trujillo ed., 1991) (observing that Chicanos and Chicanas remain in the closet
because they do not want to face the "risk... [oi] further disenfranchise[ment]l)
(quoting Ana Castillo); Patrice Gaines-Carter, Festival Will Celebrate the Pride
of Being Black and Gay, WASH. POST, May 24, 1991, at C1 (observing that black
gays and lesbians express "fear that a public acknowledgment of homosexuality
would add to the discrimination they routinely face as blacks in employment
and other areas"); Dorothy Gilliam, Coming Out of Closet Is Tougher for Blacks,
WASH. POST, July 14, 1980, at C1 (citing black homophobia and employment
discrimination as reasons why black gays and lesbians remain in the closet).
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tion of those individuals who are unable to come out for
260
economic reasons.
As a result of these social realities, income statistics
that portray the wealth of openly gay and lesbian indivi-
duals typically fail to represent the income of the poor
(including whites) and people of color. Therefore, the "spe-
cial rights" rhetoric is based on statistical data that invar-
iably reflect white and upper-class gay and lesbian income
levels. The rhetoric then describes this race and class-
privileged location as normative within gay and lesbian
communities, thereby constructing gay and lesbian people
as white. Hence, race (and class) is at the center of the
"special rights" debate in the gay and lesbian context.
The "special rights" discourse also constructs gay, les-
bian, bisexual and transgendered communities as white
when it purports to contrast the "privileged" status of "gays
and lesbians" with the "subordinate" position of "people of
color" (usually blacks).26' Such comparisons are a central
feature of the "special rights" discourse.262 For example,
during the political campaign to pass Amendment 2, the
Traditional Values Coalition, a conservative political group
in favor of the amendment, produced a video entitled "Gay
Rights/Special Rights."263 Among the many images con-
tained in the video that "contrast" black and gay experience
is footage that portrays "differences" between gay rights
parades and marches and the 1963 March on Washington
260. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 607-08 ("The connection between
economic security and the opportunity to lead an openly gay or lesbian lifestyle
means that gays and lesbians of color, who are disproportionately poor, will face
greater obstacles coming out.").
261. Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 608 (observing that " 'gay and lesbian'
wealth stereotype evolves from race- and class-biased statistics... that are
often contrasted with the low-income levels of the presumedly distinct
population of 'people of color"); see Schacter, supra note 148, at 291 (observing
that opponents of gay rights depict "comfortable gay and lesbian lives against
which the 'true' disadvantage of existing protected groups is dramatically
juxtaposed").
262. See Schacter, supra note 148, at 291.
263. Farai Chideya, How the Right Stirs Black Homophobia, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 73 (discussing content of video); see Sara Diamond, Change in
Strategy; Christian Right's Recruitment of African Americans, HUMANIST, Jan.
1994, at 34 (same); Schacter, supra note 148, at 292 (same); Margaret M.
Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and the "Civil Rights Agenda," 1
AFR.-AM. L. & POLY REP. 33, 48-49 (1994) (same); Nadine Smith, Homophobia:
Will It Divide Us?, ESSENCE, June 1994, at 128 (same).
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for racial justice." The video also contains a screen that
reads "Ever denied the right to vote?... Homosexuals:
No... African Americans: Yes."265 The video was widely
distributed to black political and cultural organizations, in
an attempt to solicit black support for the amendment.266
Ironically, while many black heterosexuals have criticized
the exploitation of black suffering by white gays and
lesbians,267 no significant critique has been lodged against
conservative political organizations that "appropriate" black
subjugation to advance anti-gay agendas.2 It thus appears
that some blacks are willing to collude with conservative,
perhaps racially hostile, organizations in order to preserve
heterosexual privilege. Heterosexism in communities of
color and in anti-racist organizations undoubtedly explains
the disparate responses to the "appropriation" of black
264. See Russell, supra note 263, at 48; Schacter, supra note 148, at 292.
265. Schacter, supra note 148, at 292 (citing Videotape: Gay Rights, Special
Rights (Traditional Values Coalition 1993)).
266. See Russell, supra note 263, at 48; Schacter, supra note 148, at 292.
267. See Butler, supra note 144, at 17 ("The idea of common oppression with
blacks is not only fallacious, it trivializes the entire history of suffering that
blacks have experienced because of their outward racial characteristics, charac-
teristics which cannot be hidden as one goes through life."); Brooks, supra note
211, at 15 (arguing that the unique experience of blacks "defies a unifying
theory of subordination"); Rogers, supra note 144, at Al (arguing that "obvious
differences [between black and gay experience] are key and show a hint of the
baselessness of the comparisons."); see also Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 626-28
and accompanying notes (detailing heterosexual black responses to race-
sexuality analogies); Russell, supra note 263, at 49 (same).
268. I have only located a few arguments that respond to the appropriation
of black subjugation by conservative, often racist, organizations-in stark
contrast to the numerous expressions of outrage at the "appropriation" of black
subjugation by gay and feminist groups. See Chideya, supra note 263, at 73
(questioning sincerity of anti-gay organizations' overtures to black community,
given the opposition to racial anti-discrimination policies by leaders of these
organizations); Diamond, supra note 263, at 36 ("IT]he Christian right's new
recruitment of evangelical blacks says nothing about whether the movement
will act in their interests or merely use them as multicultural window-
dressing."); Smith, supra note 263, at 128.
The irony of this alliance [between blacks and conservative organi-
zations] is that never before have right-wing organizations protested
with African-Americans on issues of redlining, minority-business con-
tracts, police brutality and economic redevelopment of the inner city.
Many of their key spokespersons have a long history of actively
opposing our civil rights, yet we have allowed the Far right to play "di-
vide and conquer" games between the African-American and lesbian
and gay communities.
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subordination by pro-gay activists and to the collusion of
blacks with conservative politics.
The comparative dimension of the "special rights" rhe-
toric (like its evidentiary foundation) also constructs gays
and lesbians as white and people of color as hetero-sexual.
As a threshold matter, any comparison of "gays and les-
bians" with "people of color" assumes the two are mutually
exclusive groups, thereby negating the existence of gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. 69 In ad-
dition, the wealth characterization-as the "special rights"
discourse explicitly makes clear-does not apply to com-
munities of color. These communities, unlike gay and les-
bian communities, are poor and subordinate. The "special
rights" discourse, thus, creates a "gay and lesbian"
stereotype that is defined as inapplicable to "persons of
color." The separation of gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered identity from colored status through the
stereotypification of gays and lesbians as wealthy (as
opposed to poor persons of color) further marginalizes and
renders invisible gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the trans-
gendered of color and centralizes white gay positionality,
thus portraying gays and lesbians as white and people of
color as heterosexual.
In summary, the "special rights" discourse makes gen-
eralized claims about the gay and lesbian community,
relying upon demographic data that represent white and
upper-class positionality. The discourse also constructs gay
and lesbian stereotypes and contrasts these images with
conflicting perceptions of communities of color. Consequent-
ly, the discourse creates oppositional descriptive labels (e.g.,
"wealthy" versus "poor") for the two communities which, if
accepted, preclude a recognition of "cross-identification,""27
thus solidifying a white construction of non-heterosexual
status.
271
269.'See sources cited supra note 148.
270. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 570 (discussing how conflicting
stereotypes of "Latino" and "gay" men contributed to disbelief that a Puerto
Rican male was victim of homophobic violence); id. at 608 (arguing that gay
wealth stereotype may "reflect society's views of white gays and lesbians or a
perception that all gays and lesbians are white").
271. There is scant literature on the racialization of homosexuality in legal
literature. For an excellent examination of this topic, see Eaton, supra note 148
(arguing that courts construct gays and lesbians as white and people of color as
heterosexual).
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The racial dynamics of the anti-gay "special rights" rhe-
toric were obscured in Chang and Culp's analysis. Chang
and Culp focus their attention on the Court's failure to
connect the "special rights" rhetoric with white hostility
toward civil rights measures enacted to protect people of
color from discrimination. The authors 'argue that "the
power of the Court's opinion in Romer would have been
enhanced if the Court had been willing to put the special
rights debate into a better moral and political framework
that acknowledged the power of race to distort the truth."72
As I understand Chang and Culp's claim, the historical
invocation of "special rights" in racial discrimination cases
provides a contextual framework for understanding how the
rhetoric generally represents a disparagement of civil rights
claims."'This assertion is supported by the history of white
opposition to civil rights for people of color.
The authors correctly locate the origins of "special
rights" rhetoric in racial civil rights cases of the late-nine-
enth century.274 During this era, the Supreme Court severe-
ly limited Congressional efforts to enact protective legisla-
tion for blacks who continued to face subjugation, despite
the ratification of the post-Civil War Amendments.7 5 The
Court's reasoning indicates that it perceived additional
measures to protect blacks from subjugation as providing
them with "special rights." For example, in the Civil Rights
Cases,"6 the Court invalidated a federal public accommoda-
tions statute upon finding that the enforcement provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit Congress to
regulate private behavior277 and upon concluding that
272. Chang & Culp, supra note 210, at 248.
273. See id. at 245 ("The notion that the role of civil rights law is to create
'special rights' is a product of our jurisprudence on race.").
274. See id at 245-46 (discussing deployment of "special rights" rhetoric in
the Court's racial jurisprudence).
275. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119-
29 (1997) (discussing Supreme Court's role in preserving racial subordination
during Reconstruction era). Democrats in the Reconstruction Congress and
President Andrew Johnson also strenuously opposed attempts to secure equal-
ity for the former slaves. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDIcIAL DOCTINE 91-109 (1988)
(analyzing objections to equal protection principles by members of the
Reconstruction Congress).
276. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
277. See id. at 11 ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] does not invest Congress
with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State
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nineteenth century racial segregation in places of public
accommodation was not a "badge or incident of slavery,"
which Congress could regulate under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 1 8 In discussing the claim that racial segre-
gation was a badge or incident of slavery, Justice Bradley,
writing for the Court, questioned the appropriateness of
further legislation protecting blacks from discrimination,
providing an early deployment of the "special rights"
response to civil rights legislation. Bradley argued that
[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may
see fit to make as to guests he will entertain, or as to the people he
will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or busi-
ness .... When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants
of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws.
27 9
Thus, in the immediate years following the "emancipa-
tion" of slaves, members of the Court were already un-com-
fortable with and hostile to the idea of legitimating civil
rights protection for blacks, construing such laws as "spe-
cial" handouts.
As Chang and Culp and other commentators have dem-
onstrated, the "special rights" discourse also plays a central
role in the political and judicial opposition to affirmative
action.. and other forms of civil rights protection28' for
legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State
action .... ).
278. See id. at 21 ("[Clongress has a right to enact all necessary and proper
laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and
incidents...."); id. at 24 ("[We are forced to the conclusion that [racial
segregation in places of public accommodation] has nothing to do with slavery
or involuntary servitude . ").
279. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
280. Debates surrounding the passage of Proposition 209, which eliminates
governmental affirmative action in California, highlights how the "special
rights" discourse is invoked to disparage affirmative action and to gain support
for the dismantling of policies to remedying racial and gender discrimination.
The Ballot Pamphlet that "explained" the effect of Proposition 209 to voters
included political statements from both supporters and opponents of the
initiative. One statement drafted by proponents argued that "[a] generation
ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination. But
special interests hijacked the civil rights movement. Instead of equality,
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people of color. The close connection between affirmative
action and "special rights" rhetoric also impacted the poli-
tical discourse surrounding Amendment 2. For instance,
during the Amendment 2 campaign, conservative political
groups argued that gay and lesbian civil rights protection
would lead to "quotas" and "affirmative action" on the basis
of sexual orientation 2 -despite the fact that none of the
laws invalidated by the amendment mandated or had been
interpreted to require affirmative action.283 The amendment
itself codified the anti-affirmative action rhetoric, pro-
hibiting "quota preferences" based on gay, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation.284
Thus, the "special rights" discourse has been employed
historically in political discourse and judicial opinions to
criticize, prevent and overturn governmental policies de-
governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set-asides." Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 (1997) (vacating preliminary
injunction barring enforcement of anti-affirmative action law) (quoting Ballot
Pamphlet) (emphasis added).
281. The disparagement of civil rights legislation as "special rights," for
example, colored debates surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See Schacter, supra note 148, at 305. Opponents of this legislation labeled
it "a sort of racial discrimination in reverse," 110 CONG. REc. 8635 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Sparkman), and charged that "under the cloak of protecting
the civil rights of certain minorities [the bill would] destroy the civil rights of all
citizens of the United States" by prohibiting racial discrimination in "private"
employment. See MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963,
H.R. Rep. No. 914, at 64 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2431, 2433.
Similarly, opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 claimed that it "strip[ped]
white males of equality before the law." Q. Whitfield Ayres, Civil Rights Bill
Could Be Boon to GOP, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., June 9, 1991, at G3.
282. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 263, at 51 ("Throughout the Amendment
Two campaign... [sexual orientation antidiscrimination law] was trans-
morgrified into a veritable 'affirmative action' dragon. Accordingly, the dragon-
slayers seized the opportunity to capitalize upon mainstream resentment not
only of affirmative action for lesbians, gays and bisexuals but of affirmative
action itself."); Laurie Goodstein, New York Joins Boycott on Colorado Gay Law;
Atlanta Also Bans Employee Trips to State, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1992, at A3
(reporting that conservative group "promoted [Amendment 2] as a way to
prevent homosexuals from winning 'special rights' and quotas."); Dirk Johnson,
Colorado Faces Boycott Over Its Gay-Bias Vote, N.Y. TIvES, Dec. 2, 1992, at A16
(reporting that a conservative group in support of Amendment 2 "contended
[that] anti-discrimination laws amounted to special rights that would lead to
higher quotas in affirmative action programs."). See also Schacter, supra note
148, at 293 (noting role of anti-affirmative action sentiment in anti-gay "special
rights" rhetoric).
283. See Russell, supra note 263, at 50-51.
284. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
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signed to remedy the effects of racial subjugation. The
historical deployment of "special rights" rhetoric in race
cases clearly impacts gay and lesbian civil rights, as white
opposition to "affirmative action" and "quotas" is invoked to
help defeat gay rights initiatives. As Chang and Culp
demonstrate, the Court in Romer failed to engage the racial
civil rights dimensions of the "special rights" rhetoric, an
omission which caused the opinion to lack an historical
contextualization.285 In their own analysis, however, Chang
and Culp do not reveal the more immediate (and perhaps
more relevant) racial implications of the anti-gay "special
rights" discourse: namely, that the discourse itself con-
structs a white gay and lesbian community. Chang and
Culp fail to uncover this racialization of gay and lesbian
people because race and sexuality occupy seemingly close-
but separate-spheres in their analysis. Chang and Culp
treat race as an autonomous and separate (though impor-
tant) jurisprudential reference point-a body of politics and
case law which, if engaged, provides a more complete
understanding of the disparagement of civil rights in the
context of Romer.86 Race is also seemingly treated as
distinct and separate from sexuality in Chang and Culp's
analysis when they conclude that the "special rights" dis-
course in the anti-gay context makes heterosexism analo-
gous to (hence separate from) racism. The authors argue
that the gay and lesbian victims of Amendment 2 were
injured by the same devaluation of and opposition to civil
rights in the race litigation context: "In this sense, being a
sexual minority is very much like being a racial minority. It
is another form of the Other that is excluded from
constitutional discourse.""7 While the authors are correct in
observing that the intention of the "special rights"
argument is the same in both the race and sexuality
contexts-the disparagement of civil rights and those in
need of civil rights-analogies of people of color and gays
and lesbians have the effect of erasing gays and lesbians of
color, thereby reinforcing the separation of colored and gay
status.
By failing to place race fully within the sexuality
285. Given the Court's complicity in the deployment of the "special rights"
rhetoric, such an engagement might have appeared ironic.
286. See Chang & Culp, supra note 210, at 242-48.
287. Id at 248. (emphasis added).
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context, the authors are unable to explain how the "special
rights" discourse painted a racial portrait of gay and lesbian
America. Thus, while Chang and Culp's provocative anal-
ysis highlights the relevance of race jurisprudence to the
articulation of "special rights" in the gay and lesbian con-
text and contributes to an important, ongoing dialogue
among critical race theorists on issues of sexual oppression,
the distance between sexuality and race maintained in their
discussion obscures the racial narrative portrayed by the
anti-gay "special rights" discourse and blurs the inter-
twining of racial and sexual identities.88
C. Race and Sexual Subordination: The Historical
Connection
Anti-racist theorists, in varying degrees, have margin-
alized the importance of combating heterosexist oppression
in their analyses. The ambivalence or resistance toward
pro-gay politics among anti-racists, however, does not mean
that anti-racism has not paid any attention to sexual
subordination. On the contrary, anti-racism (as the
following discussion demonstrates) has vigorously chal-
lenged sexual stereotypes, sexual oppression and sexualized
violence directed toward communities of color. Further-
more, sexual subordination and bigotry have figured promi-
nently in the oppression of people of color.28" While each
288. My observation that the "special rights" discourse constructed gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered as white has important implications
for judicial decision-making in the context of gay and lesbian equality. These
issues, which I explore in a current work-in-progress, are beyond the scope of
this Article, but are worth mentioning briefly. If, as I have argued, the "special
rights" rhetoric paints the gay and lesbian community as white, does the Court
in Romer join in this racial construction by failing to deconstruct or reject the
racial premises of the rhetoric? See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1997)
(discussing the Court's role in constructing and preserving whiteness); Eaton,
supra note 148 (discussing role of courts in constructing homosexuality as
white). Furthermore, if the Court perceives the gay and lesbian community as
white, do gay and lesbian legal "victories" result from the Court's acceptance of
progressive sexual politics or because the Court is simply protecting white
privilege (and ignoring the sexuality of gays and lesbians)? Finally, if the Court
is protecting white privilege in "favorable" gay and lesbian litigation, how will it
respond to claims of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, the transgendered of color and of
those white gays who "transgress" from the Court's view of "acceptable"
whiteness?
289. Naomi Zack, writing in the context of black subjugation, offers a crisp
analysis of this point:
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marginalized racial group has a unique history of
sexualized racial oppression, they share a similar history of
racial hierarchy executed by sexual repression and vio-
lence.29 Furthermore, white supremacist culture has as-
signed a battery of sexual stereotypes to each marginalized
racial group291 which have served to justify systems of vio-
lence and oppression against people of color. Much of this
sexualized racial marginalization, however, has carried a
heterosexual, rather than homosexual, tone. 92 Nevertheless,
the responses of anti-racism to "heterosexually linked" vio-
lence provides ample precedent for the incorporation of
sexual politics, including gay and lesbian liberation, within
critical race theory and contemporary anti-racist politics.
The existence of anti-racist responses to heterosexual
racism also creates a glaring disparity within anti-racist
discourse: heterosexual racial discrimination receives the
challenge of anti-racist advocacy, while homophobic racism
remains marginalized and unnoticed. Anti-racists have not
offered any convincing explanation for their disparate re-
sponses to heterosexual and homosexual varieties of sexual-
ized racial oppression. While the diverging responses likely
result from many factors, including homophobia among
anti-racists, the differences, whether intentional or other-
wise, have the effect of subordinating gays and lesbians of
The result of the historical intersection or connection between socially
constructed sexuality and socially constructed race has been the
sexualization of race in American lived experience .... The sex-
ualization of race means that the fictitious ideological machinery which
posits and reproduces the existence of races.., as well as the crimes
and slights that whites have committed, and still do commit, against
blacks in American culture... are qualities and conditions of
sexuality, for some individuals.
Zack, supra note 79, at 147; see also Abdul R. JanMohamed, Sexuality on/of the
Racial Border: Foucault, Wright and the Articulation of "Racialized Sexuality,"
in DISCOURSES OF SEXUALITY: FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS 94, 112 (Domna C.
Stanton ed., 1995) ("[W]ithin the discursive formation of racialized sexuality the
process of racialization is always already a process of sexualization, and the
process of sexualization is also always already-or at least functions as if it
were-a process of racialization.").
290. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 31-32 ("Social renditions of masculinity
and femininity are inseverably a part of racial constructs, just as racial
stereotypes invariably embody some elements of sexual identity. The archeology
of race soon becomes the excavation of gender and sexual identity.").
291. See infra Part I1.C.
292. See Zack, supra note 79, at 154 (noting role of heterosexuality in
sexualization of blacks in America).
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color and allowing homophobic racism to escape the chal-
lenge of anti-racist advocacy. These disparities, however,
are not inevitable. If anti-racist theory and politics can
react to a legacy of sexual subordination premised upon
heterosexual status, then homosexual-based oppression can
also occupy a meaningful space in anti-racist agendas.
1. Blacks and Sexualized Racial Oppression. Much of
the oppression and discrimination blacks have endured has
been sexual in nature.293 The sexualized oppression directed
at blacks, given a patriarchal social structure, has produced
gendered effects-creating different experiences for black
men and black women. In America's racially hierarchical
society, black men are constructed as promiscuous, threat-
ening to white women and as possessing an unmatched
sexual prowess.294 Although commentators do not explicitly
describe them as such, these constructs are heterosexual in
nature, as indicated by the perception of black male
sexuality as threatening to white women. Within gay and
lesbian communities, however, these constructs have taken
on a "homosexual" tone. 5
The sexualization of black male heterosexuality
emerged primarily during slavery. One force that led to the
sexualization of black men was the economics of slavery. In
order to generate more "commodities" for the capitalistic
slavery industry, black reproduction was needed. Although
white male slave owners often fulfilled the male role in
heterosexual biological reproduction by raping black wo-
men, 29 black male slaves were compelled to "breed" with
black female slaves in order to produce offspring, thereby
293. See generally CALVIN C. HERNTON, SEX AND RACISM IN AMERICA (1965);
STEMBER, supra note 79; WEST, supra note 140, at 119-31.
294. See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 67 (1984)
("Allegations as to the Negro's sexual prowess, or the heroic proportions of his
genitalia are a widely known legend. .. ").
295. See Essex Hemphill, Does Your Mama Know About Me?, in
CEREMONIES: PROSE AND POETRY 38-39 (1992) (criticizing sexualization of black
gay men within gay culture); Isaac Julien & Kobna Mercer, True Confessions: A
Discourse on Images of Black Male Sexuality, in BROTHER TO BROTHER: NEW
WRITINGS BY BLACK GAY MEN 169 (Essex Hemphill ed., 1991) (same); see also
Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 622-24 (discussing how stereotypification of black
sexuality within gay and lesbian communities may contribute to political
fragmentation).
296. See Zack, supra note 79, at 152.
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augmenting the property holdings of slave owners."7 The
profit-driven "breeder" role, along with generalized notions
of black sexuality as "unclean," provided the roots for and
reinforced the construction of black male heterosexuality as
promiscuous and potent. 98
Black male heterosexual practice, though encouraged
by white supremacist society to increase the number of
slaves, was at the same time stigmatized by white males
who saw black men as a threat to their patriarchal
297. While much of the literature on slave "breeding" focuses on black
female slaves (particularly due to the brutality surrounding their role in
"breeding"), black male slaves were also victims of this practice. See B.A.
BOTIN, LAY MY BURDEN DowN: A FOLK HISTORY OF SLAVERY 161-62 (1989)
(relating story of female slave compelled to breed with male slave); Lisa A.
Crooms, Don't Believe the Hype: Black Women, Patriarchy and the New
Welfarism, 38 How. L.J. 611, 619 (1995) ("Slavery imposed on all slaves a duty
to breed in accordance with their owners' expectations."); Thelma Jennings, "Us
Colored Women Has to Go Through a Plenty" Sexual Exploitation of African-
American Slave Women, 1 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 45 (1990) (describing role of black
male slaves in "breeding" of new slaves); Joyce McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 217-18 (1992) ("[Ilt is indisputable that all slaves,
regardless of their sex, were potential, if not actual .... participants in chattel
breeding...."). On the economic role of "breeding," see A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free". Legal Barriers
Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1213, 1226 (1993) ("[Bly breeding slaves for the market,.., owners could
improve their economic position."); Zack, supra note 79, at 150 (discussing role
of breeding in slave economy); Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth
Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 803 (1993) ("A
slave owner could... force slaves to have intercourse with his family, friends,
or other slaves, and then profit from the intercourse by selling or enslaving the
baby.").
298. Zack, supra note 79, at 152-53. See also William N. Fisher III, Ideology
and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051, 1063 (observing
that law of slavery era often portrayed male slaves "as sexually animalistic").
While Zack attributes the sexualization of black male heterosexuality to "the
use of black males for breeding more slaves," Zack, supra note 79, at 152, and to
"economic and social domination" of blacks by whites, Zack, supra note 79, at
153, she argues that the sexualization of black maleness was "diminutive"
relative to that of black female status during slavery. Zack argues that black
male sexuality could be viewed as "unnecessary," given the ability of white
slave owners to "breed" new slaves. See id. at 152-53. Zack's observations seem
questionable given the many ways in which the law sanctioned violence against
male slaves (and female slaves) as a result of white perceptions of black sex-
uality. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only As
an Enemy". The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial
and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1057 (1992)
(discussing the domination of black male slaves through rape law).
19991 IGNORING SEXUALIZATION OF RACE 83
domination over white women. Black male sexuality was
profitable and desirable only when it was confined to black
women.299 The stereotypification of black male hetero-sex-
uality as threatening thus developed to stigmatize prophyl-
actically black male sexuality and inter-racial sexual rela-
tions between black men and white women. 00
The racial narrative of black male sexuality as menac-
ing has left an indelible imprint in the history of American
injustice. The horrible "institution" of lynching in the post-
bellum South, for example, was justified by the construction
of black male heterosexuality as a violent threat to white
women.30 ' Although in the majority of lynchings rape was
not even alleged,"2 the pervasive fear of black men as rap-
ists of white women was exploited to legitimate the slayings
and to excuse white control and domination over blacks
generally.33 Fear of black male heterosexuality also im-
pacted the law and the legal system, resulting in (among
other things) gross deprivations of due process in criminal
proceedings,"" vast disparities in punishment, 5 and dis-
299. The racial or slave status of children was, therefore, typically
determined by looking at the status of the mother. See Christopher A. Ford,
Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82
CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1273-74 (1994); Wilbert E. Moore, Slave Law and the Social
Structure, 26 J. AM. NEGRO HIST. 171 (1941), reprinted in THE LAW OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY 325, 327 n.5 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
300. See WEST, supra note 140, at 119-20 (discussing construct of black male
as "mad and mean predatory craver of white women"); A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 535 (relating "myth that black men are particularly
prone to rape white women" to legal and social domination of blacks); Barbara
Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender
in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 34 (1996) (relating "myth of
the black man as a rapist lusting after white women" to legal and social
domination of blacks); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CI. L. REV.
209, 227 (1995) (noting "violently enforced taboo against sexual relations
between white women and Black men").
301. See Higginbotham, supra note 300, at 535; Holden-Smith, supra note
300, at 34.
302. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1272.
303. See id. ("Ironically, while the fear of the Black rapist was exploited to
legitimate the practice of lynching, rape was not even alleged in most cases. The
well-developed fear of Black sexuality served primarily to increase white tol-
erance for racial terrorism as a prophylactic measure to keep Blacks under
control.").
304. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing conviction of
black males accused of raping white women; defendants convicted and received
death penalty after one day trial, with all-white jury, and without assistance of
counsel).
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criminatory laws prohibiting interracial marriage."' Racial
domination supported by gendered and sexualized con-
structs of black males has sparked and continues to gen-
erate stiff resistance from blacks. In fact, as many scholars
have argued, black (heterosexual) male sexual subordin-
ation often serves as the "archetype" of black subjugation,
to the exclusion of black women and black gay men."
Black women also suffer from negative sexualized racial
constructs. Under racial mythology, black women are often
considered promiscuous and sexually aggressive "Jeze-
bels.""8 The Jezebel stereotype, which focuses on male and
female coupling, is clearly heterosexual in nature.
The sexualization of black women, like that of black
men, began largely during slavery and was connected, in
part, to economic forces. Black females were raped by white
slave owners and compelled to breed with other slaves in
order to satisfy capitalistic demand for new slaves and to
facilitate patriarchal domination." 9 The exploitation of
305. The death penalty for rape has been applied in a clearly racist manner.
For instance, between 1930 and 1967, 405 of the 455 men executed for rape in
this country were black. See MICHAEL MIELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 75 (1973) (citing United States Dept.
of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, Bulletin No. 46,
Capital Punishment, 1930-1970, at II (Aug. 1971)). While these statistics reflect
a fear of black male heterosexuality, the statistics also reveal a devaluation of
black women (which most commentators fal to mention): no person has been
executed for raping a black woman. See Ammons, supra note 9, at 1026 n.107
(citing Rosemarie Tong, Black Perspective on Women, Sex, and the Law, in
WOMEN, SEx AND THE LAW 153 (1984)).
306. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating on Equal
Protection grounds state law banning inter-racial marriage).
307. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1272-73 ("Within the African-American
community, cases involving race-based accusations against black men have
stood as hallmarks of racial injustice. The prosecution of the Scottsboro boys
and the Emmett Till tragedy... triggered African-American resistance to the
rigid social codes of white supremacy.").
308. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 938, 950 (1997) ("One of the most prevalent images of slave women was
the character of Jezebel, a woman governed by her sexual desires .... ."); Judith
A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV.
775, 784 (1991) ("White society created myths [during slavery] to justify their
oppression and exploitation, portraying black women as fecund and pro-
miscuous objects, available to satisfy white male sexual desires."); see also
WEST, supra note 140, at 119 (discussing Jezebel stereotype); Crenshaw, supra
note 1, at 1271 (discussing stereotypes of black female sexuality as unclean).
309. See Zack, supra note 79, at 150 ("[Bllack female slaves became objects
of sexual desire to white slave owners because money could be made if they bred
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black women as "breeders" fostered and reinforced the ster-
eotypification of black women as sexually promiscuous.
Gendered and sexualized stereotypes of black women,
like those applied to black men, have legitimated a legacy of
violence and legal injustice. The black woman as promis-
cuous stereotype justified the sexual assault of black wo-
men by white slave owners and has caused the devaluation
of black female sexual victimization, particularly through
legal institutions. During slavery, for example, the rape of
black women by any man was not recognized as a crime." '
The negative effects of sexualized racism continue to
haunt black women. For instance, now that the rape of
black women is formally recognized as a crime, the con-
struction of black women as promiscuous causes jurors in
sexual assault prosecutions to doubt black women's credi-
bility, presenting tremendous barriers to the conviction of
defendants accused of raping them.' Furthermore, men
who rape black women tend to receive significantly shorter
sentences than men who rape white women."'
Black women, thus, have been particularly margin-
alized by a patriarchal society that supports white male
them...."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1945, 1970 (1993) ("White masters... could increase their wealth by
controlling their slaves' reproductive capacity through rewarding pregnancy,
punishing slave women who did not bear children, forcing them to breed, and
raping them.") (citing JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LovE, LABOR OF SORROW 34-
35 (1981); WE ARE YOUR SISTERS 24-26 (Dorothy Sterling ed., 1984); Catherine
Clinton, Caught in the Web of the Big House: Women and Slavery, in T-E WEB
OF SOUTHERN SOCIAL RELATIONS 19, 23-28 (Walter J. Fraser, Jr. et al. eds.,
1985)).
310. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 210-56 (1975); A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 282 (1978); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism,
and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118 (1983); see also George (a slave) v.
State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859) (dismissing indictment of male slave for rape of
female slave less than ten years old because "[t]here is no act (of our legislature
on this subject) which embraces either the attempted or actual commission of a
rape by a slave on a female slave .... ).
311. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1271 (suggesting negative stereotypes
of black women "may make black women's rape either less believable or less
important); Wriggins, supra note 310, at 121 ("The criminal justice system
continues to take the rape of Black women less seriously than the rape of white
women.").
312. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1268 (discussing statistics
demonstrating shorter sentences for rape of black women); Wriggins, supra note
310, at 121 ("Studies show that judges generally impose harsher sentences for
rape when the victim is white than when the victim is Black.").
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control over the bodies of all women and black male
domination of black women, and that devalues black female
sexual victimization, regardless of the race of the perpe-
trator. Anti-racist and feminist political movements have
historically responded sluggishly, if at all, to the particular
problems faced by black women in the area of rape and
subordination.313 These movements, reflecting their hege-
monic and essentialist nature, have focused primarily on
the experiences of white female rape victims3 and on the
racist treatment of black men accused of sexual assault,
including the assault of black women.315 The narrow
responses to rape by feminist and anti-racist lobbies have
compounded the invisibility of black women's issues sur-
rounding rape. 16 Nevertheless, feminist of color critiques of
both anti-racist and feminist discourses have created some
space within these social movements for discussing and
responding to issues of heterosexual rape and sexual stereo-
types that pose particular problems for black women.
2. Latinos and Latinas and Sexualized Racial
Oppression. Latinos and Latinas have also suffered from
sexualized racial oppression and stereotypes.317 The sexuali-
zation of Latino and Latina statuses, like that of black men
and women, is gendered.
Latino males are often constructed as "macho," "pas-
sionate," promiscuous and violent."8 These stereotypes
though facially neutral, have traditionally been associated
313. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1266-82.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 1266-68, 1271-77.
316. See id. at 1266 ("Although antiracist and antisexist assaults on rape
have been politically useful to Black women, on some level, the monofocal
antiracist and feminist critiques have also produced a political discourse that
disserves Black women.").
317. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273 (1992) (describing range of stereotypes of
Mexican-Americans and noting that these images often have "sexual
overtones").
318. See id. at 1273 (describing stereotype of "tragic, silent, 'Spanish,' tall,
dark, and handsome" Mexican-American); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence
Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and
Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 240 (1994) ('The standard
description of Latino males as hot-blooded, passionate, and prone to emotional
outbursts is legendary. 'Macho' is the accepted-and expected-single word
description synonymous with Latino men and male culture.").
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with heterosexual, Latino male status. Nevertheless, within
gay and lesbian communities these stereotypes have taken
on a homosexual dimension."9 Many of the negative sexual-
ized stereotypes of Latinos and Latinas emerged during and
after the United States imperialist conquest of Mexican
territory in the Southwest;3 thus, much of the scholarly
literature on this subject surrounds Mexican American ex-
321perience.
Although "Mexican" status had historically been consid-
ered both a "nationality" and a "race," during the mid-1800s
United States expansion in the Southwest, whites began to
"conflate and stigmatize" Mexican nationality and race. 22
Under this racialization of Mexican status, Mexican Amer-
icans were sexualized. For example, the offensive "greaser"
stereotype emerged to describe a treacherous Mexican male
who was sexually threatening to and desirous of white wo-
men.323 As with negative images of black male sexuality, the
greaser stereotype centers around white fear of hetero-
sexual Mexican American male sexuality and threats to
white heterosexual male patri-archal domination of white
women. Mexican American males, on the contrary, were
also depicted as lacking masculinity, relative to white
men.
324
Sexualized (and other) stereotypes of Latinos justified
legal and extra-legal racial terrorism and domination. In
1855, for instance, California passed the "Greaser Act," pur-
portedly a vagrancy law, which expressly applied to "all
persons who are commonly known as 'Greasers' or the issue
of Spanish and Indian blood.., and who go armed and are
319. See David James Rose, Coming Out, Standing Out: Hispanic American
Gays and Lesbians, HISPANIC, June 1994, at 44 ("Latino gays are [often]
eroticized and ... fetish[ized] by gay white men.") (quoting Latino gay activists
Robert Vasquez-Pacheco).
320. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 317, at 1273-74; Lopez, supra note
82, at 29 (arguing that "animus" toward Mexicans "had its source in the Anglo-
Mexican conflicts in the Southwest, particularly in Texas and California").
321. My analysis will reflect this fact, though I do not wish to essentialize
Latino experience.
322. Lopez, supra note 82, at 28.
323. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 317, at 1274 ("[The greaser
coveted Anglo women and would seduce or rape them ff given the opportunity.")
(citing ARTHUR G. PETTT, IMAGES OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN IN FICTION AND
FILM 22-25 (1980)).
324. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 30-31 (discussing role of gender and
sexuality in the construction of Mexican Americans).
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not peaceable and quiet persons." 25 Furthermore, negative
portrayals of Latinos, including sexualized imagery, were
invoked to justify the brutal displacement of Mexican Amer-
icans from land they inhabited in the Southwest. T.J.
Farnham's writings demonstrate the role of sexualized and
gendered racism as a justificatory instrument of imperi-
alism:
No one acquainted with the indolent, mixed race of California, will
ever believe that they will populate, much less, for any length of
time, govern the country. The law of nature which curses the
mulatto here with a constitution less robust than that of either
race from which he sprang, lays a similar penalty upon the
mingling of the Indian and white races in California and Mexico.
They must fade away .... The old Saxon blood must stride the
continent, must command all its northern shores, must here press
the grape and the olive, here eat the orange and the fig, and in
their own unaided might, erect the alter of civil and religious
I . 326freedom on the plains of the Califormas.
Farnham constructs Mexican American males as
"emasculated" and portrays white (not "Spanish," but "old
Saxon") males as "true men," worthy of exercising dominion
over the western territories.327 Farnham also proclaimed
that white conquest of California was appropriate because
native Californians "are an imbecile, pusillanimous race of
men, and unfit to control the destinies of that beautiful
country."328 As Farnham's racist, gendered and sexualized
declarations demonstrate, the stereotypification of Latino
male identity served to legitimate the violent domination of
Southwestern territory by white Americans and the
subjugation of Latinos and Latinas.329
325. 1855 Cal. Stat. 175 excerpted in ROBERT F. HEIZER & ALAN J. ALmQUIST,
THE OTHER CALIFORNIANS: PREJUDICE AND DIScRIMINATION UNDER SPAIN,
MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES TO 1920, at 151 (1971); see Lopez, supra note
82, at 29 (discussing statute and its connection to stereotypes of Mexican Amer-
icans).
326. T.J. FARNHAM, LIFE, ADVENTURES, AND TRAVEL IN CALIFORNIA 413
(1840) quoted in HEIZER & ALMQUIST, supra note 325, at 140 (emphasis added);
see also Lopez, supra note 82, at 29 (discussing racist and imperialist writing of
Farnham).
327. FARNHAM, supra note 326, at 413.
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 30 ("Farnham's assertions regarding the
racial character of these Mexicans reflected the psychological need to justify
conquest: the people already in California, Farnham assured his readers, would
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Latinas, like Latinos, have also endured a history of
sexualized racial stereotypification and oppression. Latinas,
like black women, have at times been depicted as wanton
and promiscuous.33 ° Nevertheless, at points in American
history, some Latinas have been depicted as sexually de-
sirable, refined and eligible for marriage to whites, parti-
cularly to the extent that they were considered Euro-pean
and elite.3"' Both of these sexualized racial constructs are
heterosexual in nature. Although race critics, including cri-
tical race theorists and LatCrit scholars, have not devoted
sufficient attention to the sexualized subordination of
Latinas (or Latinos), 32 emerging scholarship seeks to
counter the (heterosexual) male focus of "Latino" studies."33
Existing scholarship, in fact, demonstrates that the con-
struction of Latinas as promiscuous has legitimated vio-
lence against them. For example, their claims of sexual
assault and violence, like those of black women, have been
met with disbelief or lack of concern.33 Therefore, as with
blacks and Latino males, sexual stereotypification has justi-
fied violence against and lack of concern for the victim-
ization of Latinas.
3. Asian-Americans and Sexualized Racial Oppression.
Asian Americans, like blacks, Latinos and Latinas, have
been the victims of sexualized racial constructs and violent
'fade away' under Nature's curse, and in any event, were a race 'unfit' to govern
their own land.").
330. See Rivera, supra note 318, at 241 (describing construction of Latinas
as "sensual and sexually responsive" to satisfy her "hot-blooded, passionate
partner").
331. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 31 & n.120.
332. The amount of legal and other scholarly literature on the sexualization
of Latinas and Latinos is rather small.
333. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 318; Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol,
Borders (En)gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997); Montoya, supra note 6; Maria L. Ontiveros, Rosa
Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden, and Me: Issues of Gender,
Ethnicity, and Class in Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 135 (1995); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The
Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1996).
334. See Iglesias, supra note 333 (discussing marginalization of women of
color, including Latinas, in rape policy); Rivera, supra note 318 (discussing
inadequacies of domestic violence laws to protect Latinas and arguing that law
enforcement do not take Latina victimization seriously due to stereotypes of
Latinas).
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domination. Sexualized stereotypes of Asian Americans are
also gendered, affecting men and women differently.
Sexualized racism against Asian Americans has its root in
racist and sexist immigration practices. The Naturalization
Act of 1790, for example, permitted only "free white
persons" to become naturalized.335 This restriction remained
in the statutory scheme until 1952.33  Despite the racially
exclusionary naturalization statute, Asian Americans, pri-
marily males, were allowed to "immigrate" to the United
States to serve as a source of inexpensive labor for the
nation's economy."' 7 The achievement of economic success
by some Asian Americans immigrants in the late nine-
teenth century and the concurrent downturn in the national
economy, however, led to deep hostility toward and
scapegoating of Asian Americans, in particular the Chinese,
who were blamed for the country's economic woes.338 A host
of stereotypes soon emerged to stigmatize Asian Ameri-
cans. 39 While many of the stereotypes focus more directly
on economic fears, casting Asian Americans as "unfair com-
petitors,"34 for example, others are sexualized. Asian Amer-
ican men have been constructed as effeminate, asexual,
passive and weak.34 ' Because they have historically been
335. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch.3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
336. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
337. See Cho, supra note 79, at 183 ("The racial economy of pre-civil rights
America preferred a 'bachelor society' of single Asian men who proved to be a
source of cheap, vulnerable labor."); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 317, at
1270 ("In the middle years of the nineteenth century, Chinese were welcomed
into the land for their labor: They were needed to operate the mines, build
railroads, and carry out other physical tasks necessary to the country's de-
velopment.") (citing ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND
THE ANTI-CHINESE MovEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 19-45 (1971); E. WONG, ON VISUAL
MEDIA RACISM: ASIANS IN THE AMERICAN MOTION PICTURES, at ii-v (1978)). As a
result of the preference for male immigrant labor, there were stark gender
imbalances in the Asian American population until 1965 when racial
restrictions on immigration were lifted. See GARY OKIHRO, MARGINS AND
MAINSTREAMIS 67 (1994); Cho, supra note 79, at 183.
338. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 317, at 1270-71 ("Chinese became
the scapegoats for the 1870s Depression.").
339. These stereotypes re-emerged as other populations of Asian Americans
began to immigrate to the United States in greater numbers. See Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 317, at 1271 (describing anti-Japanese stereotypes).
340. See Note, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1926, 1934-36 (1993) (discussing "unfair competitor" stereotype of Asian
Americans).
341. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 577 & n.78 (citing Petersen, supra
note 76, at 122); David Mura, How America Unsexes the Asian Male, N.Y.
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depicted as effeminate, weak and passive, Asian Americans
males have not typically been perceived as menacing sexual
threats as have black and Latino males.34 The sexualized
construction of Asian American males is also heterosexually
based-it seeks to stigmatize Asian American male hetero-
sexuality by feminizing it, or even labeling it as "gay."
343
The perception that Asian American males are effem-
inate and weak, yet economically threatening, has led to
acts of oppressive violence against them. The most widely
discussed account of anti-Asian American violence and legal
discrimination is the murder of Vincent Chin. Chin, a
Chinese American, was killed in 1982 by Ronald Ebens and
Michael Nitz, two Detroit autoworkers. A witness to the
brutal attack " testified that Ebens exclaimed "that it was
because of people like Chin... that he and his fellow
employees were losing their jobs." 5 The attackers also
called Chin a "Chink." ' Ebens and Nitz eventually pleaded
guilty to manslaughter and were each given lenient sen-
TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1996, at C9); see also John M. Kang, Deconstructing the
Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 345 (1997) ("[Tlhe
rhetoric surrounding Asian men emphasize s] either their asexuality or their
perceived femininity."); John Kuo Wei Tchen, Believing Is Seeing: Transforming
Orientalism and the Occidental Gaze, in ASIA AMERICA: IDENTITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICAN ART 18 (Margo Machida ed., 1994) (describing
the "standard representation of a Chinese man... [as] unmanly, asexual,
waifelike, comic, yet slightly sinister.").
342. See Kang, supra note 341, at 345 ("Early White American rhetoric
surrounding Black men focused on their masculine appearances, but the
rhetoric surrounding Asian men emphasized either their asexuality or their
perceived femininity."). Though not commonly seen as sexually threatening,
Asian American males have been viewed as an economic threat and have at
times been seen as sexually threatening. See Kang, supra (the fact that
pervasive racial stereotypes depict Asian American men as effeminate does not
mean "that Asian men were [never] stereotyped as sexual threats to White
women or other menacing threats.").
343. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 577; Petersen, supra note 76, at 122
(describing racist attack on Asian American students in which attackers called
victims "faggots").
344. Ebens and Nitz delivered four blows to Chin's head with baseball bats
and hit him repeatedly. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1253 n.33 (citing
American Citizens for Justice, CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE VINCENT CHIN CASE
TO THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIvISION 3-4 (June 28, 1983)
[hereinafter Confidential Report].
345. SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 177
(1991).
346. Chang, supra note 84, at 1252 n.32 (citing Confidential Report, supra
note 344, at 3).
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tences of three years probation and fines of $3,780. 7 As a
result of political efforts by the Asian American commu-
nity, the United States Department of Justice subsequently
prosecuted the defendants for violating Chin's civil rights.' 8
Ebens was initially convicted and sentenced to twenty-five
years; Nitz was acquitted.49 On appeal, Ebens' conviction
was overturned, and his retrial was held in Cincinnati
Ohio, after a successful motion for a change of venue.350
Ebens was subsequently acquitted. 5'
While the Chin case has been widely analyzed (accu-
rately) as a horrible case of anti-Asian American aggres-
sion, gender and sexuality also informed Chin's victimiza-
tion." In a patriarchal society where masculinity is a
source of privilege,35 men who deviate from or who are
perceived as transgressing from the norm of masculinity
(e.g., gay men or effeminate men), are marginalized and
subordinate. 4 Furthermore, violence is often the instru-
ment through which males can gain masculine status and
exercise control and domination over non-conformist
males.' Moreover, masculinist competition fractures along
347. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990s, at 25 (1992) [hereinafter Civil Rights Issues].
348. Chang, supra note 84, at 1253 (citing Civil Rights Issues, supra note
347, at 25).
349. See id. at 1253 (citing Civil Rights Issues, supra note 347, at 25).
350. See United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing
conviction); United States v. Ebens, 654 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(granting motion for change of venue).
351. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1253 & n.41 (citing Civil Rights Issues,
supra note 347, at 25-26). Several scholars have argued that Ebens was ac-
quitted because Cincinnatti jurors were unfamiliar with the level of anti-Asian
sentiment in Detroit. See Chang, supra note 84, at 1253; Paula C. Johnson, The
Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verite and the
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 402 n.242 (1996).
352. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1189-90 (criticizing traditional approach
that focuses exclusively on racial dimensions of Chin's death).
353. DAvID BUCHBINDER, MASCULINITIES AND IDENTITIES (1994); J.M. Balkin,
The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 261-62 (discussing privileging of
masculinity over femininity).
354. See Balkin, supra note 353, at 2361-62 (arguing that gay men are seen
as marginal because they deviate from norm of masculinity which requires het-
erosexual normativity).
355. See Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of
the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 507 (1991) ("A man who finds the path
of individual achievement to be rough going may try to express his power by
engaging in private violence such as rape or wife-battering. Alternatively, he
may attach himself to a group that pursues power through domination of
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racial lines, and in a white supremacist society, men of color
have been subjected to patriarchal, racial domination.35
This interplay of race, gender and sexual hierarchies ren-
dered Chin vulnerable to attack and explain his victim-
ization."'
Asian American political organizations have responded
vigorously to the violent victimization of Asian American
males, such as Chin. As one commentator has compellingly
argued, Asian American male victimization might actually
serve as the paradigm of Asian American oppression,358 an
observation consistent with the marginalization of feminist
ideology and the oppression of women of color in Asian
American politics generally359 and in other anti-racist con-
texts.
36 0
Although their experiences have been subordinated in
anti-racist and feminist discourse, Asian American women
have also endured a similar history of racist sexualization.
Due to racial exclusions in immigration law36' and the
gendered preferences for Asian male immigrants in the
mid-nineteenth century labor market, 6 the population of
Asian Americans in the United States was gender imbal-
anced during the pre-civil rights eraY.36 Asian American
women, however, like Asian American males, were allowed
to "immigrate" for economic purposes-to meet demand in
the sex industry, serving as prostitutes for both white men
members of other groups.").
356. See id. at 510 ("The notion of white superiority has always expressed
the anxieties of male rivalry.").
357. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1189-90 (explaining Chin's killing as the
result of sexual, gender and racial hierarchies).
358. See Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community
Responses from the Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Com-
munity, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 178 (1996) ("The movement [against anti-Asian
violence] has focused overwhelmingly on male murder victims, even though
Asian American women have also been victims of comparably brutal racially-
motivated killings.").
359. See Cho, supra note 79, at 185 ("[Dlespite the many critical articles
written by Asian Pacific Americans on the model minority stereotype, few have
theorized how it specifically relates to Asian Pacific American women."); Volpp,
supra note 7 (criticizing erasure of Asian American women in anti-racist and
feminist politics and in legal institutions).
360. See generally sources cited supra note 9.
361. See supra p. 90.
362. See id.
363. See Cho, supra note 79, at 183.
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and the skewed population of Asian American males."'
Thus, the forces that led to Asian American female
sexualization were heterosexual in nature: Asian American
women were coveted to satisfy heterosexual male desire. A
plethora of sexual stereotypes soon emerged to describe
Asian American female immigrants, primarily Chinese,
during the early nineteenth century. These stereotypes
combined racial imagery of Asian Americans as "passive"
with gendered and sexualized characterizations consistent
with sexual commodification and exploitation."' Asian
American women were constructed as compliant, sexually
pleasing "lotus-blossoms," on the one hand, while conniving
and sinister "dragon ladies" on the other. 66 The "model
minority myth" solidified white supremacist notions of
Asian American passivity and economic success6 7 and, to-
gether with historically sexualized notions of Asian Amer-
ican female status, led to the saturation of popular culture
with images of Asian American women as docile, servile
and heterosexually submissive.36
364. See OKmIRO, supra note 337, at 67; Cho, supra note 79, at 184 (arguing
that gender inequity among Asian American population "led to importation of
Asian women as prostitutes"); see also Lucie Cheng, Free, Indentured, Enslaved:
Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America, in LABOR IMMIGRATION
UNDER CAPrALISM 402-34 (Lucie Cheng & Edna Bonacich eds., 1984).
365. See Cho, supra note 79, at 184-95.
366. See id. at 185 ("The 'domesticated' lotus-blossom version of Asian
female identity.. .co-existed with the 'foreign' counterpoint known as the
'dragon lady'-a conniving, predatory force who travels as a partner in crime
with members of her own kind."); Renee E. Tajima, Lotus Blossoms Don't Bleed:
Images of Asian Women, in MAKING WAVES, supra note 9, at 309.
367. See supra pp. 91-92.
368. See Cho, supra note 79, at 186 ("Model minority traits of passivity and
submissiveness are intensified and gendered through the stock portrayal of
obedient and servile Asian Pacific women in popular culture."); Wang, supra
note 358, at 176 (discussing "'ultra-femininity myth' which portrays Asian
women as sensual yet submissive"). For an excellent explication of the role of
the "model minority myth" in the sexualization of Asian American women, see
Cho, supra note 79, at 184-95.
One of the most blatant (and notorious) expressions of white supremacist,
patriarchal characterizations of Asian women was penned in the British edition
of Gentlemen's Quarterly magazine. There, Tony Rivers explained his preference
for "Oriental girls":
Her skin colour-ah, that delicious discrimination-and its texture-
lotus-fed, innocent of roses, silky, silky. Her hair-long and black and
shiny, serenely straight.., eyes almond shaped for mystery .... When
you get home from another hard day on the planet, she comes into
existence, removes your clothes, bathes you and walks naked on your
back to relax you .... She doesn't go to assertiveness training classes,
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The development of sexualized racial stereotypes was a
product of and helped to justify the sexual exploitation and
domination of Asian American women and control of Asian
American people through the law. For instance, the por-
trayal of Asian American women as submissive sexual com-
modities led to the enactment of racist and sexist immi-
gration legislation by Congress and western states, the en-
forcement of which further deepened the disparity between
male and female Asian American immigrants."9 The white
supremacist control of Asian American women was also
exercised in the criminal system. For example, while white
and Asian American women engaged in prostitution in
western states during the late nineteenth century, the
latter were arrested in disparate rates,37° a reflection of
anti-Asian biases in the administration of criminal
insist on being treated like a person, fret about her career moves,
wielding her orgasm as a non-negotiable demand .... She's there when
you need shore leave from those angry feminist seas. She's a handy
victim of love or a symbol of the rape of third world nations, a real
trouper.
Tony Rivers, Oriental Girls: The Ultimate Accessory, GENTLEMAN'S Q. (BRITISH
EDITION), Oct. 1990, at 158, 161, 163; see also Michael Small, For Men Who
Want An Old-Fashioned Girl, The Latest Wedding March Is Here Comes The
Mail-Order Bride, PEOPLE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 127. As the Rivers' "article"
indicates, sexualized stereotypes of Asian American women are used to dis-
parage feminist politics. See Cho, supra note 79, at 192 ("Asian American
women are particularly valued in a sexist society because they provide the
antidote to visions of liberated career women who challenge the objectification
of women."); Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion,
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1086-88 (1994)
(discussing how stereotypification of Asian females as "ultra-feminine" and
compliant supports patriarchal social structure).
369. See Act of Mar. 18, 1870, ch. 230, 1870 Cal. Stat. 330 (banning
"importation" of Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian women into California for
prostitution); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (requiring inquiry as to
whether woman was brought into country for "lewd and immoral purposes").
See also Bill Onh Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separation and Conflict in an
Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 898 ("With the
advent of exclusion laws, the Chinese population dropped...."); Chiu, supra
note 368, at 1066 (discussing passage of state and federal legislation targeting
suspected Asian American sex workers); Eddy Meng, Mail-Order Brides: Gilded
Prostitution and the Legal Response, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 232 (1994)
(discussing federal legislation banning immigration of Chinese women per-
ceived to be sex workers and the effect of this legislation on population of Asian
American women).
370. See Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The
Criminalization of Prostitution, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 58 (1995).
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justice."1
The sexualization of Asian American women continues
to legitimate their subordination by private and legal
actors. Poor Asian women, for example, are a primary tar-
get of an exploitative, heterosexual "mail-order bride" in-
dustry, driven by white male eroticization of Asian women
and desire for sexually compliant, non-feminist women.7
Furthermore, the legal system has failed to protect Asian
American women from domestic violence and sexual harass-
ment.373 Many commentators offer a compelling argument
that this lack of protection results from stereotypes of Asian
female sexual passivity, which portray Asian women as ac-
cepting of and consenting to sexual harassment374 and gen-
dered physical abuse.375 Although Asian American feminists
are waging an ongoing battle to include feminist politics
within Asian American studies and political agendas, the
construction of Asian American wo-men as sexual commod-
ities and the resulting oppression and discrimination
caused by this process have been challenged to some degree
by Asian American women's organizations376 and scholars.377
D. Anti-Racist Heteronormativity: Disparities and
Inefficiencies
1. Heteronormativity Revealed: Discriminatory Respon-
ses to Sexualized Racism. As the foregoing discussion de-
monstrates, a history of sexualized (and gendered) racial
oppression has played a central role in the social, economic,
371. The institutionalization of anti-Asian bigotry in the criminal justice
system is captured in the historic case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(invalidating San Francisco ordinance regulating laundry industry upon show-
ing of dramatic racial disparity in its administration).
372. See generally Meng, supra note 369, at 197.
373. See generally Cho, supra note 79 (discussing failure of anti-
discrimination law to remedy sexual harassment against Asian American
women); Volpp, supra note 7 (discussing failure of criminal justice system to
punish perpetrators of domestic violence against Asian American women); Chiu,
supra note 368 (same).
374. See Cho, supra note 79, at 208-11 (suggesting legal reforms to remedy
"racialized sexual harassment" experienced by Asian American women).
375. See Volpp, supra note 7; Chiu, supra note 368.
376. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 79, at 211 n.52 (discussing response by Asian
Americans women's organization to sexual stereotypification).
377. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 79; Chiu, supra note 368; Volpp, supra note 7.
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political and legal oppression of people of color. Consistent
with the inherent goals of any authentic anti-racist agenda,
race theorists and activists have aggressively challenged
this legacy of sexualized racial oppression. Anti-racists,
however, have confined their responses almost exclusively
to those forms of sexualized racial oppression that appear
heterosexual in nature (or which anti-racist activists have
construed as heterosexual victimization). In fact, some anti-
racist scholars have questioned the importance of pursuing
gay and lesbian equality as a broader goal of anti-dis-
crimination law and policy."' The marginalization of anti-
heterosexism within anti-racist theory thus renders anti-
racism internally inconsistent: the forms of sexualized
oppression endured by gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the
transgendered of color remain excluded from anti-racist
discourse, while hetero-sexual victimization enjoys central-
ity.
The disparate anti-racist responses to homophobic and
heterosexual forms of racism perpetuates patterns of social
subordination, a result that is patently inconsistent with
the goals of any liberationist movement. Heteronormativity
in anti-racist discourse creates a discriminatory model of
racial justice in which heterosexual status serves as a
prerequisite for obtaining the advocacy and creative analy-
sis of anti-racist theorists and activists. Heterosexuals are
thus privileged in racial discourse, while gay, lesbian, bisex-
ual and transgendered persons are subordinate. Hetero-
normativity in anti-racist discourse, therefore, compounds
the marginalization of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgen-
dered people of color, who already face racial, class, gender
and heterosexist oppression from the greater society. The
perpetuation of social subordination and privilege by a
"liberatory" movement is clearly contradictory.
The exclusion of anti-heterosexist politics from anti-
378. See supra pp. 45-56, 60-67. Other race theorists who embrace the goals
of gay and lesbian politics may, nevertheless, place some distance between race
and homosexuality, treating the two as related-yet not intertwined concepts.
See supra pp. 67-79. As a result, their work may fail to explicate the racialized
dimensions of gay and lesbian subordination and the impact and implications of
multidimensional oppression on gay and lesbian legal reform efforts. See id.
Nevertheless, the work of these scholars does not produce the negative harms
associated with active dismissal of the injurious nature of heterosexism and the
questioning of the need for gay and lesbian equality that plague the work of
other anti-racist theorists.
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racism becomes even more troubling when one considers
that "heterosexuality" is typically a privileged status. While
heterosexual identity is a source of social power (for persons
of any race), it has also served as a source of subordination
for people of color. 79 If heterosexual status can become
stigmatized and an instrument of racial oppression, then it
is logical and, indeed, likely that gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender identities (which are generally marginalized
social categories) can also serve as sources of racial oppres-
sion and disadvantage.
2. Other Problems Caused by Anti-Racist Heteronorm-
ativity. In addition to rendering anti-racism internally
inconsistent and discriminatory, anti-racist heteronorm-
ativity causes a host of other problems and inadequacies.
First, the failure of anti-racists to challenge heterosexism
conflicts with the inherent purpose of anti-racism-re-
sponding to the many, often subtle, ways in which people of
color are oppressed in a white supremacist society. By
ignoring how the sexualization of race subordinates gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color, anti-
racist activists and theorists permit an entire category of
racial oppression-homophobic racial subordination-to
escape their needed analysis and critique. Thus, contrary to
the inherent goals of anti-racism, a species of racial oppres-
sion remains unchecked (perhaps endorsed38 ) by anti-racist
theorists and activists.38'
Heteronormativity also harms anti-racist politics and
the larger body of progressive political action. On the one
hand, anti-racist heteronormativity divides communities of
color and hinders the formation of coalitions within com-
munities of color to combat racial oppression.382 Hetero-
379. Cf. Jones, supra note 41 (discussing role of maleness as source of
subordination for black men).
380. When anti-racists question the importance of strong anti-heterosexist
laws, their actions may be construed as endorsing or legitimating sexual
subordination.
381. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1332 (arguing that heteronormativity in
critical race theory "disregards the subordination of racial and ethnic minorities
on sexual orientation grounds").
382. See Hutchinson, supra note 24 (making this observation and arguing
that homophobic statements of organizers of Million Man March hindered
collective action by black men); Valdes, supra note 12, at 1332 (arguing that
omission of sexual orientation issues in critical race theory "factionalizes rather
than coalesces progressive intra-group relations").
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normativity may also place anti-racist activists in collusion
with, and provide legitimacy for, conservative political or-
ganizations-organizations that might endorse agendas
contrary to the needs of communities of color.83 In addition,
essentialism-in all social movements-prevents collective
political action across the terrain of socially oppressed
groups. By deploying essentialist politics that deny the
importance of combating all forms of inequality, progressive
social movements often deteriorate into a futile battle of
oppression-ranking, which paralyzes the coalitional
potential."M
Finally, heteronormativity within anti-racist move-
ments (like forms of hegemony within feminism and gay
politics) legitimates the subordination of "other" oppressed
people. By questioning the importance of anti-heterosexist
politics and legal reform for persons of all races, anti-racists
contribute to an oppressive public discourse and ideology
that constructs gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the trans-
gendered as deviant and that justifies their oppression.85
The legitimization of subordination by a progressive move-
ment is (again) patently contradictory.
The last section of this Article makes a final case for
transforming racial discourse from its current hetero-norm-
ative state. This section first considers some of the possible
explanations for heteronormativity in anti-racist discourse
but finds none sufficient to validate the hegemonic nature
of this discourse. This section concludes by discussing how
multidimensionality can help anti-racist theorists and acti-
vists dismantle heteronormativity in racial theories, law
383. See supra pp. 72-74 (discussing how people of color joined conservative
political forces to promote anti-gay agendas); supra note 251 (observing that
arguments by anti-racist theorists mirror those made by explicitly anti-gay
political groups).
384. See PHELAN, supra note 108, at 145 ("If we challenge the grand
narratives of race, class, gender, and sexuality in favor of more local and
specific analyses, we find that our allies are everywhere."); Harris, supra note 4,
at 615 ("The discovery of shared suffering is a connection more illusory than
real; what will truly bring and keep us together is the use of effort and
imagination to root out and examine our differences."); Hutchinson, supra note
2, at 642-43 (arguing that inclusion of anti-racist struggle within gay and
lesbian politics "may help ease tensions between white gays and people of color
as antiracism is no longer viewed as separate from or threatening to gay and
lesbian civil rights").
385. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1332 (arguing that omission of sexual
orientation issues within critical race theory "acquiesces to the perpetuation of
homophobic inhumanity in the name of antiracist liberation!').
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and policy and help foster the progression toward a richer,
more accurate conception of justice.
III. RECONSTRUCTING ANTI-RACISM: FROM
HETERONORMATIVITY TO MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
A. Possible Reasons for Heteronormativity in Anti-Racist
Discourse
Although "raw homophobia" provides a simple explana-
tion for the heternormative nature of anti-racist discourse,
such a reductionist response fails to account for the complex
(and subtle) historical and cultural dimensions of the
problem of heterosexism within anti-racist communities
and in communities of color. While there are several pos-
sible reasons for the marginalization and omission of gay
and lesbian politics in anti-racist discourse, including
homophobia, none of these explanations validates the hege-
monic construction of anti-racist discourse centered around
heterosexual identity. Engaging and confronting these rea-
sons, nevertheless, will likely serve as a necessary element
of any successful effort to move anti-racist discourse toward
a more inclusive model of racial justice.
The exclusion of gay and lesbian politics from anti-
racist discourse may reflect the relative "newness" of the
categories gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people
of color386 and the newly emergent nature of literature
detailing the needs of these communities. Despite the re-
cent arrival of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered
person of color statuses to the topography of socially con-
structed identities, scholars, activists and artists have
already painstakingly demonstrated the existence of homo-
phobic racial oppression,8 7 which implicates issues as
386. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 614 n.225. By describing
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender of color statuses as "new," I do not mean to
suggest that people of color have only recently begun to engage in transgressive
sexual practice. Instead, this description reflects the reality that people of color
have only recently begun to organize politically and socially around their mar-
ginalized sexual identities. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 368-70 (tracing post-civil
rights emergence of black gay and lesbian identity).
387. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 562-63 n.9 (providing extensive list of
literature on the oppression of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people
of color).
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diverse as health care delivery,388 oppressive violence89 and
employment discrimination. The compelling testimony of
these commentators makes a formidable case for the inclu-
sion of pro-gay politics in anti-racist discourse.39'
Anti-racist theorists may also ignore homophobic rac-
ism because they doubt its existence. For instance, one
might easily understand how a society that has a "phobia"92
of black heterosexual males will respond violently to them,
but in a society where gay men are considered "weak," the
use of violent subordination may seem questionable.39Y This
argument, however, ignores the often inconsistent and dy-
namic nature of racism and centralizes black heterosexual
male experience. While society has created the construct of
a sexually threatening black heterosexual male to justify
the control and violent domination of all black men, it has
also used sexual stereotypes that "differ" from the menacing
black heterosexual male construct in order to justify the
oppression of people of color. Women of color and Asian
men, for example, have not typically been portrayed as
sexually threatening; nevertheless, a legacy of sexualized
racial violence has been administered against these
individuals. In addition, the sexual stereotypes of each
particular group of people of color have themselves been
inconsistent: black heterosexual males have been seen as
sexually threatening and as harmless "Uncle Toms";39' black
women have been considered sultry "Jezebels" and
388. See supra pp. 57-58.
389. See supra pp. 17-39.
390. See Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), amended
847 F.2d 1329, different results reached on reh'g 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990) (challenge to military's anti-gay and
lesbian policy by black male); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990) (race discrimination suit by black gay
male involving sexuality-based disparate treatment). For a discussion of the
court's essentialist treatment of race and sexuality in these cases, see Eaton,
supra note 148, at 56-66.
391. See Valdes, supra note 12 (encouraging anti-racist and pro-gay
theorists to respond to the needs of gay and lesbian people of color in light of
emerging race-sexuality critiques).
392. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK N AMERICA (1997).
393. Although I have found no published accounts of this argument, several
law professors have made this point in response to my presentation of the ideas
expressed in this Article.
394. WEST, supra note 140, at 119-20 (describing range of black
stereotypes).
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venerable "mammies";395 Latinas have been constructed as
passionate and promiscuous and religious and passive;...
Latinos have been constructed as "macho" and passionate, 397
yet indolent and docile; 98 Asian American males have been
perceived as conniving and competitive yet asexual and
effeminate;399 finally, Asian American women have been
portrayed as difficult "Dragon Ladies" and as soft and
compliant "lotus blossoms."" Therefore, the possibility that
homophobic racism might not "resemble" other forms of
sexualized racism should neither preclude nor deter the
examination and countering of homophobic racism by anti-
racist theorists.
Heteronormativity in anti-racism may also reflect the
fact that homophobic stereotypes describing gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and the transgendered of color do not seem as
developed as those applied to heterosexuals of color. In fact
many "gay" stereotypes conflict with "racial" stereotypes,"'
implying an "absence" of stereotypes that apply to gays,
lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. Al-
though there is some legitimacy to this basis for the inat-
tention to heterosexism in anti-racist discourse, it ulti-
mately fails as a justification for marginalizing gay and les-
bian politics. First, "heterosexual" racial stereotypes are
often generalized, justifying a host of harms against com-
munities of color irrespective of the sexual identity of the
victims. For instance, the construction of Latino men as
"macho" and aggressive has been invoked in the context of
oppressive homophobic violence to excuse police inattention
to crimes committed against gay people of color. This pro-
cess is revealed in the slaying of Julio Rivera-a poor,
Puerto Rican gay male-by a gang of white supremacist
and homophobic youth.0 2 After Rivera's killing, gay rights
395. See Ammons, supra note 9, at 1049-51 (describing range of black
female stereotypes).
396. See Rivera, supra note 318, at 240 (describing range of Latina
stereotypes).
397. See id.
398. See Lopez, supra note 82, at 31.
399. See supra p. 90-91.
400. See supra p. 94.
401. Perhaps this "conflict" led James Baldwin to describe a black gay man
or woman as a "conundrum to society." See Richard Goldstein, "Go the Way
Your Blood Beats". An Interview with James Baldwin, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN
AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
402. For a detailed account of Rivera's murder, see Alessandra Stanley, The
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activists pressed the police to investigate the crime more
vigorously and to classify it as a "hate crime." Police,
however, denied that Rivera was a victim of a "hate crime"
and instead attempted to portray Rivera as responsible for
his own victimization-labeling the crime as "drug-related,"
a characterization reflective of the stereotypification of poor
Latinos as "criminal."0 3 Because Rivera was a Latino
male-and therefore "macho" and aggressive-the police
could not perceive him as gay (and a victim of homophobic
violence). On the contrary, because he was Latino, male and
poor, Rivera's victimization was more easily dismissed by
the police as a drug offense, a crime undeserving of publi-
city and heightened investigatory efforts. 4 4 Thus, hetero-
sexual stereotypes of people of color may serve as a
prophylactic justification for racist acts regardless of the
sexual identity of the victim and may contribute to the
perpetuation of homophobic racism. Indeed, while specific
racial stereotypes of gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-
gendered persons of color may not be sharply transcribed
into the social structure, statistical data and numerous
reports vividly demonstrate that racism and homophobia
interact to create patterns of particularized victimization
for people of color. Fighting these "patterns" of discrim-
ination is entirely consistent with prevailing anti-racist
thought which focuses extensively on challenging subtle,
implicit, de facto and hidden forms of oppression. °' Thus,
Symbols Spawned by a Killing, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at B1. For a closer
examination of the racial, class and sexuality issues implicated by Rivera's
murder and responses to the murder by police and political activists, see
Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 567-73.
403. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 570-71 (discussing police response to
Rivera's slaying).
404. Police and mainstream gay activists never considered race as a motive
in the case, despite the fact that the youths were members of a white
supremacist organization. Id. at 568-69. A combination of factors likely resulted
in the marginalization of race in responses to Rivera's death; these factors
include the essentialist framing of the crime by white gay and lesbian activists,
the admission of homophobic intent by one of the assailants and the desire of
the police to prevent giving any heightened attention to the crime. See id. at
568-73.
405. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 149 ("Black women can experience
discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those
experienced by white women and black men."). Indeed, it is not clear (or likely)
that all of the victims of heterosexual racial stereotypes actually engaged in
heterosexual practice.
406. See sources cited supra note 54.
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the absence of clearly articulated racist-homophobic stereo-
types should not deter anti-racists from combating the
racial effects of heterosexist subordination. °7
Finally, heteronormativity and intolerance of sexual
diversity among anti-racists and in communities of color
may reflect an attempt by people of color to combat the
painful history of sexualized racial stigmatization and other
forms of discrimination. As Cathy Cohen (looking
specifically at black experiences) has argued, the "system-
atic degradation, stereotyping and stigmatization of Black
Americans has all but dictated that attempts at incor-
poration, integration and assimilation on the part of black
people generally include some degree of proving ourselves
to be 'just as nice as those white folks."'403 Similarly, in
Asian American and Latino and Latina communities,
intolerance of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender ident-
ity may result from the construction of these communities
as "foreign."09 In order to overcome this stereotype hetero-
sexual Asian Americans and Latinos and Latinas may
conservatively police sexuality within their communities,
stigmatizing gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender identity
as undesirable and as inconsistent with a goal of being
accepted by white American society. 10
407. In fact, these patterns may reflect both conscious and "unconscious"
homophobic-racism. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 609 (arguing that common
"racist" and "homophobic" stereotypes may converge and create particularized
effects for people of color).
408. Cohen, supra note 3, at 376; see also Clarke, supra note 141, at 199
(attributing insensitivity towards gays and lesbians in black communities to a
desire "to debunk the racist mythology which says [black] sexuality is
depraved."); Jackie Goldsby, Queen for 307 Days: Looking B(l)ack at Vanessa
Williams and the Sex Wars, in SISTERS, SEXPERTS, QUEERS: BEYOND THE LESBIAN
NATION 121 (Arlene Stein ed., 1993) (arguing that history of stereotypes
concerning black sexuality contributes to silence surrounding issues of sexuality
within black communities); Petersen, supra note 76, at 125 ('The legacy of
slavery (i.e., the desire to keep Black sexuality out of the view of white voyeurs)
may contribute to the silencing and enforced invisibility of lesbians in
contemporary Black communities.").
409. See Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History, 85
CoLuM. L. REv. 1186, 1188 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR
(1983)) ("One of the critical features of legal treatment of other non-whites has
been the inclusion of a notion of 'foreignness' in considering their racial identity
and legal status."); Natsu Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship,
"Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 263
(1997) (discussing "pervasive presumption of 'foreignness' attaching to those of
Asian descent in the United States").
410. This "justification" for heterosexism in communities of color is vividly
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Although white supremacy provides a context for
understanding some of the intolerance of transgressive
sexual identities in communities of color and perhaps for
explaining, in part, the heteronormative nature of anti-
racist discourse, it ultimately fails as a justification for the
exclusion of pro-gay politics in communities of color and
anti-racism.
First, allowing white supremacy to dictate sexual
expression in communities of color and the composition of
anti-racist political agendas and legal theories is in-
consistent with the goals of anti-racist struggle. Indeed,
such a situation actually inscribes white supremacist ideol-
ogy into anti-racist discourse and in the culture of commun-
ities of color. 1' Anti-racist politics should seek to resist,
rather than embrace, white supremacist ideologies.
In addition, even if heteronormativity in anti-racism
represents a response to a history of racist sexual stigma-
tization and exclusion, anti-racists should balance the
"gains" (if any) from this heterosexist response against the
problems caused by essentialism. These problems undoubt-
edly outweigh any "benefit" that anti-racism could obtain
from a heteronormative "compromise" with white suprem-
acy and white homophobia.
demonstrated in the exclusion of SALGA, the South Asian Lesbian and Gay
Association, from participation in New York City's annual India Day parade (a
celebration of Indian Independence Day). In "explaining" the group's exclusion,
Nitin Vora, president of the Federation of Indian Associates (the group
responsible for organizing the parade) stated that "homosexuality" "is not
Indian values... [clertainly that's not to be appreciated. That is not what we
should be showing to the American people." Somni Sengupta, Indian Parade:
Gays Not Allowed, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1995, at A12 (emphasis added). A
feminist group was also excluded. See id. The Supreme Court's decision in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (holding that application of state public accommodation law to force
inclusion of gays and lesbians in private parade violated First Amendment)
effectively bars any claim by SALGA to participate in the parade on civil rights
grounds.
411. See Kendall Thomas, "Ain't Nothing Like the Real Thing": Black
Masculinity, Gay Sexuality, and the Jargon of Authenticity, in REPRESENTING
BLACK MEN 66 (Marcellus Blount & George Cunningham eds., 1996). As
Kendall Thomas has argued:
[Tihe heteronormative vision of racial identity that would exclude the
expression of sexual difference among African-Americans does not
exorcize but rather incorporates the ideology of White supremacy into
the very body of black America, and with it, the phobic conceptions of
black sexuality as such that white supremacy has always insinuated.
Id. at 66.
105
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, a heteronormative response to white
supremacy is discriminatory. Although heterosexual prac-
tice within communities of color has been subjected to
stigmatization and has served as a source of violent
oppression, anti-racism has not responded to this stigma-
tization by excluding heterosexuals from anti-racist politi-
cal activism and theory, nor have communities of color
sought to "closet" heterosexual identity. In fact, hetero-
sexual status operates as a prerequisite for anti-racist
advocacy and, often, for making an "authentic" claim to
"person of color" status.412 Thus, if white supremacy really
explained the heteronormative construction of anti-racist
discourse, one would expect (but, alas, does not see) equal
policing of heterosexual practice in communities of color
and the exclusion of heterosexuals from anti-racist agendas.
The disparate "response" to white supremacist stigmatiz-
ation of sexuality in communities of color suggests that
heterosexism and homophobia are actually central causes of
heteronormative anti-racist politics, rather than fears of
retribution from whites.
Finally, the construction of a heteronormative racial
discourse as a response to white supremacy means that
anti-racists have simply acquiesced in the notion that
heterosexuality is "normal" and homosexuality is "deviant."
If anti-racists were to transcend heterosexist ideology and
recognize the connections between racism and hetero-
sexism, then the terms of racial justice would not require
the subordination and invisibility of gays, lesbians, bisex-
uals and transgendered persons of color. Anti-heterosexism
(and sexual freedom generally) would instead be considered
an integral component of racial justice.413Although I have
412. Cohen, supra note 3, at 379 (arguing that as a result of black
heterosexual policing of black sexuality, "to be a true black man is antithetical
to being gay"); see Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are, supra
note 24, at 4-5 (arguing that homosexuality is often considered a product of
white culture by people of color); Thomas, supra note 411, at 59 (arguing that
heteronormativity in the black community dictates who is "authentically"
black); Sengupta, supra note 410, at A12 (reporting view of Indian American
community activist that homosexuality does not represent "Indian values").
413. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 616 n.231 ("The suppression of sexual
difference to advance purported racial freedom... reflects an essentialist view
that sexuality is separable from and unconnected to racial identity, sub-
ordination and liberation."); cf Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1295 ("Although
collective opposition to racist practice has been and continues to be crucially
important in protecting Black interests, an empowered black feminist
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engaged several possible explanations for the heteronorm-
ative nature of anti-racism, none of these reasons provides
a justification for the continued deployment of hetero-
normative anti-racist legal theories and politics. Whatever
the explanation for the exclusion of gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender equality from anti-racist discourse, the
result remains problematic and indefensible: heteronorm-
ativity in anti-racism leads to legal theories and political
action that marginalize gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-
gendered people of color, conflict with the inherent goals of
anti-racism, cause political fragmentation within and across
socially oppressed groups, and discount and ignore the
sexualization of race in homosexual contexts, thus limiting
the transformative potential of anti-racism. Due to the
numerous inefficiencies, injuries and contradictions assoc-
iated with anti-racist heteronormativity, race theorists
should actively seek to reconstruct their theories in order to
purge them of their sexually hegemonic nature. The final
section of this Article tentatively discusses some of the
immediate implications of a multidmensional anti-racist
legal theory and civil rights regime.
B. Beyond Heteronormativity in Anti-Racist Theory and
Law
1. Reconstructing Anti-Racist Legal Theory. While het-
eronormativity plagues anti-racism in its present form, the
newly emerging race-sexuality critiques of gay and lesbian
legal theory and critical race theory provide alternative and
more accurate equality paradigms that conceptualize racial
oppression and heterosexism as interrelated, rather than as
unconnected and autonomous systems of subordination.
This Article has offered multidimensionality as an instru-
ment for reconstructing anti-racist legal theory beyond its
currently heteronormative nature.414 Multidimensionality
sensibility would require that the terms of unity no longer reflect priorities
premised upon the continued marginalization of Black women."). Other reasons
for anti-racist heteronormativity include the notions that "race" unlike "sexual
identity" is an "immutable characteristic" and that heterosexism does not pro-
duce sufficient injuries to warrant the attention of civil rights scholars. Because
these arguments were addressed in Part II of this Article, I do not repeat them
in this section.
414. See supra Part II.A-1; see also Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 566
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demands that anti-racist and other progressive theorists
seek to uncover the many dimensions and layers of social
inequality and identity categories, realizing that no one
system of oppression ever stands alone.4 Multidimen-
sionality also reveals the troubling disparities that result
when essentialist civil rights theorists reject pleas for the
formation of more inclusive paradigms, while their own
work likely reflects the transparently multidimensional
perspectives of particular classes of individuals (e.g., het-
erosexual men of color or white gay men).416 Anti-racist
scholars should engage this Article and other works within
the growing and compelling race-sexuality corpus, seeking
to explore the many ways in which people of color are
affected by heterosexist subordination and how their own
scholarship marginalizes gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the
transgendered. They should then attempt to reshape their
work so that it no longer deploys a heteronormative
paradigm that subordinates the sexually transgressive. As
the emergent race-sexuality scholarship and the foregoing
analysis demonstrate, heterosexism plays a central role in
the subordination of people of color. Accordingly, anti-racist
theory must embrace gay and lesbian equality in order to
articulate effective and comprehensive challenges to racial
oppression in its various forms and contexts.
2. Reconstructing Civil Rights Law. While this Article
has uncovered the systematic exclusion of anti-heterosexist
(developing "multidimensionality" paradigm in context of gay and lesbian legal
scholarship and political activism); Hutchinson, supra note 24 (using
multidimensionality to examine black political activism).
415. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 640 (explaining possible impact of
multidimensionality on sexual equality discourse).
416. Other race-sexuality scholars have also encouraged the formation of
more inclusive, comprehensive and accurate paradigms for examining the
complexity of social oppression. See Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality:
Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 139-
41 (1994) (offering "holistic" model for recognizing connections between various
forms of oppression); Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics of Identity:
Who Owns the Label "Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 25-28 (1997)
(same); Kwan, supra note 36 (proposing "co-synthesis" as tool for recognizing
connections between various forms of oppression); Valdes, supra note 12, at
1332 (urging critical race theorists to "address and rectify" omission of sexual
orientation issues in their work); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal
Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Interconnectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995) (proposing "interconnectivity" as a model for
recognizing connections between various forms of oppression).
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politics from anti-racist legal theory and political discourse,
the same omission plagues the body of anti-discrimination
law. This section offers some tentative suggestions for ex-
tricating heteronormativity from civil rights law and policy.
Most commonly, anti-heterosexism is marginalized in
anti-discrimination laws when such laws fail to recognize
"sexual identity" as a protected category.417 Sexual identity
remains unprotected in federal civil rights law418 and is a
protected classification in only a few states and municipal
civil rights regimes.419 While anti-discrimination law often
fails to include sexual identity as a protected category, most
civil rights laws prohibit formal racial discrimination. The
failure of anti-discrimination law to combat heterosexist
discrimination-while purporting to provide for racial
equality-means that it subscribes to the same narrow and
heteronormative vision of racial equality offered by anti-
racists. By omitting sexual identity discrimination from civ-
il rights law and treating it as unimportant in judicial opin-
ions, legislatures and courts, in addition to legitimating the
oppression of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgen-
417. Several commentators have noted that a primary limitation on the
application of "intersectionality" in the gay and lesbian context is the non-
recognition of sexual orientation discrimination in civil rights law. See Arriola,
supra note 416, at 128-29 (observing that intersectionality "does not reach
discrimination occurring along intersections of non-traditionally recognized
categories, such as homosexuality"); Valdes, supra note 12, at 1335 ("The
doctrinal experience with race and gender suggests that intersectionality is not
well suited to sexual orientation equality claims because 'sexual orientation
discrimination' is not formally prohibited by federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes."). The particular forms of discrimination-racism and sexism- analyzed
under much of the intersectionality scholarship are recognized in federal and
state civil rights regimes. Thus, the theory does not contemplate the
experiences of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color who
typically do not receive civil rights protection for their sexualized victimization.
Although intersectionality does not contemplate this result, the theory must be
understood as providing a re-conceptualization of oppression, rather than a
mere "doctrinal" critique. See Harris, supra note 208, at 768 ("Crenshaw's
concept of intersectionality brings a postmodernist skepticism about the trans-
parency of language to bear on legal doctrine and social policy. In demanding a
jurisprudence that can recognize women of color as proper legal subjects in
themselves, Crenshaw destabilizes the familiar categories of "race" and
"gender."); see also supra pp. 9-17 (discussing theoretical contributions of
intersectionality scholarship).
418. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1335.
419. Although formal equality, as the experience of women and people of
color demonstrate, does not end social subordination, it is an important step
toward the achievement of that goal.
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dered of all races, offer an essentialist construction of for-
mal racial equality that ignores the reality that racism has
a homophobic dimension and that racism and homophobia
are related systems of oppression.
Furthermore, the failure of civil rights law to provide
for sexual equality may actually provide an incentive for
defendants in discrimination cases to concede "heterosex-
ist," rather than "racial," bias when the surrounding cir-
cumstances of their cases strongly suggest the operation of
"some" discriminatory motivation."' Thus, the current het-
eronormative nature of civil rights law may provide a
loophole that would permit litigants to admit to homophobic
discrimination as a means of escaping liability for racial
discrimination. In such a situation, heteronormativity and
the legal marginalization of gays and lesbians would clearly
permit and legitimate the perpetuation of racial subor-
dination and discrimination.4
The absence of sexual identity as a civil rights category
has other important implications for the achievement of
racial justice. Consider again, for example, the beating of
Loc Minh Truong. Truong's assault was a manifestation of
racial, gendered and homophobic stereotypes. Much of the
evidence of bias in the case, however, was "sexualized."
Despite the sexual coloring of the crime-or the fact that
the evidence had a sexual "hue"-the crime also supported
racial domination. This observation is consistent with the
history of racialized sexual aggression against persons of
color of all sexualities, the surrounding facts of Truong's
assault, and the multidimensionality of oppression. Because
systems of oppression (including oppressive violence) and
social identity categories are multidimensional, evidence of
bias in a particular incident of violence or discrimination
will be multidimensional. Hence, sexual epithets, common
evidence of bias in discrimination and hate crimes cases,4 21
may inflict racial wounds as well as sexual wounds. 23
420. Cf. Valdes, supra note 1, at 136-68 (discussing anti-discrimination
cases in which defendants conceded sexual orientation bias, rather than gender
bias because the former is an unprotected category in civil rights law).
421. See id.
422. See generally Wang, supra note 53, at 50 (discussing use of epithets in
commission of "hate crimes"). In this Article, I take a neutral position on the
constitutionality and efficacy of "hate crimes" statutes. This topic remains
subject to substantial scholarly debate.
423. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 641 (arguing that the word "'gay' may
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Truong's victimization, for example, negatively affected
both gay and lesbian and Asian American communities,
thereby reinforcing both sexual and racial hierarchies.
4 24
Despite the multidimensional nature of oppression, the
sexualized nature of the evidence in the Truong case led
prosecutors and the police to conclude that the crime was
"sexual," dismissing any possibility of "racial" motivation.
While their essentialist conclusions are problematic because
they treat racism and homophobia as separate, the con-
clusions also underscore the importance of including sexual
identity discrimination in civil rights law. Because Truong's
assault was sexually colored-that is, homophobic in ap-
pearance-sexual bias was likely the strongest avenue,
from a litigation standpoint, for pursuing the criminal and
civil cases under the state criminal and civil hate crimes
laws. The sexuality approach, that is, provided for the least
amount of confusion for the police, attorneys and juries that
had to decide "what type" (or types) of bias influenced the
attack.
In the context of Truong's victimization, however, the
particular laws under which the assailants were prosecuted
and subsequently sued included race and sexuality as pro-
tected categories. Thus, Truong's attorney was able to pur-
sue the case as a sexual hate crime and, given the sexual
coloring of the evidence, had a likelihood of securing a ver-
dict against the defendants. If sexual identity had not been
included in the civil hate crimes statute, then Truong's case
would have probably been more difficult to pursue as a
"hate crime"-despite the strong evidence, indeed confes-
sion, of biased motivation. Due to pervasive societal treat-
ment of homophobia as separate from racism, it would
likely have been difficult to convince the jury that the
sexualized and homophobic evidence in fact proved racial
domination. This complicated project-demonstrating to
courts, attorneys, law enforcement and juries the connec-
tion between racism and homophobia-is necessarily a
describe a poor, Latino male, a black, lesbian feminist, or a white, middle-class
male-depending on the context of its usage" because oppression and identity
categories possess "multiple dimensions and contextual layers") (emphasis
supplied); Julie Inness, Going to the Bottom, 9 BERKELEY WOMENS's L.J. 162,
171 (1994) ("When a Black lesbian is called 'dyke,' the word cannot be
understood as directed at her only as a lesbian; her attacker wishes to harm her
because he sees her as a Black lesbian.. .
424. See supra p. 33.
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crucial element of strategies to achieve the legal equality of
sexually transgressive persons of color. Furthermore, in the
absence of sexual identity as a protected civil rights cate-
gory, attorneys have no other choice but to uncover the
racial dimensions of sexualized racial oppression and dis-
crimination targeting persons of color.4 These measures,
however, may not prove sufficient to convince a jury or
court, accustomed to essentialist conceptualizations of op-
pression, to find racial discrimination when evidence ap-
pears homophobic in nature. Hence, a civil rights statute
that fails to recognize "homophobic" discrimination may not
provide an adequate remedy for racism in its homophobic
forms.
426
The statute under which Truong brought his claim,
however, precluded the type of confusion that could result
in situations where the law fails to provide protection for
the various hues and dimensions of racial (or other forms)
of bias. By explicitly including sexual identity as a pro-
tected category, the "hate crimes" statute at issue in the
Truong case provided a remedy for situations in which
evidence of racial motivation is largely sexually colored. 27
425. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1339 ("The development of tools and
techniques that permit and advance transformative legal analysis in light of
sexual orientation's formal vulnerability therefore is one of the key tasks
pending for the second stage of sexual orientation theorizing."). In the Truong
civil suit, for example, the attorney could have taken several steps during
discovery to bring out possible racial elements of the attack, including
questioning the defendants regarding, or otherwise seeking to determine, how
the assailants determined Truong was "gay," if they by-passed white gay
individuals, and if they harbor racial prejudice. The attorney could also have
attempted to construct an argument that a demonstration of homophobic
motivation (which the assailants conceded) could be used to infer racial mo-
tivation, given the psychological data that individuals commonly adhere to
multiple forms of bigotry. The validity of this latter option will probably differ
in the criminal context, where the rights of the defendants are much more
enhanced. Furthermore, the legality of this approach is unclear even in the civil
context. See Freshman, supra note 80, at 250 (discussing use of one form of bias
to prove existence of other forms of bias and noting split among courts
regarding the legitimacy of this practice). For purposes of this Article, I am not
advocating the use of this methodology in the criminal law context.
426. The absence of sexual identity in federal civil rights law has already
affected a race discrimination claim brought by a black gay male. The Court
dismissed the race claim concluding that the evidence seemed "sexual" in
nature, and because sexual identity is not a protected category under federal
law, plaintiff was left without a remedy. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
427. Because heterosexual racial stereotypes and anti-racist attention to
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Thus, civil rights regimes that protect sexual identity (as
well as other disparaged statuses) provide an opportunity
for litigating multidimensional discrimination claims. Only
by vigorously seeking to undo both formal and structural
manifestations of heterosexism, can civil rights law tran-
scend its current heternormative nature and move towards
recognizing the multidimensional harms caused by racism
(and other forms of forms of oppression). The inclusion of
marginalized sexual identity within existing civil rights
laws is an important step toward this end.428
CONCLUSION: THE CRUELTY OF PARTIAL JUSTICE
During the completion of this project, a horrible act of
oppressive violence occurred in the city of Jasper, Texas. On
the night of June 7, 1998, James Byrd Jr., a 49-year-old
black male, accepted a ride from three white males. Byrd,
who was walking home from a social function, was then
beaten and chained to the truck that the men drove and
was dragged for two miles. Byrd's body was later found
dismembered, broken into parts from the impact of the
dragging.49 The three killers were subsequently arrested
and charged with capital murder. Police later found that
Byrd's killers were white supremacists, and the district at-
torney prosecuting the case concluded that the crime was
racially motivated."' On July 6, the three men were indict-
ed on the capital murder charges.431 On February 25, John
William King, the first of Byrd's killers to face a criminal
trial, was convicted and sentenced to death."
heterosexual racial subordination are more inscribed in the social structure
(than are homophobic race stereotypes and anti-racist challenges to homophobic
racism), the sexualized victimization of heterosexual people of color might be
more easily identified as "racial" victimization by judges and juries. Thus, under
the present construction of most civil rights law which include race as a
formally protected category, acts of heterosexual racial discrimination may be
"read" as racial even if they are they are sexually colored.
428. See Valdes, supra note 12, at 1339 (arguing that formal protection for
"sexual orientation" must be secured in order to apply theories such as
"intersectionality" in the context of heterosexist discrimination).
429. See generally Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged in a
Possible Racial Killing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16 [hereinafter Black
Man Fatally Dragged]; Carol Marie Cropper, Town Expresses Sadness and
Horror over Slaying, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at A16.
430. See Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged, supra note 429, at A16.
431. See 3 Indicted in Texas Killing, N.Y. TlIES, July 7, 1998, at A12.
432. See Rick Lyman, Texas Jury Picks Death Sentence in Fatal Dragging of
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Byrd's killing sparked an outpouring of support from
anti-racist organizations and people of color (and whites)
across the country, who appropriately condemned the crime
as a gross act of racial domination.433 Byrd's lynching, a hor-
rible manifestation of white supremacy and the social con-
struction of black maleness as threatening and in need of
violent restraint, serves as a reminder to people of color of
the ongoing need for vigilant responses to racism-in both
its graphic and more subtle (everyday) forms.
As I think of Byrd's killing and the vigorous responses
to the crime by anti-racists and the media, I cannot escape
the temptation to juxtapose these reactions against the
ways in which anti-racists respond to homophobic racism
and to heterosexist domination generally. I try to imagine
how the anti-racist response to Byrd's vicious murder would
have sounded if, instead of offering needed advocacy and
support, anti-racist activists had provided the same battery
of (non)excuses they offer to gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgendered people of color for failing to challenge or to
take seriously the institutions of heterosexist oppression
and homophobic racism.
In order to have conformed their response to Byrd's
death with their reaction to heterosexism, perhaps anti-
racists should have considered if Byrd's chosen "behavior"
left him vulnerable to the attack. Maybe, for instance, Byrd
committed a tragic error by accepting a midnight ride from
three white men driving a truck in rural East Texas; or
perhaps he was "acting black" and somehow provoked the
racist assailants to attack. On the other hand, perhaps anti-
racists should have sought to discover whether blackness is
itself deviant and inferior-that is, to engage the terms of
the racial eugenics movement, refashioned as scholarship
by contemporary writers such as Richard J. Hernstein and
Charles Murray."4 Such an inquiry could determine
a Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al. Only one white person has ever
been executed in Texas for killing a black person. Id.
433. See David Firestone, Speakers Stress Racial Healing at Service for
Dragging Victim, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, § 1, at 20 (reporting responses
from civil rights organizations and black politicians to Byrd's death).
434. See RICHARD J. HERNSTAIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994)
(arguing that race and intelligence are linked). This would be a "fairer" test
than the one posed by Butler in his discussion; Butler did not engage, but
accepted the terms of social theories that declared homosexuality "deviant." See
Butler, supra note 144, at 16.
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whether blackness has an appropriate "metaphor" for civil
rights protection or whether anti-black discrimination is
reasonable or legitimate under "certain circumstances." Or,
maybe a better test to determine whether Byrd's racially
motivated murder qualifies for the attention of anti-racism
would have endeavored to discover whether anything in
Byrd's life embarrassed the black community (or other
persons of color) before whites; if Byrd was anti-assim-
ilationist, for example, then advocating on his behalf might
obscure the path of integration. Finally, perhaps anti-
racists should have inquired into Byrd's sexual practices
and identity, determining whether his sexuality conformed
with the "party line" established by anti-racist discourse.
Transgressions from these requirements would cause his
immediate disqualification from anti-racist activism.435 With
these considerations made and publicly aired, the anti-
racist "powers that be" could then decide whether to protest
Byrd's death or to dismiss it with the ambivalence, con-
fusion, uncertainty and hostility with which they address
homophobic racism affecting gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
the transgendered of color (and heterosexism affecting per-
sons of all races).
On many levels these "imagined" anti-racist responses
to Byrd's killing would have been as cruel as the killing
itself. The search for reasons to justify ambivalence toward
racial suffering and inhumanity in any form is terribly
inconsistent with the goals of anti-racism and of progressive
social change. Yet, these evasive responses to racial and
sexual hierarchy by anti-racists are quite "real" when the
victims of oppressive violence and other forms of domin-
ation are gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered. The het-
eronormative nature of anti-racist political and legal dis-
course creates a troubling litmus test in which "proper" (i.e.,
"heterosexual") sexual identity qualifies people of color for
the advocacy of anti-racist thought and politics. This litmus
test, like racial, gender and sexual hierarchies deployed by
a white supremacist society, harms persons of color and is
435. In a heteronormative society, individuals are presumed to be
heterosexual. Indeed, that the anti-racists did not inquire into Byrd's sexuality
indicates that they "perceived" him as being heterosexual. See Mary Coombs,
Between Women/Between Men: The Significance for Lesbianism of Historical
Understandings of Same-(Male)Sex Sexual Activities, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
241, 255 (1996) ("[Hleterosexuality is both assumed as the natural and normal
form of sexual practice, and assumed away as a subject to be examined.").
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not more legitimate or less destructive because it occurs
within the context of and under the guise of anti-racism.
Heteronormative anti-racism is ultimately a shallow and
"partial justice" that denies the promise of liberation to sex-
ually transgressive persons within communities of color.
This half-empty freedom calls into question the very legi-
timacy of racial liberation as a "progressive" social move-
ment.
The various internal critics of progressive social move-
ments have compiled a formidable array of works that allow
willing scholars and activists to disavow narrow and partial
theories of equality and to replace them with more complete
and inclusive models. While the race-sexuality critiques
have only recently begun to unfold and take shape, these
works, coupled with a history of anti-racist opposition to
sexualized racism, provide ample guidance for ending the
contradictory perpetuation of social subordination within
anti-racist discourse. Thus, the road to transforming and
reconstructing anti-racism from heteronormativity toward a
multidimensional social movement is brightly illuminated
by historical example and the by the ongoing efforts of crit-
ical scholars. By offering multidimensionality as a para-
digm for theorizing equality, I hope to push willing anti-
racists (and other equality theorists) along this vital path of
racial reconstruction.
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